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SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the underlying causes of food insecurity, famine in general and green 
famine in particular in the enset-dominant livelihood zones of Kambata land in southern 
Ethiopia, which are historically considered more resilient and less vulnerable to food insecurity 
and famine than other parts of Ethiopia. Given Ethiopia’s  long-standing history of food 
insecurity and famines, the discourse of food insecurity and famine is dominated by natural 
and demographic factors as the main causes. In order to unpack the multi-layered underlying 
causes of food insecurity in general and green famine in particular, the  thesis  adopts  Sen’s  
analytical framework of ‘entitlement  to  food’. Using multi-site qualitative research techniques, 
this thesis captures the perceptions of different actors at different levels about the causes of 
green famine, identifies the sources of livelihood vulnerability and the types of livelihood 
strategies undertaken by households in the study area. By systematically capturing and 
analysing these different aspects, the study concludes that the causes of green famine extend 
beyond the dominant narratives of drought and population growth, and that these factors 
alone cannot fully explain famine occurrence. Green famine is caused by a web of complex and 
intertwined policy-related,  political,  natural,  socio-­‐economic  and  demographic  factors  that  
have long been present in the study area. 
 
The thesis further investigates how the contemporary understanding and classification of 
famine is dominated by anthropometric and mortality outcomes (‘objective indicators’) and 
thresholds set by outsiders and how ‘subjective  indicators’  such  as the perceptions, 
knowledge, experience and coping strategies of famine victims are undervalued and given less 
weight by ‘famine scales’. By incorporating ‘subjective indicators’ of famine, this thesis 
challenges conventional famine conceptualisation and measurement and recommends that 
these indicators be given equal treatment and weight to ‘objective indicators’ in famine 
classification. 
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Ato   Mr 
Birr   Ethiopian currency 
Bulla Enset based food. It is the best quality food and served for special 
occasions. It can be prepared as bread, porridge and dumpling 
Degga   Higher altitude/highland agro-climate 
Derg Military/socialist regime ruled Ethiopia from 1974-1991 
Equib   Informal local savings institutions 
EPRDF The ruling political party since 1991 and a coalition that consists of 
different regional political parties. 
Fuga One of the Kambata clan that is considered as a lower caste group and 
pursue specialised livelihood activities mainly pottery. But, they also 
involve in tannery, blacksmithing and traditional healing 
Gillalo/belg The short rains from January/February-April in the study area 
Gorro (u) Actual hunger due to food shortages. It is not a seasonal hunger. It can 
last longer 
Gorri doola Years/periods of hunger and famine 
Hammicho(amicho) The underground corm of the enset tree, often consumed boiled  
Kebele (Singular) The lowest administrative unit, below the Woreda/district 
Kabbe/koda Shared animal rearing, resources transfer and crop production 
arrangement 
Kocho/wassa Processed and fermented enset food. It can be prepared and 
consumed as bread 
Massaala/ Meskel One of the most important traditional festivals celebrated in Kambata 
land. It falls on September 27/28 and celebration goes on for more 
than a week. Neighbors pool money together and slaughter a bull and 
share the meat amongst them. Different types of traditional meals and 
drinks are prepared and shared with friends and families 
xvii 
 
Ooja/mehar The long rains from May-September in the study area 
Qolla   Relatively hot and warm agro climate - lowlands 
Rehuuta  Famine related death, a final stage of famine  
Shanno gorru Famine that kills 
Shoomma  A momentary hunger, a feeling for food 
Seera Set of unwritten rules, code of conduct, rituals, practices that all 
members of Kambata ethnic groups practice, respect and adhere in 
their every day life 
Tukul Hamlet 
Udufunne/qa’ane Extreme shortage of food and lack of support from friends and 
patrons. Widespread destitution. It is a famine  
Woreda (singular) A district, equivalent to a county 
Wessho/wesse Enset crop/false banana 
Woina-degaa Mid-altitude land agro-climate 
Yewulle Symptoms of swelling on legs and bellies during famine (nutritional 
Oedema) caused do to lack of protein 
Yewulsanno gorru Famine that causes swelling  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction and background to the study 
 
Ethiopia’s  latest  [2003]  drought-driven famine seems familiar at first: infants with pot-bellies 
suckling the emaciated breasts of mothers too tired to wave away flies crawling across their lips. 
Then you notice that the countryside is lush and green, damp from rain, with cattle and goats 
nibbling the foliage. Take away the fields of banana and pineapple and it could be the Lake 
District (The Guardian, May 2003). 
 
1.1 Research context 
Ethiopia has a long-standing record of food insecurity, hunger and famines of different scales 
and magnitudes (Degefa 2005: 5; Lautze and Maxwell 2007: 223). Historical evidence and 
literature on famine studies indicates that famines in Ethiopia occurred ‘as early as the ninth 
century’ (Mesfin 1984: 31). Since 2011 Ethiopia has been among the top recipients of United 
States government food assistance in the world (Feed the Future 2011: 9). Recent figures 
indicate that in 2012, an estimated 7.5 million chronically food-insecure people are being 
supported through a safety net programme (Ellis and White 2012: 4).  Even today in 2013, 
chronic food insecurity and localised famines have remained a serious challenge and inflict 
severe damage to the lives and livelihoods of millions of people in Ethiopia.  
 
The major famines that struck Ethiopia and received wider international attention were the 
Wollo famine of 1973–74 and the most publicised famine of 1984–85 (Sen 1981: 87; Mesfin 
1984; Dessalegn 1991). The 1984 famine is considered to be the second most severe famine in 
the modern history of Ethiopia. Kumar (1990: 203) cited in Devereux (2000b: 33) claimed that 
‘the estimate of one million deaths would constitute an absolute minimum for the entire 
famine period and the actual figure could turn out to be more than 1½ million’. However, 
Africa Watch (1991: 172) and Dessalegn  (1991: 108) estimated 590,000 and 400,000 deaths 
respectively. Further, Dessalegn suggested, out of 400,000 deaths, an estimated 100,000 
occurred in Wollo province, one of the hardest-hit areas in the country. 
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Historically, the cereal-dominated livelihood zones/areas,1 particularly the northern and 
central highlands of Wollo and Tigray, have suffered from persistent food crises and famines 
over time (Mesfin 1984; Dessalegn 1996; Lautze and Maxwell 2007: 223). It is not a surprise 
that this part of the country has frequently been affected by these incidences in view of the 
region’s  limited  natural  resources; with relatively lower rainfall distribution and a single season 
(mehar2) production system. Given their historical relationship with famine and hunger and 
their political significance, the central and northern highlands of Ethiopia have been a centre 
of attention for famine researchers, policy-makers, humanitarian actors and the government 
(Degefa 2005: 21; Vadala 2008: 14; Lautze et al. 2009: 13). The observation by Lautze and 
Maxwell (2007: 224) neatly captures the existing region-biased famine management 
strategies, responses, and the politics behind them: ‘significant  resources  were  devoted  to  
improved famine early warning systems, focused on the north-eastern highland agriculture 
areas because vulnerability was believed to be the greatest in these areas and/or because it 
was the political heartland of the EPRDF’. 
 
Yet, more recent famines, particularly the famines of 1999–2000 and 2002–03, have received 
less local and international media attention and response than their predecessors. The 
Government of Ethiopia has declined to declare them as a famine despite various studies that 
indicated the food crises had reached famine level (see Salama et al. 2001: 568; Hammond and 
Maxwell 2002: 263; Kaiser 2003; Howe and Devereux 2004; Vadala 2004, 2008). 
 
Most of the southern Ethiopian highlands, known not only for their diverse ethnic 
composition, but also for their agro-ecological and livelihood diversification, remained 
relatively hunger and famine resilient. Even during the 1974 famine that affected most parts of 
the country, ‘the enset growing highlands of Kambata, Sidama and Guraghe did not face the 
famine’ (Dessalegn 1996: 92, 2007: 13). However, since the late 1990s, these formerly resilient 
                                                             
 
1 The Food Economy Group (FEG) 2010: Iii)  defines  a  livelihood  zone  as  ”areas  within  which  households  
(on average) share similar livelihood patterns, i.e. they have access to the same set of food and cash 
income  sources  and  to  the  same  markets”.    For  more, see DRMFSS 2010 and online: http://www.feg-
consulting.com/what/services/early_warning/livelihood-integration-unit-liu. 
 
2 Most of the southern highlands and lowlands of Ethiopia experience bi-modal rainfall patterns. Belg is 
a short rainy season whereas mehar is the longer/main rainy season. 
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livelihood systems have become vulnerable to various shocks resulting from intertwined social, 
economic, political and policy-related factors. The recent famines, particularly the post-
millennium famines, have spread out to larger areas of Ethiopia, including the southern 
highlands and lowlands (Hammond and Maxwell 2002; Lautze et al. 2003; Bevan and 
Pankhurst 2004; Degefa 2005; Lautze and Maxwell 2007). Further, currently the majority of 
the enset-dominant livelihood zones of southern Ethiopia are becoming increasingly 
synonymous  with  the  term  ‘hotspot’  used  by  aid  agencies  and  the  government  due  to  
increasing rates of acute and chronic malnutrition after a single season of rain failure or other 
shocks. As a result of these shocks, periodic and persistent food crises, hunger and famine 
have regularly occurred in these areas (Rami 2003; Anderson and Choularton 2004). 
 
Many scholars and famine experts, including Mesfin (1984), R. Pankhurst (1985), Dessalegn 
(1991), Sen (1991), Webb and Von Braun (1994), Devereux, Sharp and Amare (2003) have 
researched Ethiopian famine paying less attention to the southern Ethiopian highlands and 
lowlands, the pastoral areas of the Borana in Oromia region and Somali regions respectively. 
So far, only a few researches (see, e.g. Walker 1990; Bevan and Pankhurst 2004; Alemayehu 
2001; Ayele 2008) have been conducted in the southern Ethiopian highlands and lowlands 
looking at the causes of recurrent famines. While most attention, resources and responses 
focus on the traditionally famine-prone, but politically important, regions of northern Ethiopia, 
the food crisis is deepening and causing more damage to livelihoods in the south. While policy 
and research focus on the north, the south risks being forgotten and could potentially become 
the next epicentre of a famine (Alemayehu 2001: 10).  The  catch  phrase  ‘green famine’  in  loose  
terms refers to the occurrence and spread of food crises and consequent famines in the 
southern parts of Ethiopia, particularly in enset-dominant livelihood zones. The common 
explanation of the cause of hunger and famine in general, and of green famine in particular, in 
Ethiopia is climate variation manifested through delay or failure of rains, often described as 
drought, population pressure and resultant land shortage. However, a closer look and deeper 
analysis indicate that the underlying causes of green famine go beyond a simple failure of rains 
and drought and land shortage. 
 
Why is there food insecurity and famine in the southern Ethiopia highlands when everything is 
green? Is this a new occurrence or a chronic accumulation of underlying causes? Is it a new 
occurrence or a manifestation of deeper underlying causes? Is it a climatic and seasonality 
phenomenon?  Is it a failure of entitlements? Is there sufficient understanding of the 
underlying causes among the policy-makers, development scholars and other stakeholders to 
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define appropriate and relevant policy responses? The quest for answers to this puzzle and 
paradox continues while green famine continues to evolve. This situation necessitates closer 
examination to establish the causes and the policy responses of the government and policy-
makers. 
 
The magnitude and the intensity of green famine are neither documented nor recorded by 
development and policy researchers in Ethiopia (Alemayehu 2001: 10). There is a clear lacuna 
in famine studies, particularly on the immediate and underlying causes and the scale of green 
famine. Further, the wider impacts of green famine on lives and livelihoods of people has not 
been assessed and documented. Thus, this research aims at filling these gaps and contributing 
to a wider famine theory and policy discourses. 
 
1.2 Research objectives 
The main research objective is to examine the underlying causes of food insecurity in general 
and of the green famine in particular in the southern Ethiopian highlands, specifically in the 
Kambata-Tembaro (K-T) zone.3 The dissertation also captures the perceptions of different 
actors, the sources and trends in vulnerability of rural livelihoods, the local dynamics of green 
famine and how households are coping with the recurrent situation in K-T zone. Furthermore, 
it investigates the role and contribution of government food security policies, strategies and 
programmes in addressing and reducing household vulnerability to food insecurity, and green 
famine in southern Ethiopia. It specifically reviews three selected food security programmes – 
the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), the Other Food Security Programme (OFSP) and 
the Agricultural Extension Service Programme (AESP) – that have been implemented in three 
different time spans over the course of the last two decades. By analysing the causes of green 
famine and identifying its characteristics, this research will contribute towards the debates and 
theories of famine in a wider context. Further, it reviews and critiques how scientific and 
standardised  anthropometric  and  mortality  measurements  of  famine  (as  ‘objective’  indicators)  
have become dominant parameters in defining and categorising famine. By proposing an 
alternative famine scale, the study aims to contribute to the knowledge of famine 
measurement and classification. Finally, it explores how the occurrence of green famine 
challenges the conventional discourse and understanding of the causes of famine in Ethiopia. 
                                                             
 
3 A zone is an administrative unit in Ethiopia above district (woreda) and consists of several districts. 
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1.3 Research questions 
The research attempts to tackle the following questions in order to help understand the 
causality of green famine in southern Ethiopia and support the development of appropriate 
policy responses for the future. 
 
1. What are the explanations for hunger and famine amidst green agro-ecology in the southern 
Ethiopian highlands? 
 What are the underlying causes for the green famine in southern Ethiopia? 
 What other factors (natural, socio-economic and political) contribute to the 
occurrence of green famine? 
 What are the sources of livelihood vulnerability? 
 Which livelihood groups are the most vulnerable and face persistent food insecurity in 
the study area? 
 How does the level of affectedness vary among the different groups/livelihood 
systems? 
2. How does the occurrence of green famine force us to rethink the conventional 
understanding of causes of famine and debates in Ethiopia? 
 What are the characteristics of green famine? 
 What theoretical similarities exist between the causes of green famine and other 
famines that occurred in Ethiopia? 
 How do green famines in Ethiopia force us to reconsider definitions and classification 
scales for famines? 
3. What is the role and contribution of implemented food security policy responses in reducing 
vulnerability to green famine and improving the well-being of the people in Kambata-Tembaro 
(K-T) zone? 
 How effective are the ongoing food security programmes currently implemented in 
the study area? 
 What lessons can be learned for policy responses in the future? 
 What are the institutional arrangements of these policies at the local level and how do 
these affect the implementation of the programmes? 
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1.4 Thesis structure 
This thesis is organised as follows. 
 
Chapter 2 outlines the methodology and empirical data collection techniques employed and 
sources of data that underpin this research. It introduces the study area and provides general 
background on some key features. Further, it presents the fieldwork process, ethical 
considerations, personal reflections and positionality. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the literature review. It discusses a range of concepts and discourses 
pertinent to this research including definitions of famine, famine theory and famine scales and 
measurements and coping strategies.  It also explains the reasons for selection of Sen’s  
analytical  framework  of  ‘entitlement  to  food’ to investigate the causes of food insecurity and 
green famine.  
 
Chapter 4 introduces the central theme of this thesis – green famine. It also presents the 
historical background of green famine in Ethiopian famine history, its progression and current 
status and how different actors perceive it. It also investigates the underlying causes and 
trigger factors of green famine, and its effect on the lives, livelihoods and well-being of people. 
It examines why green famine is not categorised and classified as a famine by the Government 
of Ethiopia and other actors, despite being defined as a famine by victims of famine.  
 
Chapter 5 explores different livelihood types evident in the study area and investigates the 
types of risks and vulnerability factors that are affecting different livelihoods and their trends 
over time. It also investigates which livelihoods are becoming more or less vulnerable to 
different shocks and are susceptible to insecurity and green famine.  
 
Chapter 6 investigates the theoretical and causal similarities and differences between the 1984 
famine and the green famine of 2007–08 in southern Ethiopia. Further, it discusses the current 
discourse around famine mortality and anthropometric outcomes in famine definitions and 
classification and how famine victims’  perceptions  and  understandings  and  locally  defined  
coping strategies are overlooked in famine classification. By proposing an alternative famine 
scale, this chapter determines whether green famine can be classified as a famine or not. 
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Chapter 7 critically  examines  how  the  Ethiopian  government’s  food  security  policies  and  
interventions are playing a role in addressing and reducing household livelihood vulnerability 
to food insecurity and green famine in the study area. After analysing their impact, it provides 
recommendations for future policy formulations in the area to address the issue of growing 
livelihood vulnerability to food insecurity and green famine. 
 
Chapter 8 summarises the findings of the thesis. It looks back at the research questions raised 
at the beginning of the thesis and sees how the empirical evidence presented has answered 
the questions. It also presents the contribution of the study to knowledge and theories of 
famine and famine measurements and concludes by briefly highlighting opportunities for 
future research. 
 
A brief guide to how Ethiopian words and names are used in the thesis 
In order to avoid confusion for readers who are not familiar with Ethiopian names and words, 
this thesis  has  adopted  a  ‘guide’  developed  by  Bahru  and  Pausewang  (2002:  6). See Box 1.1.  
 
Box 1.1: Remarks on Ethiopian words and names 
 
There   is   ‘no   scientific   system  with   exact   rules’   for   representation   of   Amharic   sounds   in   the  
Latin alphabet but, to assist the reader, consistency of transliteration has been imposed. The 
Glossary above provides a list of terms in the national language, Amharic, and Kambatissa, a 
language of the Kambata ethnic group. To avoid confusing the reader with the Amharic plurals 
of words transliterated words are shown in the form -s (woredas, kebeles). There is no 
standardised method for spelling names of places in Ethiopia and it is common to find 
different spellings for the same place – for instance, Kembata, Kembatta or Kambata. Local 
spelling has been maintained in quotations but elsewhere names have been standardised. 
Unlike  conventional  name  rules,  in  Ethiopia,  ‘the  second  name  does  not  denote  a  family  name,  
but the first name of the father; often a third name is added, which is the first name of the 
grandfather’.   It   is   also   common   to   see   some   names   consisting   of   two  words,   for   example,  
Wolde-Selassie, Gebre-Selassie. In such cases, the two words do not indicate two different 
names. Following Ethiopian practice and the logic of names, Ethiopian names are not inverted 
in the references in this thesis. Ethiopians thus appear under their first names in text citations 
and in the list of references. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Methodological underpinnings and introduction to the study area 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methods used to collect empirical data during the field 
study. Further, it presents the fieldwork process, ethical considerations, reflections and 
positionality. Finally, it introduces the study area and provides general background 
information. 
 
2.2 Research methodology  
This research used multi-site qualitative data collection methods (Herriott and Firestone 1993) 
to capture a wide spectrum of perceptions about the causes of green famine at different 
administrative4 and institutional levels. A qualitative approach was chosen because it provides 
a platform for participants to present their ‘perceptions, experiences and knowledge’ about 
issues surrounding green famine and factors affecting their livelihoods over time (Glesne 
1999). In  addition,  the  ‘multi-method nature of qualitative research allows for triangulation of 
different perspectives and helps to gain an in-depth  understanding’  of  green famine, and 
supports the design of a policy response to prevent its occurrence in the future (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2013: 9). Multiple methods were used to collect primary data including semi-
structured interviews with key informants, participatory methods, focus group discussions and 
case  studies  (life  history  interviews).  In  addition,  relevant  ‘grey  literature’,  academic  
publications and government policy documents were reviewed (see Table 2.1). Woreda-level 
survey was undertaken in collaboration with the woreda- and kebele-level actors in one of the 
study woredas in order to capture the trend of prevailing migration of people to Republic of 
South Africa, Middle East and other countries (see Chapter 5).5 
                                                             
 
4 After 1991, Ethiopia adopted a federal system ‘divided along ethnic lines’. According to this structure 
the country was divided into nine regional states and two chartered city-states (Addis Ababa and Dire-
Dawa (see Figure 2.1). The administrative structure and unit is cascaded from the federal to region, 
zone, woreda and kebele (see Kidane (2001: 20) for more on Ethiopia’s  ethnic-based federalism). 
5 Woreda (plural used in this thesis woredas): Amharic name for district. Kebele (plural used in this thesis 
kebeles): the lowest administrative unit, below the woreda. 
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Further, during my stay in the community, I closely observed the overall situation in the area 
to understand what changes (livelihood, social, political, economic etc.) have occurred during 
the time I had been away. I attended different rituals and ceremonies (weddings, funerals, 
festivals), visited market centres and had many ad hoc discussions with people from different 
walks of life. Thus, using a combination of different qualitative data collection methods that 
present perspectives of different actors provided rigour and richness and helped to develop a 
better understanding of the phenomenon of green famine. Table 2.1 summarises the types of 
research methods, sources of information and number of people involved in the research 
process. 
 
Table 2.1: Summary of information sources, research methods and number of respondents 
Sources of information  
 
 
Research methods 
 
 
Total 
number of 
respondents 
participating 
SSI FGD PRA Case 
studies 
Community elders – men  3 3  50 
Community elders – women  3 3  50 
Resilient and non-affected households  3 3  50 
Vulnerable and affected households   3 3  60 
Households with various livelihoods     26 
Development agents     11 
District officials and food security experts     6 
Zone level food security experts     2 
Regional bureaucrats and technical experts     4 
Regional agricultural research centre     2 
Academics from Hawassa and Addis Ababa 
University and Forum for Social Studies (FSS) 
    6 
Federal bureaucrats and technical experts     4 
UN agencies (WFP, FAO, UNOCHA)     3 
Famine experts and senior consultants     3 
Total     277 
 
In total, I conducted 41 semi-structured interviews, in a mix of 12 participatory rural appraisal 
(PRA) exercises and 12 focus group discussions (FGDs) and 26 household case studies (oral 
histories). Respondents for case studies were selected from among the participants of the 
FGDs and PRAs, when it was deemed that they had interesting life stories, relevant to the 
central research questions.  
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2.3 Study area 
The study was conducted in Kambata-Tembaro (K-T) zone in Southern Nations, Nationalities 
and Peoples’  Region  (SNNPR)  of  Ethiopia.  The  SNNPR  is  one  of  the  nine  regional  states  of  the  
Federal Republic of Ethiopia. The region is home to more than 56 ethnic groups with 
distinctive cultures, languages, histories and livelihoods. It borders with Kenya in the south, 
South Sudan in the south-west, Gambela region in the north-west and Oromia region in the 
north-west, north and east (DPPC 2005a) (see Figure 2.1). In July 2012, the region had a total 
area of 105,887 sq. km and a total population of 17.4 million people, which is about 20 per 
cent of the national area and 18 per cent of the country's population (CSA 2012). 
 
The Kambata-Tembaro (K-T) administrative zone6 is located in the north-eastern part of SNNPR 
(DPPC 2005b: 1). It comprises seven woredas, namely Kadida-Gamela, Damboya, Angecha, 
Doyo-Gena, Kacha-Bira, Hadero-Tunto and Tembaro with a total area of 1,356 sq. km (see 
Figure 2.1). According to projected data based on the 2007 national census, the K-T zone total 
population in 2012 was 797,900 people, of which 394,758 were male and 403,142 female. The 
zone is one of the most densely populated areas in the country and region with a crude 
population density of 588.5 people per sq. km, considerably higher than the estimated 
regional average of 164 (CSA 2012). According to the livelihoods classification there are 175 
different livelihood zones in Ethiopia and 40 in SNNPR (DRMFSS 2010). K-T zone covers four 
main livelihood zones: Badewacho-Alaba maize, Hadiya-Kambata cereal and enset (KCE), 
Hadero-ginger and Kedida-Badewacho coffee livelihood zones. The majority of the woredas 
including Angecha, Doyo-Gena and Damboya and parts of Kacha-Bira, Hadero-Tunto, and 
Kadida-Gamela are categorised as ‘Hadiya-Kambata cereal and enset livelihood zone’ (DPPC 
2005b: 1). 
 
K-T zone was selected on the basis of prevailing food crises and as one of the areas repeatedly 
affected by green famine. The study was conducted in three woredas in K-T zone: Kadida-
Gamela, Kacha-Bira and Doyo-Gena (see Figure 2.1). 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
6 Here  ‘zone’  is  used  to  indicate  the  administrative  structure  in  Ethiopia.   
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Figure 2.1: Map of Ethiopia showing the area of study  
 
Source:  Author’s  map. 
 
12 
 
2.4 Sampling process of woredas and kebeles 
As noted above, the study was undertaken in three woredas in K-T zone. The woredas were 
purposely selected but were stratified and sampled based on similar characteristics and 
attributes related to types of livelihood and their strategies, risks and vulnerability factors, and 
previous history of food crises occurrences. Most parts of the three selected woredas fall into 
the Hadiya-Kambata cereal-enset livelihood zone and the majority of households depend on 
enset as a major source of food. These three woredas comprise three major and distinct agro-
ecological zones that represent the study area, namely degga (highland), woina-degaa (mid-
altitude) and qolla (lowlands). 
 
To make the final selection of the woredas the following process was undertaken. Out of a 
total of seven woredas under consideration, two (Tembaro and Hadero-Tunto) were not 
included in the sampling because they have different agro-ecological characteristics and fall 
within the Hadero-Ginger livelihood zone where ginger and coffee are the main sources of 
income  (DPPC 2005b: 1). Following this review the number of woredas was narrowed down to 
five: Kacha-Bira, Kadida-Gamela, Damboya, Angecha and Doyo-Gena; and the indicators were 
taken into consideration for the sampling process and selection included:  
(1) The history of emergency food distributions over the last two decades. 
(2) The size of estimated total population affected by green famine in 2003 and 2007–08 
based on recorded data from the K-T zone early warning and food security 
coordination office (indicated by emergency food ration distribution, number of 
malnourished children admitted to the emergency feeding centres etc.).  
(3) The estimated population that returned to respective woredas after the introduction 
of ethnic-based regionalisation. 
(4) Trends of local and international migration.  
(5) Availability of historical data/information and previous studies on the livelihood and 
food security situations. 
 
In addition to these criteria, the selection of the woredas was also influenced by the familiarity 
of the researcher with the livelihood zone, and personal and professional attachments 
developed over years. I was born, raised and worked in Kacha-Bira and Kadida-Gamela. 
Additionally, as noted earlier, the study sets out to identify the underlying causes of increased 
vulnerability to food insecurity and green famine in the highland areas of southern Ethiopia, so 
the lowland woredas were purposely not chosen. 
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The data for the above five indicators was obtained from K-T zone bureau of Agriculture and 
Rural Development, Health and other relevant offices. For instance, available data indicated 
that during the 2007–08 green famine period the percentage of the population supported 
through the PSNP and emergency relief was 45 per cent in Kadida-Gamela, 44 per cent in 
Kacha-Bira and 30 per cent in Doyo-Gena districts (see Table 5.6). Similarly, quantitative 
evidence indicated that significantly large numbers of population have returned to Kadida-
Gamela district following the ethnic-based decentralisation as compared to other woredas (see 
Chapter 4). Discussions with key informants at K-T zone and woreda levels indicated that 
Kacha-Bira woreda was hardest hit by the 2007–08 green famine, compared to Kadida-Gamela 
and Doyo-Gena woredas. Further, discussion with woreda-level actors in Kadida-Gamela 
indicated that the eucalyptus tree has becoming the most important cash crop and thus its 
production is on an increasing trend. Doyo-Gena district is located next to Hosanna town 
where different actors are involved in facilitating the international migration process and as a 
result many people from the surrounding woredas are using this opportunity to invest in this 
livelihood strategy. Although all three woredas consist of the three distinct agro-ecological 
zones (highland, mid and lowland), the majority of the kebeles in Doyo-Gena woreda fall under 
the highland zone. As a result, it was assumed that the availability of enset is higher and 
subsequently a better food security condition should be present here than in Kacha-Bira and 
Kadida-Gamela. Once the above indicators were explicitly observed and contrasted across the 
five woredas, the three woredas were selected for further investigation. The selection was 
undertaken in a participatory approach involving food and livelihood experts who had a 
deeper understanding of the study area. Table 2.2 summarises some key features of the three 
districts and compares them to regional and national indicators. 
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Table 2.2: Some key features of the study area compared to regional and national indicators 
Key features Woredas SNNP 
Region 
National 
Kacha-Bira Kadida-Gamela Doyo-Gena 
Total area (sq. 
km) 
190 189 131 105,887 1,104,300 
Total population 
(2012) 
117,282 103,028 91,186 17.4 million 8.4 million 
Population 
density (people 
per sq. km) 
(2012) 
616 584 698 164 76 
Average land per 
household (in ha) 
in 2012 
0.25 0.33 0.50 0.75 1.00 
Staple foods  Enset, sweet 
potato, Irish 
potato, taro, 
maize, wheat 
Enset, sweet 
potato, maize 
Irish potato, 
haricot beans 
Enset, wheat, 
potato, barley, 
beans and pea 
  
Sources of cash Coffee, 
eucalyptus, 
ginger and 
livestock sales, 
khat 
Coffee, teff, 
wheat, livestock 
sales and khat 
Wheat, enset 
products and 
livestock sales 
  
Ethnic 
composition 
Kambata Kambata Kambata   
Total PSNP 
beneficiaries 
(2008) 
18,498 15,564 4,671 1,298,981 7.36 million 
Source: DPPC 2005b; CSA 2012; Bevan and Pankhurst 1996. 
 
Similar indicators were considered and sampling techniques applied for the selection of the 
kebeles in all the three study woredas. Each woreda consists of an average of 14 rural kebeles 
and two kebeles per woreda were selected and sampled based on the available data on 
different indicators of food security including: 
(1) The number of PSNP beneficiaries. 
(2) Geographic location and representativeness of the woreda’s  major livelihood groups. 
(3) Number of population targeted and receiving the agricultural extension packages and 
history of emergency relief distributions over the last two decades. 
(4) Level of affectedness by green famine in 2007–08 (indicated by number of children 
and adults admitted to the emergency feeding centres, admission trends of children to 
therapeutic feeding centres during and after 2007–08). 
(5) International migration pattern and assumed remittance flow. 
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Quantitative evidence and other relevant information were collected from different sector 
offices at the woreda level such as the woreda administration council, agriculture and rural 
development and health offices and reports from international non-governmental agencies 
operating in the area. After all the kebeles had been compared and contrasted, two kebeles 
considered most representatives of the main livelihood zone of the woreda and K-T zone were 
selected for further investigation.  As noted earlier, the sampling of community-level research 
participants was undertaken by a participatory rural appraisal (PRA) approach that ensured 
greater engagement of participants in the research process. With support and collaboration 
from development agents, the kebele administration, kebele and community food security 
taskforce members, community representatives were called for a meeting at the central 
location of the Kebele. The representatives were selected from different livelihood groups, 
socio-economic status, education backgrounds, and resettlement and migration history. 
 
2.5 Wealth categorisation and identification of households 
Wealth ranking is an important method of enquiry that helps to identify who is better off or 
poor and vulnerable to food insecurity and to define critical factors contributing to any change 
in a given livelihood context (Chamber 1997; Degefa 2005: 70). In each of the selected kebeles, 
the community representatives consisting of both men and women groups, representing 
diverse livelihoods groups were asked separately to identify local indicators of wealth. 
Different locally applied wealth indicators were discussed and identified by respective groups 
across all the study kebeles. These wealth indicators included: household land size; livestock 
size, composition and ownership (numbers, types of breeds, i.e. local and exotic/hybrid 
breeds, draught oxen and owned, share-raised etc.); enset coverage (both age of enset and 
total size); type of housing (well maintained, grass thatched or corrugated iron roofed); 
number and availability of eucalyptus and coffee trees; main livelihood strategies (seasonal 
labourers, potters, tanners, blacksmiths, mixed agriculturalists); migration history (permanent 
residents, displaced and returnee or household whose member or members migrated to South 
Africa or other countries); socially, economically and culturally marginalised groups (castes, 
orphan and women-headed households); PSNP recipients, and agricultural extension package 
adoption and recognition status (model farmer, champion farmer or not participating  or 
dropped out from the extension package due to various reasons); and visible socio-economic 
indicators (large number of dependents, extravagant, poor saving culture). Once these wealth 
indicators were identified and agreed upon, the participants were asked to divide their village 
community into different wealth categories (See Table 2.3).   
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Table 2.3: Wealth categories and food security indicators in the study area 
Wealth 
group 
Local name Indicators and estimates Food 
security/ 
livelihood 
status 
Rich/ 
(better-
off) 
Duubala/qaba
xxamu 
Livestock size (3 milking cows, pair of oxen, donkey) 
At least 1 exotic breed cow 
Land size (up 8 timad), 1 or more timad rented in 
1–2 timad enset in his backyard (more mature ones) 
Coffee and eucalyptus (up to 1 timad) 
Educated family members. Having additional house in 
nearby town. Has a family member in South Africa or 
elsewhere. Modern residence (corrugated roofed) 
Resilient and 
food secure 
Middle Mererranchu 1-2 milking cows, an ox, sheep/goat, chicken  
Up 4 timad land, Up 250 trees of enset, some coffee and 
eucalyptus trees 
Able to send his children to school and higher education 
Better housing condition 
Food secure, 
but struggle 
when face 
shocks 
Poor Buxxichu Up to 2 timad land, but half of it rented out 
One or more livestock raised on shared arrangement 
Small enset coverage (up 100, only immature) 
1–2 chicken, works as daily labourer, PSNP beneficiary 
Food insecure 
and 
vulnerable 
Destitute Wie’nna  
buxxichu 
No livestock, no enset (except very few and immature at 
his backyard, 1 timad and often rented out 
PSNP beneficiaries, socio-economically vulnerable 
groups such as low caste clan members, displaced and 
returnee households, demobilised soldiers after 1991 
Food insecure 
and 
vulnerable 
Note: Timad is a local unit used to measure the size of farmlands. One timad is approximately 0.25 ha 
and 1 ha is approximately 4 timad. 
Source:  Author’s  fieldwork,  2011. 
 
After this process, the total percentage of the different wealth groups within the total 
population in respective kebeles was established. After the participants completed the wealth 
categorisation process, they were further asked to identify households in their respective 
villages  considered  as  ‘vulnerable  and  affected’  and  ‘resilient  and  less  affected’  by  green 
famine in 2007–08. The list of names of households provided by the participants was 
crosschecked with the list obtained from the kebele and woreda earlier. In each category, 10–
12 households per kebele were sampled representing the broader characteristics of 
households in the kebele for the follow-up questions and discussions (see Table 2.1). The 
identification process helped to define important characteristics and attributes of different 
households such as livelihood groups and social and economic status within the broader 
population in the kebele and study area. The results of the community wealth categorisation 
showed that the majority of resource-poor, vulnerable and green famine affected households 
were drawn from the bottom two wealth categories (poor and destitute) whereas resilient and 
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less affected households were from the top two groups (better-off and middle wealth 
categories) across the three districts.  
 
2.5.1 Agricultural seasonal calendar of the study area 
The study area experiences a bi-modal pattern of rainfall and has a very intricate farming 
calendar that consists of many activities during the year. The gillalo7 (belg), a short rain 
occurring between January/February and March/April, supports the production of short cycle 
crops such as sweet potato, Irish potato maize, haricot beans, taro and different vegetables. As 
can be seen in the seasonal calendar in Figure 2.2, almost all the belg production is consumed 
during the normal lean season that extends from March to July and covers the household food 
consumption needs until the ooja8 (mehar) crops are ready (DPPC 2005b: 2). However, it 
should be noted that the in highland kebeles, the lean season extends until October.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
7 Gillalo is the local name for belg rain in Kambata area. 
8 Ooja is the local name for mehar rains in Kambata area. 
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Figure 2.2: Agricultural seasonal calendar 
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Source:  Author’s  fieldwork,  2011,  and  DPPC  (2005b: 2). 
 
The second – longer – rainy season, mehar, starts in May/June and ends in mid-September or 
early October. During this time the peasant farmers mainly plant teff, wheat, horse beans, 
barley and other food crops normally harvested in October/November depending on the type 
(early/late maturing) and rain performance. Seasonal labour movement takes place at two 
different times from August to November, just after the end of planting mehar crops such as 
teff, wheat, barley and sweet potato for those in highland areas, and between May and June, 
just after the end of belg plantation activities and late September until December in the case 
of mid-altitude and lowland areas of the district. The labour movements are intra-regional and 
some people go to the maize, wheat and chilli pepper producing areas while others go to state 
plantations of sugar cane and agro-processing industries in the Rift Valley region of the country 
to earn additional income (DPPC 2005b: 1- 2). However, since 1991 seasonal labour movement 
has been very limited (Dome et al. (2012: 66). The  latter  is  described  as  ‘circular  migration’  by  
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Ellis (2000) and the migrants could stay for up to half a year depending on the availability of 
jobs and the amount of farm activities and labour needs on their own farm at home. 
 
2.6 Fieldwork 
The fieldwork for this research was undertaken in two phases. The first phase from September 
to December 2010 was an introductory phase while I was based in Ethiopia. In this period, I 
was part of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) team that was commissioned by the World Bank to undertake an impact 
evaluation  of  the  Ethiopian  government’s  PSNP.  Simultaneously,  I  was  pursuing  the  
identification and mapping of important actors at different levels for my research. Being part 
of the team provided me with a unique opportunity to access the gatekeepers of information, 
particularly in the region of interest SNNPR, which otherwise would have been a lengthy and 
negotiated process. I implemented the second phase of my fieldwork from January to 
September 2011. 
 
As noted above, the study was undertaken in three woredas. In each woreda, two kebeles 
were selected for the community-level fieldwork. Prior to accessing communities at the kebele 
level, I visited offices of the Woreda Administration Council and Agriculture and Rural 
Development to present my research permission letter, introduce the research objectives, 
process and select kebeles to undertake the research.  After choosing the kebeles at the 
woreda level, I paid a visit to the kebeles with my research assistant and explained the 
research objectives and purposes to the kebele administrators (the kebele chairperson and the 
manager), members of the Kebele Food Security Task Forces (KFSTFs), Community Food 
Security Task Forces (CFSTFs) and Development Agents (DAs). After the introduction and 
discussion with the kebele actors, community elders (key informants) including both men and 
women were selected, forming separate groups scheduled for a meeting during the following 
week. Before the actual fieldwork, the community-level field instruments were tested and 
revisions were made accordingly. The focus group discussion points and interview questions 
were prepared in English and conducted in Amharic, the official and main language of Ethiopia, 
and Kambatigna, the language of the Kambata ethnic group. As a native speaker of both 
languages, translation was not a problem. However, during the discussions and interviews, I 
had to pay maximum attention to some of the ambiguous concepts and terms of my research 
to ensure that the correct words were clear and conveyed the right meaning and reflected 
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what was intended. In some instances, interviews were conducted in English, particularly with 
expatriate food security and famine experts who were working or had worked in Ethiopia. 
With the key informants of both male and female groups, we conducted various PRA exercises 
such as community wealth ranking, proportional piling and timeline/chronologies to 
understand the main events and changes that had happened in the recent history, as well as 
positive and negative effects on the livelihoods in the area (field instruments are shown in 
Appendix 1). During the community timeline exercise, the green famines of 2003 and 2007–08 
emerged as important events that affected the community in its recent history. Once we 
established a list of events, we followed up with the facilitation of focus group discussions 
around the green famine of 2007–08. After a wealth-ranking exercise, the community elders 
were asked to help identify those households/groups affected by the green famine of 2007–08 
and households considered poor and vulnerable economically and socially within their local 
villages based on locally defined indicators. These indicators are discussed in Table 2.3 above. 
Once the right combination of groups was identified, various activities consisting of PRA 
exercises and FGDs were facilitated, similar to those done with the community elders. 
 
Respondents to household case studies were purposively selected from among the focus 
group participants who were deemed to have relevant and interesting life stories related to 
the central research questions. The description of case study households included households 
whose members were admitted to the emergency feeding centres during the green famine 
time, households who had lost their family members due to the green famine,9 returnee 
households from resettlement sites and other regions since the regime change in 1991, 
households who deployed extreme and irreversible coping strategies, caste groups (see in 
Chapter 6), households with unique livelihood strategies, households who had a member 
migrate to the Republic of South Africa, the Middle East or other places, and PSNP beneficiary 
households. 
 
After completing the kebele-level work, key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted with 
the woreda-level authorities, including the woreda administrators early warning and food 
security experts from the office of agriculture and rural development. The respondents were 
                                                             
 
9 In Kambata culture, it is very shameful to reveal in public that a family member has died due to hunger 
and famine-related causes. Thus the participants had to be encouraged to meet the researcher after the 
session for a one-on-one discussion at their homes. 
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selected based on their experience of work and knowledge in the area of concern in the past 
ten years and before. In addition to interviews with these actors, ad hoc discussions were 
conducted with health and nutrition experts from the woreda offices of health and clinics who 
had first-hand knowledge of green famine. At the zone and regional levels, key informants 
were interviewed with experts on food security and early warnings, agriculture and extension 
services, agronomy and inputs division from the bureaus of agriculture and rural development 
and food security. Further, senior researchers at the regional Agricultural Institute and Areka 
Enset Research Centre, food security experts at the UN and humanitarian agencies, and 
academics at Hawassa University were interviewed. 
 
After completing the community, woreda, zone and regional-level fieldwork, the last phase of 
fieldwork was conducted in the capital, Addis Ababa. Officials were interviewed in government 
agencies (the Food Security Directorate, Livelihoods Integration Unit, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development, Emergency Nutrition Units), academic and research institutions (Addis 
Ababa University and Forum for Social Studies), the UN agencies, and food security and famine 
experts from different aid agencies. Since the research retrospectively interrogates the causes 
of green famine, which is a politically sensitive issue, almost none the government officials 
were open to having a thorough discussion at the capital and regional levels. As a result, it was 
very challenging to arrange interviews. However, flexibility with timing and the use of an 
extended network of friends and colleagues to access these actors was actively explored. In 
contrast, it was very gratifying to have discussions and interviews with experts and academics 
on issues surrounding food security, hunger and famine in southern Ethiopia, which are not 
often talked about within mainstream policy and research in Ethiopia. 
 
All the interviews, household case studies, FGDs and PRA exercises were audio-recorded to 
ensure all relevant information was fully captured. After the transcriptions were completed, all 
the field data was systematically categorised and grouped into different thematic areas 
according to the central research questions. First, preliminary data analysis was undertaken 
during the organising of field notes and the transcription of the recorded information. Further 
comprehensive data analysis was facilitated by adopting a thematic analysis approach to focus 
more on the meanings and contents of the information, rather than counting and quantifying 
the themes (Sayer 1992). However, there were instances where some relevant themes were 
quantified to evaluate how often respondents at different levels gave the same information. 
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2.7 Ethical considerations and reflections on positionality 
As noted earlier, the research was conducted in my birthplace and the surrounding woredas 
where I have worked as a DA at the local level. Being an insider gave me unprecedented access 
to the community and other information I needed to carry out my research. However, having 
such a close relationship to the local context and population also presented some challenges in 
terms of maintaining the right balance, neutrality and level of interaction with respondents. 
Thus, I had to maintain a focus on the objectivity of the work during the entire process. 
 
Further, I have been away from my community for nearly a decade to study and work as a 
development  practitioner  in  different  parts  of  the  world.  Hence,  I  acquired  a  perceived  ‘new  
and  elevated  status’  in  my  community  and  in  the  eyes  of  former  colleagues;  subsequently  the  
power relationship had changed. At the beginning of my fieldwork some local actors, 
particularly the local authorities, considered me as an outsider due to my long absence and 
changed status. However, after explaining and discussing my research objectives and purpose 
for returning to the community, I was able to reconnect with the population and was able to 
conduct my fieldwork with no significant challenges. After a certain level of trust was re-
established, the community members became more comfortable and opened up to discuss 
and share their experiences of hunger, famine and government policies on the ground. 
 
Research ethics require that the researcher must ensure the confidentiality of the research 
participants and protect them from any harm (Laws et al. 2003). In line with this, the research 
was carried out according to the ethical guidelines of the University of Sussex, UK. Prior to 
interviews and discussions, verbal consent was elicited from research participants to record 
their voices. For  individual  case  studies  involving  participants’  who  lost their family member or 
relatives due to the green famine, I applied culturally appropriate and sensitive methods of 
enquiry. 
 
The politics surrounding hunger and famine in Ethiopia are very intense, sensitive and 
complicated. Further, the occurrence of drought-induced food crisis and famine situation in 
the greater Horn of Africa during the time of my field research did not have a positive 
influence on my research. Because of the drought, the livelihood situation particularly in 
southern and south-eastern Ethiopia deteriorated and famine once again became noticeable 
in the media. Thus, unsurprisingly, the majority of the local authorities and senior officials at 
different levels were not comfortable in fully engaging in the research process. However, such 
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problems were managed by repeated attempts to explain my research objectives, and I relied 
on my extended network and insider privileges to acquire critical information without exposing 
informants to any potential harm. In addition, I ensured the confidentiality of respondents, 
particularly those who were affiliated with government offices and policies at various levels, by 
using pseudonyms in my records, and often refraining from audio-recording the discussions to 
avoid any repercussions for them in the future.  
 
The PhD fieldwork experience was a very exciting process and full of learning moments from 
interviews and discussions with people from different background and experiences. However, 
It was also frustrating to witness the sheer disconnect between people who suffer from green 
famine and government authorities and other outside actors. The latter have never 
experienced a famine situation in their life and yet they argue that it is just a food crisis and 
that there is no famine in the area of concern. The level of failure of responsibility is beyond 
comprehension.  Further,  it  was  also  a  challenging  experience:  discussing  households’  
experience of suffering from hunger and green famine and learning the level of suffering they 
had gone through was particularly difficult. Equally, listening to the stories of people who had 
lost their family members and relatives due to green famine was an emotionally draining 
experience. In contrast, it was a remarkable experience to witness the resilience and the 
enterprise of vulnerable people in how they have navigated through the effect of green famine 
by deploying different coping strategies. Living with my family and circle of friends helped me 
immensely to overcome and deal with the situation and successfully complete the fieldwork. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Literature review and analytical framework 
 
Famine victims are not well served by famine theory (Devereux 1993a: 28). 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the literature review of this study. It discusses a range of concepts and 
discourses pertinent to this research including definitions of famine, famine theory and famine 
coping strategies, malnutrition, rural livelihoods resilience and vulnerability and concepts and 
measurements of food security. It also explains the reasons for selection of Sen’s  analytical  
framework  of  ‘entitlement  to  food’ to investigate the causes of food insecurity and green 
famine. 
 
3.2 The concept and definition of famine 
Historical evidence suggests that the existence of famine can be traced back to biblical times 
and humankind has suffered from many dreadful famines since then. As Maxwell (2001: 13) 
noted,  the  ‘biblical  story  of  Joseph’s  encounter  with  the  Pharaoh’  while  he  was  in  exile  in  Egypt  
provides an early recorded incidence of famine. Joseph was summoned to interpret the dream 
of the Pharaoh and, as the bible story narrates, revealed it by foretelling that: 
Behold, there come seven years of great plenty throughout all the land of Egypt; and there shall 
arise after them seven years of famine; and all the plenty shall be forgotten in the land of Egypt; 
and the famine shall consume the land (Genesis 41: 29–30, King James Version). 
 
The story also illustrates how the concept of the modern day ‘food  security  planning’  and 
‘emergency  food  reserve’  (Dessalegn 1991:221; Maxwell 2001: 13) was started based on 
Joseph’s  famine  forecast  as  the  Pharaoh  ordered  his  officers  to  gather  food  all  over  Egypt  and  
store it to be used during famine years (Genesis 41: 34–36). 
 
Despite the fact that remarkable success has been achieved in reducing vulnerability to famine 
and its occurrence in many parts of the world, famine still persists today and looms as large as 
it did centuries ago, particularly in Africa. As recently as 2011, the world witnessed the horror 
of famine in Somalia on TV and online, which depicted emaciated children and adults in their 
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last bid for survival migrating en masse to neighbouring countries. This famine inflicted serious 
damage to the livelihoods of thousands of people and the death of an estimated 244,000–
273,000 people, mostly children (Checchi and Robinson 2013: 10). As Mesfin (1984), de Waal 
(1989), Swift (1993: 1) and Devereux (1993a)  argue,  ‘famine  is  a  preventable  tragedy’  and  
there is enough capacity and resources to eliminate famine globally. However, the occurrence 
of the latest Somalia famine is even more distressing because it happened in an era when 
exchange of information through social media services (Viber, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, 
Skype, Instagram, etc.) is at the fingertips of billions people and the world is more connected 
than ever before.  
 
There is a plethora of academic literature on the definition and causes of famine. However, 
there appears no single and comprehensive definition that all actors agree upon (see, e.g. de 
Waal 1989; Walker 1989; Deng 1999; Edkins 2000; Howe 2002: 20; Lautze et al. 2003). The 
definition of famine has remained a contested ground for multiple actors who are involved in 
famine prevention, response and management including famine scholars. However, for people 
who have experienced dreadful suffering from famine, the concept and definition of famine is 
very clear and they know precisely what hunger and famine entail. De Waal identified the 
existence of a rift in the understanding and definition of famine between the outside actors, 
more  specifically  those  who  use  the  English  term  ‘famine’,  and  insiders  (‘famine  victims  and 
locals  in  Africa’).  The  former  define  and  see  famine  as  ‘starvation/mortality,  whereas  the  latter  
do  not  associate  it  with  starvation  and  mortality’  (de  Waal  1989:  10).  This  raises  a  basic  yet  
legitimate question of ‘whose definition’ is correct and should be counted? Is the difference in 
the conceptualisation of famine between insiders and outsiders a part of the puzzle of why we 
are still witnessing this avoidable tragedy? 
 
In his seminal work Theories of Famine, Devereux (1993a: 10) neatly summarises and classifies 
the definition of famine into five categories. These are: (1) dictionary definitions, (2) 
definitions that consider famine as a result of food availability decline, (3) famine as mass 
starvation definitions, (4) behavioural definitions, and (5) insider definitions. Analysing most of 
the widely available famine definitions, Devereux described the challenges of arriving at a 
simple  and  clear  definition  that  could  be  used  across  all  contexts:  ‘Most attempts to define 
famine merely describe its commonest causes and effects, and the boundaries between 
definition, description and explanations of famine are often  blurred’  (Devereux  1993a:  9-17). 
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The Oxford  Advanced  English  Learner’s  Dictionary  of  Current  English (2013)10 defines famine as 
‘a  lack  of  food  during  a  long  period  of  time  in  a  region’.  This  definition  is  very  simple  and  linear,  
and assumes that famine is an event that takes place when a given region experiences an 
extended period of food shortage. As Devereux (1993a: 10) argues, dictionary definitions of 
famine fall short, because they fail to recognise the dynamics and complexity of social and 
economic livelihood systems in different regions and livelihood zones. Devereux summarises 
that, with the exception of the  insider’s  definition  of  famine,  definitions  tend  to  agree  on  
asserting famine to be a result of food shortage; famine implies starvation and inflicts excess 
mortality on its victims. The most polarising aspects of the concept of famine are related to 
famine mortality and viewing famine as event versus process. 
 
3.2.1 Contested grounds of famine 
3.2.1.1 Famine inflicts excess mortality 
As noted, the conceptualisation of famine remains divided among various actors and is largely 
dominated by a mortality discourse. Notable scholarly works that put forward in this category 
include, among many others, Sen 1981; Cox 1981; Watts 1983; Mesfin 1984; Ó Gráda 2009. 
 
Sen (1981: 40) analysing four different famines in Africa and Asia has advanced the notion of 
famine  mortality:  ‘Famine  is  a  particularly  virulent  form  of  starvation  causing  widespread  
mortality.’  Similarly,  others  have  also  argued  that  famine  inflicts  excess  mortality  on  its  victims.  
For instance, analysing rural vulnerability to famine particularly in the central and northern 
highlands of Ethiopia from 1958 to 1977, Mesfin (1984: 9) defined famine as: 
a general and widespread, prolonged and persistent, extraordinary and insufferable hunger 
lasting for several months and affecting the majority of the rural population over or more or less 
extensive area, resulting in total social and economic disorganization and mass death by 
starvation.  
 
This way of defining famine suffers from some conceptual/ theoretical deficiencies. First, 
defining famine based on area coverage is misleading and could have a serious implication for 
famine response because famine can occur in a smaller geographic area and affect only a small 
                                                             
 
10 Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, [online) Available at 
http://oald8.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/dictionary/famine (Accessed 25 November 2009]. 
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portion of people in a given region or country. Second, only a small section or class of a total 
population suffers from famine and the vulnerability to famine and the level of affectedness 
could significantly vary within the same livelihood and socio-economic groups. Third, the 
causes of mass death are not necessarily related to starvation as will be discussed later in 
more details. Sen (1981: 43) stressed that famine does not affect the majority of population, 
asserting:  ‘While famines involve fairly widespread acute starvation, there is no reason to think 
that it will affect all groups in the famine  affected  nation.’ 
 
Due to the linking of famine with mass mortality, the scale of mortality has become a decisive 
factor in famine classification and responses. By contending the mortality narratives, Edkins 
(2000:  39)  noted,  ‘In  the  modern  view,  famine is widespread starvation; the suffering and 
death of particular individuals is what counts and what is counted. The greatest famines are 
the  ones  where  the  largest  numbers  of  death  occur.’ 
 
As a result, mortality during a given famine situation has remained the strongest indicator and 
prerequisite for denoting a situation as famine. All the definitions above have highlighted that 
there is a strong linkage between famine and mortality. However, different empirical studies 
have refuted this argument and have revealed why famine does not always result in mass 
mortality. For example, de Waal, in his influential work Famine that Kills (1989), differentiated 
famines that kill from those that do not. Based on empirical work in western Sudan among the 
people of Darfur who experienced famine in 1984–85, he tried to dispel the strongly held 
assumption  of  famine  resulting  in  excess  mortality  by  arguing  that  ‘Famine  means,  in  Darfur,  
not merely starvation [and mortality] but also hunger (that is, all manners of suffering), 
destitution,  and  social  breakdown’  (ibid.: 76). He indicated that the cause of mortality during 
the 1984–85 famine was not directly a result of starvation; it was due more to unhygienic and 
overcrowded living conditions and subsequent diseases (see also Young and Jaspars 1995). In 
bringing the perspectives of destitution, suffering and failure of social support into famine 
conceptualisation de Waal challenged the automatic association of famine with mortality. 
Similarly, Young (1992:4) defined famine  as  ‘the  later  stage  of  food  scarcity  when  people  
become destitute and many more than normal die because of the conditions produced by 
famines,  which  encourage  the  spread  of  diseases’. Importantly,  De  Waal’s  work  on  famine  in  
Darfur highlights the views of famine victims who have their own criteria for defining famine.  
 
Despite being challenged for a long time, the mortality discourse of famine still influences 
decisions regarding the classification of famines. However, as we advance into the twenty-first 
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century the applicability of this discourse is becoming more and more limited. Given the 
advances in nutrition and health treatment, logistics and communications, the availability of 
famine early-warning systems and response capacities, present-day famines do not result in 
excess mortalities any more. Thus, unless it is caused by a conflict situation, as in Somalia, it is 
inconceivable that there will be another famine of the magnitude of the 1984 famine in 
Ethiopia, resulting in excess mortality and mass migration of hungry people to relief camps. As 
various famine scholars have advocated for a long time, the conceptualisation of famine 
should  move  away  from  mortality  discourse  and  be  based  on  the  victims’  perspective. 
 
This research will adopt the definitions of both de Waal and Young to analyse how people 
experience and define famine in their lives, how vulnerability develops into destitution and to 
understand better why government and major actors often refrain from using the word 
‘famine’  during  aggravated food crises. 
 
3.2.1.2 Famine  is  ‘a  one-off  event’ 
Broadly, there are two divergent views among different actors involved in famine study, policy 
and decision-making circles (de Waal 1989; Howe 2002: 20; Devereux 2001a; Ó Gráda 2009: 9). 
Some scholars argue that famine is an event that explodes suddenly and affects a segment of 
the community and country at large (Mayer 1975, cited in Howe and Devereux 2004; Sen 
1981). Sen, based on his work on famines in Ethiopia, Bangladesh and the Sahel countries in 
the  1970s,  argued:  ‘A  person  can  be  plunged  into  starvation  if  his/her  endowment  or  
entitlement  to  food  collapses’  (ibid.: 46). 
 
This is a classic example of the view of those who see famine as a one-off event that catches 
people suddenly like a flash flood and causes starvation and death. This conceptualisation fails 
to recognise that before the actual famine, there are always ‘chains of events’ (shocks) that 
occur and weaken the resilience of livelihoods (Howe 2002: 21; Lautze et al. 2003). 
 
The competing school of thought to this view assumes that famine is a process and has 
different distinct phases until it grows to a full-scale famine (Walker 1989; Mesfin 1984; de 
Waal 1989; Dessalegn 1991; Deng 1999). For instance, Rangasami argued that famine is not an 
event per se; it is rather a social process. It builds on vulnerability and grows and matures to a 
full  famine  at  certain  levels.  Rangasami  identified  three  phases  of  the  famine  process:  ‘dearth’  
or  incipient  famine,  ‘famishment’  or  maturing  famine,  and  ‘full-blown’  famine  (Rangasami  
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1993, quoted in Howe and Devereux 2004: 356).  Walker (1989: 6) also challenged the concept 
of famine as an event by arguing that famine  should  be  understood  as  ‘a socio-economic 
process which causes the accelerated destitution of the most vulnerable, marginal and least 
powerful groups in a community, to a point where they can no longer, as a group, maintain a 
sustainable  livelihood.’ 
 
This view is nearer to famine  victims’  own  understanding.  For  people  who  have  experienced 
and suffered from famine it is not a surprising event that occurs unexpectedly. Some famine 
scholars argue that understanding and conceptualising famine as a process has much to offer 
towards the efforts of famine prevention, response and management, while the opposing view 
can significantly limit the efforts. This is because considering famine as a sudden event masks 
the underlying causes of vulnerability and a growing deterioration of livelihoods (Lautze et al. 
2003). Responding only after the famine situation matures and households have adopted 
irreversible coping strategies affects the capacity of livelihoods against current and future 
shocks. Failing to address factors that are making livelihoods vulnerable is treating the 
symptoms of the problem without solving its root causes (de Waal 1989; Howe and Devereux 
2004). 
 
Like considering the defining consequence of famine to be excess mortality, conceptualising 
famine as a one-off event is a conventional and outdated famine discourse (Bevan and 
Pankhurst 2004). As explained in chapters 4 and 6, famine is a process that has distinct phases 
and stages, and communities are aware of its progression and are often ready to deploy 
different  strategies  to  deal  with  the  ‘bad  days’  ahead  of  them. 
 
3.2.1.3 Famine coping strategies 
The literature on famine indicates that during the 1980s and 1990s, a strong research 
emphasis was given towards identification of household coping strategies and their role as 
predictors of impending food crisis and famine situations (Cutler 1986; Longhurst 1986; de 
Waal 1989; Dessalegn 1991; Davies 1993; D. Maxwell 1996). Osmani (1998) noted that in the 
course of hunger and famine, households do not just sit back and wait for external help. They 
fight hard against the situation by employing different types of ‘risk-minimising and coping 
strategies’ to get through the challenging times they face. Coping strategies are defined as 
‘responses and measures undertaken by an individual member or all household members 
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against seasonal or extended food shortages (decline in food supply and access) at household 
and community levels’ (Davies 1996: 45). 
 
Coping strategies are often adopted in ‘a sequenced manner’ (Corbett 1988: 1103; Dessalegn 
1991; Davies 1993; Ayele 2008). For instance, Corbett (1988: 1103-1104) drawing on the 
empirical evidence of household coping strategies adopted during the 1970s and 1980s 
famines in northern Nigeria, northern Ethiopia (Wollo) and Red Sea and West Darfur regions of 
Sudan, noted similar patterns in the sequencing and order of household coping strategies and 
responses to overcome food shortages and famines. Households consider the costs and 
benefits of coping strategies, often starting from easily reversible risk management before 
moving on to irreversible survival strategies (Mesfin 1984; Corbett 1988; de Waal 1989; Walker 
1990; Dessalegn 1991; Devereux 1993b). Coping strategies and adapting strategies are 
different and serve different purposes. As Davies (1996: 59) defined them: 
Coping strategies are the bundle of producer responses to declining food availability and 
entitlements in abnormal seasons or years, while adapting strategies involve a permanent 
change in the mix of ways in which food is acquired, irrespective of the year in question. 
 
As coping strategies are direct actions undertaken by people who face food insecurity or 
famine  (insider’s  experience), they have much to offer in famine conceptualisation and 
classification (Carr 2006: 17). However, many food security and famine writers have expressed 
their scepticism on the role of coping strategies, arguing that coping strategies are not 
sequential, or universal and that they are too diverse (Riely 1991; Davies 1993; Howe and 
Devereux 2004). But recent empirical evidence indicates that coping strategies adopted by 
households in many countries of Africa are categorically similar and sequenced (Walker 1989; 
Dessalegn 1991; Maxwell et al. 2008). Corbett (1988) observed that the type of coping strategy 
could signal the onset and severity of famine. Overall, there is a general understanding that 
coping strategies are critically important in gaining a better understanding of the progression 
and the extent of famine. When households face food shortages, they start adopting different 
coping strategies in an evolving process – from simple and easily reversible to complex and 
irreversible. When all evolving and available coping mechanisms are exhausted, households 
consider that full-scale famine has begun. Coping strategies adopted by households during 
crisis situation are rational and households do not arrive at decisions on deploying irreversible 
strategies easily unless the situation is beyond their capacity because, as Cannon and Müller-
Mahn (2010: 625) and Dessalegn (1991: 1990) argued,  people  ‘behave  culturally’  even  when  
confronting difficult [famine] situations.  
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3.3 Theories of famine causation 
The causes of famine are multidimensional and thus there is not one single theory that fully 
explains why famines occur over time. Thus, there is not a single best prescription that can 
help to prevent further famines from occurring (Devereux 1993a, 2001a). Devereux argued 
that one of the contributing factors for the absence of a single theory of famine is the different 
forms  of  ‘disciplinary  biases  that  are  associated  with  the  theorists  themselves  as  they  tend  to 
reflect and present their own ideology (left, right, liberal), discipline (economist, 
anthropologist,  climatologist,  nutritionist,  demographer,  sociologist)  on  famine’  (Devereux 
1993a: 29). There are four famine theories that explain the occurrence of famine: supply 
failure theories, demographic theory, demand failure theories, and political/policy-oriented 
theories.  
 
The supply failure theorists argue that famine is caused by climatic factors (e.g. drought, 
floods, el Niño)11 and environmental factors including desertification and soil fertility decline, 
and  other  related  factors.  This  group’s  thinking  is  very  linear  in  its  nature,  and  its  central  
argument is that the above factors eventually affect food production. The aggregated decline 
in food supply in a country or region can result in mass starvation and famine. This supply 
failure discourse of famine is still the dominant explanation in the present day, particularly in 
the context of Africa where famine persists. In the case of Ethiopia, which has experienced 
more famines than other countries in sub-Saharan  Africa,  this  discourse  of  ‘drought  famine’  is  
strongly held among the circles of policy-makers and other actors (Mesfin 1984; Lautze et al. 
2003; Degefa 2005, 2006). 
 
Although an aggregate food supply decline could be an important contributing factor in food 
insecurity and famine, this school of thought fails to understand aspects of vulnerability, 
access and other components of complex food systems. As Devereux (1993a: 37) argued, 
‘drought  causes crop failure; but vulnerability to  drought  causes  famine’.   Further, this thinking 
also views famine sufferers as helpless and passive victims of the vagaries of nature. However, 
as the literature on coping strategies shows, when faced with food shortages due to various 
shocks, households do not sit back and wait to starve. Rather, they deploy different coping 
                                                             
 
11 Devereux categorises these  under  the  ‘political  economy  of  famine’  consisting  of  soil  erosion,  
deforestation, overgrazing, overpopulation, colonialism, dependency and self-cropping (1993a: 113). 
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strategies and can access food through different informal networks they have established 
during good and bad times (Longhurst 1986; Corbett 1988; Dessalegn 1991; Davies 1993; D. 
Maxwell 1996). The supply failure theories of famine cannot fully explain the causes of 
famines. Still, they have influenced explanations of green famine. 
 
The second most dominant famine causation theory is the demographic theory. This theory 
was initially advanced by Reverend Thomas Malthus in 1798. After more than two centuries, 
this theory of famine still has a significant influence on the conceptualisation of famine (de 
Waal 1989; Devereux 1993a, 2001a; Lautze et al. 2003: 105; Degefa 2006: 8). The Malthusian 
theory can be categorised as a supply-side theory of famine as it asserts famine as an outcome 
of food shortage. However, given its historical role in the explanation of the causes of famine, 
it is treated in its own right. This  theory  asserts  that  ‘food  production  can  increase  at  most  by  
an arithmetical progression while population simultaneously increases in a geometrical 
progress such that population  growth  outstrips  food  production’.  As  a  result,  
starvation/famine occurs and plays its ‘balancing role’ between the two variables (Devereux 
1993a: 47). The central argument of this theory is that the effect of population growth could 
affect the total output of food production and subsequently causes starvation. The 
applicability of the demographic theory in explaining the causes of famine is insufficient and 
has been successfully challenged on several grounds.  
 
First, population growth actually has a positive effect and can help to increase agricultural 
production through investment in irrigation facilities and research on agriculture and 
biotechnology on improved production techniques and transportation. Despite massive 
growth  of  the  world’s  population  over  the  last  century,  modern  biotechnology  successfully  
introduced high-yielding, disease- and drought-resistant and early-maturing crop varieties and 
advanced farming techniques. The green revolution is a classic example of how most of heavily 
populated and food-deficit Asian countries were able to achieve remarkable food production 
and overcome food shortages and famine by using improved crops such as rice and wheat and 
production techniques. Evidences indicate that ‘when faced with land shortage and a growing 
demand for food at household level, households can opt for farm intensification strategies to 
raise productivity by utilising more labour, improving production techniques and frequent 
cultivation techniques’ (Boserup 1983; Devereux 1993a: 46; Moorehead and Wolmer 2001: 
105). Second, famines do not reduce population growth; evidence suggests that in the 
aftermath of famine, countries have experienced ‘a population-boom’ compared to pre-
famine periods. Further, during famine times the prevalence of mortality is  higher  among  ‘the 
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very young and the very old’. Third, strong and sustained economic growth serves as family 
planning and discourages population growth. As witnessed in Western countries and recently 
in emerging economies, with a higher economic status and improved living standards, 
households tend to opt for small family size (with fewer children) for economic and other 
reasons (Dyson and Ó Gráda 2002 cited in Lautze et al. 2003: 106). 
 
The third important famine causation theory is focused on the demand side or what Devereux 
classifies as economic theories of famine. This group associates the causes of famine mainly 
with a lack of access to food due to poverty, market failures, hoarding and the failure of 
exchange entitlement, rather than with the availability of food as argued by the supply-side 
thinkers. The thinking behind this famine theory has come to the fore of famine debate 
through Sen’s entitlement approach, and has been advanced by many modern-day famine 
thinkers, analysts and development and policy experts globally. Sen challenged the supply-side 
theory by examining four different famines in Asia and Africa and concluded that several 
famines have taken place with no significant decline in food availability per capita. Sen (1981) 
said people face famine not because of food shortage, but because of the failure of their 
different set of entitlements to food. He  defines  entitlements  as  ‘a  key set of alternative 
commodity bundles that a person can command in society using the totality of rights and 
opportunities  that  he  or  she  faces’  (1984: 497). He identified that an individual or a household 
could ensure their entitlement through the following options: production-based, trade-based, 
labour-based and inheritance and transfer-based entitlements (Sen 1981: 2).  
 
However, this theory of famine fails to capture the nexus between politics and famine, and 
how politics shape and contribute to the famine process. Most of the contemporary famines in 
Africa are mainly linked to conflict and violence-generated emergencies (de Waal 1989; Keen 
1994; Duffield and Prendergast 1994; Edkins 2000). It also overlooks the role of humanitarian 
intervention against the incidence of famine in modern times.  
 
The fourth group of famine causation theory departs from both supply-side and demand-side 
thinking, as it focuses on the political and policy determinants of famine. In comparison to 
other famine causation theories,  this  one  is  relatively  new  and  some  scholars  argue  it  is  not  ‘a  
full-fledged  famine  theory’  (Degefa  2005: 69). The central argument is that the majority of 
contemporary and historical famines are the result of political dysfunction, or are politically 
driven  and  often  intended  to  suppress  certain  groups  of  society  to  achieve  political  gain.  ‘Lack  
of  a  functioning  multiparty  democracy’,  and  poor  government  policies,  interventions  and  
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response failures (failure to acknowledge the existence of famine and failure to respond on 
time) are evident. The famine of Ethiopia in 1984–85, the Chinese famine in 1958–62, the 
North Korean famine of 1995–98, and the southern Sudan famine of 1998 are all classic 
examples of how states (often dictatorial regimes) manipulated the context and eventually 
created a famine situation (de Waal 1989; Keen 1994; Deng 1999; Sen 1999: 178; 
Devereux 2001a: 135).  
 
Both de Waal (1997) and Sen (1999) presented a new dimension in the thinking on famine, 
asserting that the causes of contemporary famines in Africa originated from lack of democratic 
governance systems and a failure of political accountability on the part of both national 
governments and international relief organisations. This emerging thinking on famine is 
different from all previous theories of famine causation. However, the democracy thesis of 
famine by Sen has limited applicability and usefulness in famine prevention and management 
particularly in an African context. Despite the claims of most of the current governments’  
political systems in sub-Saharan Africa to be democratic, they are undemocratic democracies. 
For instance, in most famine-prone countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and South 
Sudan, the presence of strong and vibrant civil society organisations, a free press and a 
multiparty system is very weak and non-existent (Bailey 2013: 28). However, despite 
difficulties in enforcement, the ‘anti-famine political contracts’ approach could be applicable 
and help to reduce the occurrence of famine. As argued by Devereux (2007: 7), this emerging 
new thinking on famine brings the three critically important elements in the famine causation 
process – politics, policy and response failure – to the centre of famine debate and analysis. 
 
The conventional narrative and understanding of the cause of famine in general and green 
famine in particular among policy-makers and famine experts in Ethiopia is dominated by the 
supply failure theories of famine. Thus, most policy responses were aimed at increasing 
availability of food at the aggregate level with less focus on diverse livelihood and farming 
systems. The analytical framework of this research is built around the various theories of 
famine. It mainly draws on the  ‘entitlement  approach’  to unravel the causes of food insecurity 
in general and green famine in particular in K-T zone. The entitlement framework (Sen 
1981:154) is chosen because: 
(1) It is comprehensive and identifies several reasons why individuals are prone to, and 
affected by, famine. 
(2) It does not provide a single cause of famine, but rather a general framework of 
analysis (Devereux 1993; Vadala 2004: 16) 
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(3) It draws on social, political and economical perspectives, and explains how famine 
affects only certain segments of the population unable to access their entitlements, as 
opposed to famine affecting the masses whereas others are able to cope. 
 
Further,  Sen’s  entitlement  approach  has  changed  the  long-held view of presenting famine as a 
catastrophic event that affects the masses, to an event affecting certain households and 
specific  livelihood  groups.  According  to  Sen,  ‘starvation  is  the  characteristic  of  some  people  
not  having  enough  food  to  eat’  (Sen  1981:  1).  His  insights  provide  a  framework to investigate 
which livelihood and social groups are more affected by green famine and are more vulnerable 
to different livelihood shocks in the study area. At a wider and national level, this analytical 
framework is particularly relevant in the case of food insecurity and famine study in Ethiopia, 
where the dominant discourse of the causes of food insecurity and famine are explained by 
the supply failure theories of famine. 
 
3.4 Rural livelihood strategies 
Rural livelihoods are diverse and complex. Rural households engage in different forms of 
livelihood strategies both farm-based (on-farm) and outside the farming business (off-farm) to 
make their living, reduce their vulnerability to food insecurity and overcome shocks and 
stresses. As Swift and Hamilton (2001: 90) argued, sustainability is a key quality and measure 
of a successful livelihood  and  food  security  is  ‘an  important  element  of  a  sustainable  
livelihood’. 
 
The Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) has become the centrepiece of rural development 
and food security policy planning and responses. This approach helps to understand better the 
complexity of systems, sources of vulnerability and strategies that people use to make a living 
(Carney et al. 1999). As Scoones (1998: 5) noted, ‘a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope 
with and recover from stresses and shocks, and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, 
while not undermining the natural resources base’. 
 
The state of household livelihood outcomes (sustainable/food secure or vulnerable /food 
insecure) is determined by the interaction of different factors such as household assets/capital 
(natural, economic, human, social, physical), policies, practices and institutions that relate to 
how a household is able to access and utilise them over time (Scoones 1998: 3, Lautze et al. 
2003: 77). Although the overwhelming majority of rural livelihoods in Africa are agriculture-
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oriented, studies have shown that ‘agriculture is not the only, and in many cases not even the 
main, source of food security and income’. Rather, earnings from ‘non-farm activities’ are 
becoming increasingly important sources of income (Swift and Hamilton 2001: 67; Reardon 
1997 (1996), Turner et al. (1993) cited in Carswell 2000: 3). According to Ellis (2000: 15) 
livelihood  diversification  is  ‘a  process  by  which  rural  famines construct a diverse portfolio of 
activities and social support capabilities in their struggle for survival and in order to improve 
their  standard  of  living’.  Livelihood  diversification  process  and  the  outcomes  are  shaped  by  
different endogenous and exogenous factors. For instance, Carswell (2000: 31) in her study in 
Wolita, southern Ethiopia highlighted how an institutional arrangement, particularly an 
informal local savings institution (equb), can mediate the access to resources (finance) for a 
household’s  pursuit  of  livelihood  diversification  by  engaging  in  petty  trade.  By  utilising  their  
capabilities and assets, households are in continuous pursuit of positive livelihood outcomes. 
However, in addition to assets, the existence of a favourable policy environment is a 
prerequisite to attaining and maintaining positive livelihood outcomes. 
 
3.4.1 Concepts of vulnerability and resilience 
Like the causes of famine, the causes of livelihood vulnerability are multidimensional. 
Chambers (1989: 1) defines vulnerability as 
exposure to contingencies and stress, and the difficulty in coping with them. Vulnerability has 
thus two sides: an external side of risks, shocks and stress to which an individual or household is 
subject: and an internal side which is defencelessness, meaning a lack of means [assets] to cope 
without damaging loss. 
 
According to Vaitla et al. (2012: 3), resilience  is  the  ‘ability  of  an  individual,  a  household,  a  
community or an institution to withstand a shock or setback of some type and recover, or 
“bounce  back,”  after  a  setback’.  As  with  vulnerability,  the  resilience  of  a  household  is  
influenced by both endogenous and exogenous factors. 
 
Moser and Holland (1997: 17) associated vulnerability with the level of household asset 
ownership: ‘The more assets people have, the less vulnerable they are; the greater the erosion 
of assets, the greater the level of insecurity’. However, in a complex livelihood system, the 
poor asset level of a household is not the only factor that can determine the level of 
vulnerability of household livelihood to risks and shocks and subsequent food insecurity and 
famine.  In  Sen’s  (1981) analysis,  a  household’s  vulnerability  to  famine  is  a  result  of  a  failure  of  
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different sets of entitlements, individually or concurrently. As a livelihood outcome, 
vulnerability is influenced by different internal and external factors. Lautze et al. (2003: 80) 
argued that ‘the policy environment in general and policy interventions introduced to support 
livelihoods of people in particular could be a source of both resilience and vulnerability’ for 
household livelihoods over time. 
 
As noted above, the Sustainable Livelihood approach has pushed the dimensions of livelihood 
vulnerability and resilience to the centre of food security analysis. In this approach, 
vulnerability  is  considered  both  a  ‘context’  (e.g.  shocks,  trends,  seasonality)  and  a  ‘livelihood  
outcome’,  and  the  term  vulnerability  describes  the  risk-response interactions and the outcome 
(Carney et al. 1999; Alwang et al. 2001: 11). In this context, vulnerability is a more dynamic 
process and forward-looking concept that indicates how the interaction between different 
factors and the outcome can affect the state of livelihood at present and in the long term. 
 
3.4.2 Concepts of food security and food security measurements 
Like famine, food insecurity is a multidimensional phenomenon and manifests in two types, 
chronic and transitory. Chronic food insecurity is caused by structural factors such as weak 
economic growth, bad policies, and poor infrastructure and market systems. In a 
community/livelihood zone where the prevalence of chronic food insecurity is high and 
widespread, the risk of vulnerability to hunger and famine is higher and a single shock can 
push livelihoods over the edge. Thus, successfully ensuring food security in such contexts 
reduces the vulnerability of people to hunger and famine. Transitory food insecurity is more 
short-term, seasonal in nature and triggered by drought, conflict, sudden price changes and 
other factors (Alemayehu 2001: 5; Degefa 2006: 5). 
 
Until the 1980s, discourses on food insecurity presuppose that famine were due to a decline in 
overall food availability. Sen (1981) challenged this view by showing that food insecurity and 
famine can exist while there is an abundance of food. In his work on the evolution of thinking 
about food security, Simon Maxwell (2001: 14) traced how the global view of food security has 
progressed and changed since the 1970s, shifting from ‘global and national food supply, 
towards the issue of household and individual access to food’.  One of the important outcomes 
from the 1996 World Food Summit in Rome was a refined definition of food security as a 
situation ‘when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, 
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safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and 
healthy life’ (FAO 1996: 1). 
 
Similarly, the measurement of food security and the unit of analysis have also seen 
considerable changes over the last 35 years (D. Maxwell 1996). As a result, most of the food 
security measurements include ‘subjective indicators’ that reflect the perception of people 
who experienced food insecurity or are vulnerable to food insecurity along with objective 
indicators (national food balance sheet, consumer expenditure data, daily calorie intake, 
nutrition balance of food sources) (Degefa 2005: 77). There is a caveat in measuring the 
national food balance sheet as it often focuses on cereals only and fails to capture indigenous 
and traditional food sources (often root and tuber crops and other wild foods) consumed by 
households across the world. Further, as noted by Scoones (2007: 318) the national data on 
average  household  food  energy  is  ‘notoriously  unreliable  as  the  national  data  collection  
capacities  of  most  countries  in  Africa  are  weak  and  limited’.  Recently, considerable efforts 
have been made in incorporating the qualitative indicators of food security. For instance, since 
1995,  the  United  States  Department  of  Agriculture  (USDA)  has  developed  a  ‘qualitative’  food  
security module that is used along with the standardised survey to measure the subjective 
indicators (perception and behaviour) of household food insecurity and hunger (Kennedy 
2002: 21). As we enter the twenty-first century, global food security thinking and discourse has 
also progressed further by focusing more on livelihood security. 
 
Similarly, the Coping Strategy Index (CSI) developed by Daniel Maxwell (1996) and ‘reduced 
CSI’ (rCSI) by Maxwell et al. (2008) is another example that indicates the progression in 
thinking on food security measurements and the emergence of qualitative/subjective food 
security indicators in the scene of food security analysis.  The  CSI  measures  ‘the  behaviour  of  
people’,  particularly  how  people  respond  when  their  access  to  food  is  threatened  by  different  
factors. The CSI combines both the frequency and the severity of coping strategies to establish 
the current food insecurity level of a household. The higher the CSI score the more serious the 
food insecurity situation at household level. 
 
Recognition is given to intra-household food distribution and factors that are affecting 
individual food entitlement or real access to food such as gender, age, culture, income/ 
employment status etc. With a rapidly evolving and changing discourse and thinking on global 
food security over time, food security policies and responses have been changing subsequently 
at global and national levels too. In the light of a dynamic and changing thinking about food 
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security, this thesis examines how the food security policies that are in place in Ethiopia reflect 
the changes in thinking and whether they are addressing household vulnerability to food 
insecurity.  
 
3.5 Relationship between food access, malnutrition, morbidity and mortality 
Generally, food insecurity, malnutrition, poor health and disease (morbidity) and prevalence of 
mortality are interlinked. The malnutrition status of a population of a given livelihood zone or 
country is established through undertaking complex and scientific assessment techniques that 
measure a prevalence of wasting or  a  ‘proportion of child population (six months to five years 
old) who are below 80 per cent of the median weight-for-height or below –2 Z-score weight-
for-height’  and  also  known  as  Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) (NCHS, 1977 cited in Howe and 
Devereux 2004: 362). In the same manner, an estimate of mortality rate is established by 
measuring  ‘the  number  of  deaths  that  occur  in  a  population  of  known  size  that  is  at  risk  for  the  
death event during a specific period of time and can be expressed in terms of crude and age-
specific rates (Under Five Years Age) deaths per 10,000 people  per  day’  (Checchi and Roberts 
2005: 2–4) (see more on this in Chapter 6). 
 
As noted earlier, when confronted with chronic or acute food insecurity households respond 
by deploying different coping strategies including reducing consumption, going without food 
for longer than usual and relying more on cheaper and less nutritious food sources, distress 
selling and leasing out their productive assets including land, and others. However, although 
such coping strategies provide a short-term respite and solutions to hunger, they often have 
wider nutritional, social and economic repercussions. Empirical evidences suggest that, for 
instance, relying on less nutritious food sources for a sustained period decreases the balance 
of important micronutrients that are critical for maintaining normal function of the human 
body system. Similarly, cutting back the size of a meal, going without food for longer periods 
and subsequent loss of micronutrients has a negative effect on the overall immune system. 
The cumulative effect of these actions by individuals or communities results in  ‘ weakened 
immune system, increased loss of weight, increased risk of infection to various diseases 
including diarrhoea and increased risk of acute malnutrition  particularly  among  children’  
(Brinkman et al. 2010: 158–59). As Young and Jaspars (2006:  33)  argued,  ‘combined  food  and  
health  crisis  creates  a  high  risk  of  both  malnutrition  and  mortality’.     
 
However, the linkage between food access, malnutrition prevalence, morbidity and mortality 
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is not direct and more complex and as a result it has been and still is subject to controversies 
and contested views and conclusions over time by different actors (Lautze et al. 2003: 138). 
Such a complex and contested relationship between these variables often sends wrong signals 
and has often resulted in formulation of inappropriate policy responses to food insecurity 
(chronic and acute) and famine situations in different settings. Like food insecurity and famine, 
malnutrition is a multidimensional phenomenon and thus calls for an integrated and holistic 
approach to understand the multiple factors that play a role in its occurrence and to design 
effective responses and interventions. The conceptual framework of malnutrition developed 
by UNICEF (1998) for the analysis of nutrition indicates that the underlying causes of 
malnutrition stem from poor access to food, poor public health and inadequate health services 
and inadequate maternal and child care practices. According to this conceptual framework, 
food insecurity is just one of many factors that cause malnutrition and thus cannot sufficiently 
explain it in isolation. Different  studies  have  also  revealed  that  ‘the  risk  of  dying  associated  
with malnutrition' is influenced by different confounding factors such as seasonality, livelihood 
groups (pastoralist vs. sedentary agriculturalist), settlement structure (internally displaced 
persons and refugees in camps versus residents in normal settings), age and demographic 
factors (under five, adolescents, pregnant and lactating women and elderly) and others (de 
Waal 1989; Checchi and Roberts 2005; Young and Jaspars 2009: 54–81). 
 
Similarly, the role of malnutrition prevalence (anthropometric outcomes) as indicators of food 
insecurity and famine situations remains contested on the basis of whether they are early or 
trailing indicators of the situation. For instance, citing the empirical work of Kelly (1992) in the 
1980s in Wollo region of Ethiopia Lautze et al. (2003: 135) contend the role and contribution of 
anthropometric outcomes in famine early warning system as: 
Deterioration in anthropometric status is not a particularly late indicator of acute food insecurity 
and concluded that although nutritional status may be an early indicator of food insecurity in 
some circumstances, this cannot be generalized to all contexts; therefore, nutritional status 
cannot be used to predict famine. 
 
Echoing this perspective, Young and Jaspars (2006: 27) highlighted that the relationship of 
malnutrition status and mortality is not linear but complex, indicating  that  ‘high levels of 
malnutrition can occur without mortality levels exceeding the emergency threshold, and high 
levels of mortality can occur without concomitant increases in the prevalence  of  malnutrition.’  
Various empirical studies in sub-Saharan Africa and other regions prone to food insecurity and 
malnutrition shed light on the complex relationship between food insecurity, malnutrition and 
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mortality. Young and Jaspars (2006: 1, citing Itano 2003) noted  that  ‘in  Southern Africa in 2002 
two years of drought and widespread harvest failure caused acute food insecurity and a 
regional food crisis followed, but there was apparently no widespread malnutrition and 
mortality’.12 By reviewing nutrition and mortality indicators and thresholds that are widely 
used by different actors during emergency and developmental settings include the IPC, Young 
and  Jaspars  (2009:  80)  concluded  that  ‘there is no way of accurately (quantitatively) 
apportioning the relative importance of food, disease and malnutrition in contributing to 
death because of the complex pathways through which this takes place and the synergy 
between  them.’ 
However, despite there being a lot of grey areas and a lack of wider consensus, malnutrition 
rate, particularly GAM, is  widely  regarded  as  a  ‘strong  and  objective  predictor  and  indicator’ of 
the severity and risk of food insecurity and famine situations and thus used to trigger 
responses and advocacy purposes (IPC Global Partners 2008; Young and Jaspars 2009: 19).  As 
de Waal (1989: 31) succinctly captured the growing role of anthropometric outcomes in a 
contemporary famine classification and response:  
The  figures  of  ‘percentage  malnourished’  retains  a  powerful  grip  on  the  perceptions  of  famine  by  
international agencies. An extreme manifestation of this trend is the tendency to define famine 
as’  nutritional  emergency’.  The  development  of  techniques  such  as  nutritional  surveillance  
creates  a  ‘citadel  of  expertise’  (often  inappropriate expertise) which prevents dialogue with lay 
people, including the famine victims. Thus, in contemporary discourses famine has become a 
technical malfunction, not a human experience (emphasis added). 
 
As discussed in chapter 6, due to lack of commonly agreed thresholds of malnutrition different 
actors and agencies use different levels during emergency settings.  
 
 
                                                             
 
12 However, a retrospective study by Devereux and Tiba in Malawi indicated that indeed famine 
situation occurred in 2002 (see more on Devereux and Tiba 2007: 144). 
CHAPTER 4 
Green famine explained: An analysis of its timeline, causes and impacts 
 
Famine has wreaked havoc in Ethiopia for so long; it would be stupid not to be sensitive to the 
risk of such things occurring. But there has not been a famine on our watch – emergencies, but 
no  famines  (‘Meles  Q  and  A’,  Time Magazine, August 2008). 
 
More and  more  famines  are  ‘man  made’,  by  default  if  not  intent,  and  fewer  can  be  attributed  to  
natural catastrophe (Stephen Devereux, Theories of Famine, 1993: 22). 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the concept of green famine, the central theme of this study. By tracing 
the roots of green famine in the famine history of Ethiopia and by defining its causes, the 
chapter aims to situate the concept of green famine within the wider discourse of famine 
causation theory. 
 
Green famine refers to the occurrence and spread of food crises and consequential famines in 
the green and enset-dominant livelihood zones of southern Ethiopia (Alemayehu 2001). As 
discussed previously, these areas are historically food secure, certainly relative to the more 
famine-prone areas of the northern Ethiopian highlands. Despite the fact that green famine is 
widely used in the media and among different actors to describe the state of food crises in the 
southern Ethiopian highlands, there is a general knowledge gap about the historical and 
geographical occurrence of green famine. Some argue that the history of green famine dates 
back to famine times of the late 1970s and early 1980s, whereas others argue that the history 
of green famine goes back to the 1984 famine that affected the larger part of the northern, 
north-eastern and central highlands and lowlands of Ethiopia (Goyder and Goyder 1988; 
Dessalegn 2007).  
 
Section 4.2 presents challenges of famine definitions in the literature and in the official 
discourse in Ethiopia, while Section 4.3 presents local definitions and understanding of famine 
according to famine-affected and non-affected communities in the study area. Further, the 
chapter investigates the historic developments and milestones around the incidence of green 
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famine, in what circumstances it has been applied and how the issue has unfolded and 
affected the lives and livelihoods of people in K-T zone. It also analyses the underlying causes 
and factors that triggered the green famine in 2007–08. 
 
4.2 Challenges of famine conception and definition in Ethiopia 
As noted in Chapter 3, there is no agreed definition for famine. Given the confusion that 
surrounds the term,  politicians  and  aid  officials  often  debate  when  to  employ  ‘famine’  to  
describe a situation of severe suffering that is taking place (Howe 2002; Howe and Devereux 
2004). In particular,  bureaucrats  and  politicians  often  seek  to  avoid  to  use  the  term  ‘famine’  
during  food  crises,  instead  preferring  to  label  these  as  a  ‘humanitarian  emergency’,  ‘food  
crisis’,  ‘livelihood  crisis’  or  ‘near-famine  situation’.  The  key  question  remains, however, of why 
the concept of famine is so contested despite the significant strides that have been made in 
understanding its causes and management?  Reflecting on the 1998 Bahr el Ghazal famine in 
southern Sudan and why different actors failed to declare it earlier, Deng (1999: 6) noted ‘It  
seems that the perception of famine as starvation is most appealing to the Westerners and 
their  media  upon  which  the  voluntary  [humanitarian]  sector  entirely  depends’. 
 
In the context of Ethiopia, particularly among the various actors involved in hunger and famine 
response and policy-making, famine is conventionally understood as an extreme event of food 
crisis that can inflict higher mortality rates (Lautze et al. 2003: 133; Lautze and Maxwell 2007: 
224). As a result of associating famine with higher mortality and absence of widely agreed 
definition of the term, politicians and aid agencies have shied away from using the term to 
describe many crises in Ethiopia where there was great suffering and the loss of lives and 
livelihoods. For instance, comments by the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, 
during the 2003 and 2007–08 events indicate how famine was understood and defined. In 
November 2002, when interviewed by the BBC Africa Programme, Meles said that up to 15 
million people were facing a severe food crisis situation. He warned that unless external 
support was provided, the situation could turn into a famine worse than the  1984  famine:  ‘If  
the 1984 famine was a nightmare, this one will be truly appalling’  (BBC  2002).  Yet,  as  seen  in  
his comment in the opening quotation to Chapter 4, in 2008 the Ethiopian government 
claimed  that  there  was  no  famine  on  their  watch,  only  ‘emergencies’. 
 
Many institutional and major aid actors in Ethiopia have also decided to avoid the use of  
’famine’.  For  example,  the  USAID  Famine  and  Early  Warning  Systems  Network  (FEWS  NET)  
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described  the  unfolding  situation  in  2003  in  Ethiopia  including  southern  Ethiopia  as  ‘pre-
famine conditions’.  The  FEWS  NET  (2003: 5) food security alert stated: 
Without  question,  the  sheer  magnitude  of  Ethiopia’s  2003  emergency food needs appears 
daunting. Yet, unlike the 1984-85 famine, viable institutions such as the DPPC, EFSR and 
Government-donor coordination mechanisms are in place to monitor and analyze food security 
conditions as well as catalyze and coordinate an effective response delivery to the affected 
population. Humanitarian disaster and outright famine can and must be averted through massive 
food aid pledges and deliveries by the Ethiopian government and humanitarian community 
(Emphasis added) 
 
In a similar manner, senior government officials and representatives of UN agencies that I 
interviewed in 2011 offered the following views: 
 
‘The  2003  and  2007–08 food crisis in Southern Ethiopia is one of the worst that the region ever 
experienced. It affected a sizable portion of people across the region particularly poor segments 
of  the  society.  However,  we  can  categorise  it  as  a  near  famine  situation’  (KI_HA/UN-
WFP/03/05/2011).13 
 
‘I  think  overall this green famine issue is exaggerated to me and there is no such a big issue of 
hunger  in  these  areas’  (KI_HA/RG-FSEW/04/05/2011). 
 
‘Well,  it  is  hard  to  categorise  it  [2007-08 green famine] as a famine because the official death rate 
is not known and it is  sort  of  silent’  (KI_AA/FED-FSEW/10/09/2011). 
 
‘There  was  death  of  children  but  I  think  those  who  died  were  those  already  affected  before  the  
emergency  situation’  (KI_KB/WO-FSEW/05/01/2011). 
 
Table 4.1 presents the results of nutrition surveys conducted by four different NGOs – Concern 
(Ireland), World Vision (WVI) (USA), OXFAM (UK) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
(Switzerland) during the 2000 and 2003 green famines in three districts in Wolita zone and two 
of the study districts in K-T zone in southern Ethiopia. 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
13 See Appendix 2 for details of coding system. 
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Table 4.1: Selected nutrition surveys in SNNPR, 2000–2003 
Woreda Agency Date of 
survey 
GAM Z-scores 
(95% CI) 
SAM Z-
scores 
(95% CI) 
Mortality /10,000/day 
CRM U5 
Damot- 
Weyde 
Concern April 2000 25.6%* 4.3% N/A N/A 
Boloso- 
Sore  
OXFAM July 2000 45.1%** 20.4% N/A N/A 
Kacha-
Bira 
WVE May 2000 17.4%*** 
 
2.8% 
 
N/A N/A 
Kadida-
Gamela 
WVE May 2000 17.2%**** 1.3% N/A N/A 
Damot- 
Gale 
MSF April, 
2003 
27.5 %  8.2%  1.1 2.8 
*Thirty randomly selected cluster survey with a sample size of 960 children; **Cluster sampling, 30 
clusters, 901 children screened; ***708 children sampled; ****773 children sampled 
Source: Van der Veen (2000:15) and from the ENCU database 2011a 
 
Table 4.1 shows that the malnutrition rate is extremely high and beyond the 15% GAM 
emergency threshold set by the WHO. Although five districts cannot be considered a fully 
representative sample for the entire region, overall, the results indicated the prevalence of a 
very high level of malnutrition. The results also indicated that the under 5-mortality rate in 
Damot Gale is higher and surpassed the food crisis phase threshold (1-2/10,000/day) used by 
the IPC (see Chapter 5). 
 
The above responses shed light on how famine is a contested notion both conceptually and 
politically. People  in  power  often  shy  away  from  using  the  term  ‘famine’  and reach for 
descriptions that imply the severity of the situation was different, not least because of the 
difficult questions that are raised once it is accepted that a situation is grave enough to be 
categorised  as  a  ‘famine’.  However,  the  difficulty  in using the term contributes to delays in 
response or inappropriate levels of support being given (Howe 2002). In addition to these, I 
argue that other factors contributed to an aversion to the term famine. First, as Howe and 
Devereux (2004:  355)  argued  ‘famine is a more emotive word’ than food crisis or hunger, and 
declaring a situation as famine could have profound political costs and risks both domestically 
and internationally. History shows that, domestically, previous famines played a prominent 
role ‘in regime changes’ in Ethiopia (Lautze and Maxwell 2007: 224, Hampson 2008; Lautze et 
al.2009: 13). Because of such high political risk, the government has a strong incentive to 
downplay the existence of famine by using different terms such as food shortages or 
emergencies. Investigating the trends of famine conditions in various African countries, 
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including Ethiopia, Bailey (2013: 27) pointed out that ‘the political risk of famine is managed 
through  two  somewhat  contradictory  strategies:  prevention  and  denial’. 
 
Second, in the case of Ethiopia, and particularly in the case of green famine, the people who 
suffered from famine were mainly the rural poor who are relatively voiceless compared to the 
urban population, who have access to media and communication means to share their 
situation and ensure they are heard. A lack of credible information and witnessing might 
therefore have contributed to the denial by the government. 
 
Third, the 2007–08 green famine happened at a time when the country was preparing to 
celebrate the Ethiopian New Millennium.14 The ruling party (EPRDF) was widely promoting the 
‘success’ of its policies, particularly accelerated economic growth and agricultural production, 
since it came to power in 1991. Thus, amidst these grand events nationwide, it was in the 
interests of the regime to downplay the significance of green famine. The timing of the green 
famine in 2007–08  has  a  historic  parallel  with  the  1984  famine  in  terms  of  the  government’s  
failure to admit and respond in a timely and appropriate way. Goyder and Goyder (1988: 86) 
and Africa Watch Committee (1991: 169) cited in Lautze et al. (2009: 18) noted: 
Clearly the priority of the Government in September 1984 was that the tenth anniversary of the 
revolution  and  the  founding  of  the  Communist  Workers’  Party  of  Ethiopia  be  celebrated  in  great  
style. Political priorities were paramount and attention and resources became diverted from the 
devastating problems of famine building up in the countryside. 
 
Fourth, regional politics also played a role as the crisis was in the SNNP Region, home to more 
than 45 ethnic groups, whose political influence pales in comparison to the dominance of the 
ethnic groups in northern Ethiopia, which is historically the country’s  famine  belt. A similar 
situation was observed when famine struck Gode district in the pastoralist Somali Region of 
Ethiopia in 2000, where the central government kept silent until the news broke out through 
different media outlets (Salama et al. 2001; Hammond and Maxwell 2002: 263). However, the 
people who were affected and experienced the scourge of famine define famine in their own 
terms as detailed below. 
 
                                                             
 
14 Ethiopia follows the old (Julian) calendar of the Coptic Orthodox church, which is 7 to 8 years behind 
the Gregorian calendar. The New Millennium was celebrated on 11 September 2007. 
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4.3 Definition of hunger and famine according to different community groups 
Historical evidence indicates that Kambata was ‘an independent kingdom until Menelik II 
annexed it in 1892 into the Ethiopian empire’ (Braukämper 1983, cited in Belachew 2001: 132). 
Currently, the Kambata people are one of the major ethnic groups in southern Ethiopia. 
Kambata is located in the north-eastern part of the SNNPR. The total population of Kambata in 
2008 was estimated to be 611,674 (BoFED 2011). However, although official data is lacking, 
many Kambata people reside in different parts of the country and abroad, mainly in Republic 
of South Africa. Kambatigna/Kambatisa is the main language of the Kambata people and it falls 
under the wider Highland East Cushitic group language. Amharic is the official working 
language of the K-T zone. In addition, different languages of neighbouring ethnic groups such 
as Hadiyigna and Wolitigna are widely spoken in the area (Wolde-Selassie 2001: 61; Yacob 
2002: 45). 
 
Discussions with four categories of community groups across the three districts show that 
there  is  a  common  understanding  and  agreement  on  the  definition  of  hunger  as  ‘food  
shortage’, that is due to various factors affecting agricultural production (production-based 
entitlement failure) and access to food (See Table 4.2). However, households affected by 
famine and those who were unaffected define hunger differently. Affected households who 
are generally from a poor socio-economic background view hunger not only as a shortage of 
food. As participants in a FGD with affected households in one of the study kebeles explained, 
hunger  is  ‘a  suffering  that  emerges  from  food  shortage  and  as  a  result  it  affects  the  physical  
appearance  of  victims’ (FG_KG/VCG-TG/02/03/2011).  
 
In contrast, for the non-affected households, hunger is when their own production cannot 
cover their food needs and as a result they spend some days with too little food, or no food.  
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Table 4.2: Definitions of hunger according to different community groups 
Category of 
respondents 
Summarised definitions of hunger 
Affected households Physical weakness as a result of shortage of food due to production failure and 
market price increase 
‘mexxuru chamaenorru  bechooda  gorru  yinaam.’ (‘When  there  is  nothing  to  
taste, we call it hunger’)   
Unable to eat your meal when you want due to shortage, lack of access and 
being dependent on unusual food  
Non-affected 
households 
When the food that is produced from own production cannot cover the food 
need of a household and as a result they spend some days with little food 
Community elders: 
men 
A localised food shortage that affects mostly the poor and destitute 
households in the community 
Community elders: 
women 
A food shortage at both home/own production and market. The reason is 
poverty/scarcity  ’gorru bachoo’ 
It is just having enset all the time as a food without complements such as milk, 
milk products or different sauces 
Source: Author’s  fieldwork,  2011. 
 
A participant in a focus group discussion with elder women explained that hunger is a situation 
where no diverse food options are available and when they are forced to consume only enset-
based foods such as kocho15 bread, hammicho, and different dishes prepared from it. Despite 
being an important staple food and having a very strong cultural value among the Kambata 
people, during normal periods, enset-based foods are not consumed alone and at every 
mealtime. Enset is served and consumed with different sauces and dishes. Hence, when such 
options are not available, they consider the situation as hunger. 
 
Kambata people see famine as a more complex process that often persists for months as the 
affected people continue to suffer silently and slowly. They only define a food crisis and 
hunger as famine after certain successive stages have taken place and clear indicators are 
manifested. According to the Kambata elders who were consulted during the field research 
and in other ad hoc conversations, it appears that famine is a sequential process, and hence 
there are a series of stages that take place before the actual famine happens. The first phase 
of hunger is called shoomma, a desire or feeling that one experiences if one skips a meal due 
to various reasons. This feeling disappears upon having a meal and this stage is different from 
normal hunger. During the onset of the hunger season, this shoomma is very commonly 
                                                             
 
15 Kocho is a fermented and processed enset-based food consumed in the form of bread or other forms. 
Hammicho is the underground corm of enset usually consumed boiled with milk or yogurt (see Brandt et 
al. 1997: 11) 
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experienced and people endure it by having a small portion of food or, as a community elder 
put  it,  ‘shoomu  yemazuuta  karsen  sha’g  aye’mada  jechuuta  assanno’  (‘a  temporary  feeling  of  
hunger  can  give  you  a  time  when  you  could  tighten  your  stomach’).  As  the  availability  of  food 
at the household level winds down, during the onset of the hunger period, households skip 
meals often from three meals a day to one meal and as a result, they experience the first 
phase of hunger (shoomma) on a regular basis. 
 
The second phase is gorro, which is actual hunger, described above as a general shortage of 
food (Table 4.3).  This stage is more serious than the first one and cannot be overcome by 
tightening the stomach and simply adjusting the meal size. An elderly respondent explained 
the severity  of  hunger  as  ‘gorru  hunnen  faenumbua’, meaning  ‘one  cannot  escape  hunger  by  
running  away’.  Gorro is  probably  longer  than  just  ‘simple’  seasonal  hunger  and  it  may  affect  
the larger community and to an extent even the better-off households. The duration of gorro 
also reflects the process of suffering and distress that many people go through. People 
normally adopt different coping strategies in the event of gorro, such as selling their assets and 
calling upon their friends and patrons for extended support. In most cases they also borrow 
cash or food at a higher interest rate to get through the difficult days. If households are able to 
deploy different types of responses, no death needs to occur at this stage. Another distinctive 
feature of gorro is that the informal social support remains intact and those who are affected 
can claim support. The community elders also explained that the magnitude of the effects is an 
important feature that differentiates gorro/hunger from udufunne/famine. As a community 
elder explained: 
‘Gorru abish xudamumbuo hikansi gajajuntis gorru kawu manna affano (hunger is not often 
visible because it affects small segment of the community). However, famine is very visible and 
affects almost everybody and as a result it strains  the  social  support  system’  (FG_KB/AS-CEM/ 
27/1/2011). 
 
The third phase is more complex. It is called udufunne/qaane and means a situation of an 
extreme shortage of food where literally nothing is available to depend on (Table 4.3). This is 
the equivalent of a destitution phase where households run out of options. When they call it 
‘kazzamannu  uddufunnit  aa’ggeu’  it  means,  ‘this  year  we  are  experiencing  an  onset  of  extreme  
food  shortage’  at  home  and  in  the  market,  and  even  what  they  bought  on  the  market  is not 
enough for their needs. At this stage, people go for days with very little or no food, and as a 
result those who are affected start showing clearly visible signs of physical weakness due to 
hunger and early starvation. They become emaciated and show significant loss of body weight, 
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which will remain for some time at this stage. If no support is provided in the form of food at 
this stage, people will quickly move to the next phase, which is called yewulle, literally meaning 
‘being  swollen’. This contrasts with the previous stage as the physical body starts swelling 
significantly, particularly the legs and belly. Nutritionists describe this as oedema. Movements 
are often limited at this stage as the affected people generally lack energy to move around in 
search of food and may even collapse on the road. These signs are often manifested in certain 
demographic groups such as under fives, lactating and pregnant women, and some elderly 
people. According to elders, once someone arrives at this stage, his/her chances of survival are 
very limited. If no emergency support is provided at this critical stage, the next stage will be 
eventual death. 
 
Table 4.3: Concept and definition of famine in Kambata  
Source: Author’s  fieldwork,  2011. 
 
Kambata views of famine as a process rather than a sudden event contrast with formal 
definitions that emphasise the number of people who died. Factors such as loss of livelihood, 
failure of social support systems, increased destitution and types of coping strategies adopted 
are different indicators the Kambata use to define the different stages of famine. The views of 
famine among the Kambata is strikingly similar with the Dinka ethnic groups in South Sudan 
Famine stage in 
local name 
Description Perceived causes Example 
Shoomma A feeling that one experiences for short 
period in the absence of food 
Seasonal food 
shortage 
Common during 
lean seasons 
Gorro An extended shortage of food from own 
production and high price at market. It 
could cause severe suffering physically 
and psychologically 
Rain failure, market 
behaviour, crop/ 
livestock disease 
occurrence 
2000, 2003 
Udufunne/qaane An extreme shortage of food at 
household and community level and 
when large segment of population is 
affected. An equivalent of destitution. 
Affected people show signs of physical 
weakness and emaciation. Informal 
safety nets collapse 
Progressive loss of 
household assets 
due to different 
shocks over time, 
failure of coping 
strategies 
1984, 2003  
Yewulle Affected people show signs of swollen 
feet and belly (oedema) 
Progressive loss of 
assets, no access to 
nutritious food, 
failure of coping 
strategies, failure of 
social support 
system 
2007–08 
Rehuuta Final stage/death Disease, 
government and 
humanitarian 
response failure  
1984 
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and other communities in Africa (Deng 1999:7-8)  (see also discussion in Chapter 6). This 
sophisticated local classification system offers valuable insights for the Ethiopian government 
and other humanitarian actors who seek to avert further green famines, as argued elsewhere 
in the thesis. 
 
4.4 The concept of green famine and its timeline in southern Ethiopia 
This research does not aim at establishing a chronological timeline and historical evidence of 
when green famines have occurred. But it aims to explore some of the historic developments 
and milestones around the incidence of green famine in southern Ethiopia. It is believed that 
by doing so, our knowledge and understanding about the magnitude of green famine in 
general will be enhanced and it will help to engage with different actors and policy-makers in 
designing a context-based remedy to prevent green famine from recurring in the future.  
 
Interviews with academics and famine experts indicate that the term green famine was coined 
during the 1984 famine that struck Ethiopia. Two Western development practitioners who 
lived in Ethiopia while working for humanitarian agencies during the 1984 famine came across 
the deceptively green situation of the agro-ecology in the enset-dominant livelihood area in 
southern Ethiopia. They used the term green famine to describe the prevailing food crisis and 
famine in the Wolita area in southern Ethiopia (Goyder and Goyder 1988: 88), which was a 
green and lush environment compared to the barren and semi-arid parts of the northern 
highlands of Wollo and Tigray. For the aid workers, it was a total surprise to see many people 
being affected in Wolita area, which traditionally was food secure. However, the severity and 
magnitude of the situation was not as great as the one in northern Ethiopia, which was 
described as a ‘biblical  famine’  by  the  BBC  journalist  Michael  Buerk  who  was  reporting  from  
Korem famine camp, the epicentre of the famine (BBC 1984). In contrast, green famine in the 
south did not receive much media coverage or policy attention. Goyder and Goyder (1988: 89) 
described this situation as follows: 
To the casual observer, Welayita [Wolita] after the main rains had begun in July 1984, looked a 
verdant and fertile area: yet people starved in their own homes and villages, and unlike in Wollo, 
rarely came into camps on the main roads. 
 
Of the 41 key informants at different levels during this study, five respondents said they first 
heard the term green famine in 1984 whereas the overwhelming majority (36) respondents 
indicated that they heard about it in three different periods (in 2000, 2003 and 2007–08). 
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Though all the respondents heard about green famine at different times, they stressed that 
since the 2003 famine they have heard the term more often, as quotes indicate: 
 
‘I  have  heard  about  it when I was a post-graduate student at the Addis Ababa University (AAU). 
The term green famine was given to a situation of food crises and famine in the Southern part of 
Ethiopia specifically in Wolita region. The term was only used by some researchers from AAU and 
humanitarian personnel who worked in the response to the crisis. It was named a green famine 
due to the vibrant green surrounding of the area in comparison to Wollo and other drought 
prone  parts  of  the  country’  (KI_AA/AAU-IDR/03/09/2011). 
 
‘First  in 1984, and later since the 2000 food crisis the term became synonymous with a food crisis 
in most of the enset-cereal or in enset-dependent areas which includes the Hadiya, Kembatta, 
Wolita,  Sidama,  Guraghe,  Gedio,  Oromo  and  others’  (KI_AA/FSS-DR/13/07/2011). 
 
‘I  have  heard  about  it  in 2000 when hunger struck the Wolita area, and then in 2003 and 2008 
some of the enset-cereal livelihood zones. Of course the situation [greenness] is distorting 
sometimes. I have been accompanying TV journalists and local and international staff to these 
parts of the country and they often do not understand the situation on the ground because this 
part is covered with lots of eucalyptus and other trees, and is evergreen. You can see green 
coffee leaves even though there is no fruit and there are different types of trees that are green 
year round but when you look inside the households, there is no food. It was even green in 2008 
when the belg rain completely failed and the area experienced a protracted dry spell. This part is 
not like Somali or other regions, which are barren land. It is green from outside but there is 
trouble  inside’  (KI_HA/UN-WFP/03/05/2011). 
 
These quotes confirm that the notion of green famine has existed since at least 1984. 
However, it only came to wider attention very recently.  
 
4.5 Green famine coverage in the media 
All forms of media can play both positive and negative roles in efforts to manage hunger and 
famine. Deng (1999) assessed the positive role that the media, particularly the Western media, 
had in bringing to light the famine in southern Sudan in 1998 to the national government and 
international community. Box 4.1 presents a brief timeline indicating how the international 
media has captured and brought the issue of green famine to recognition and resultant 
response in Ethiopia. 
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Box 4.1: Timeline of the recognition of green famine 
 
2000 Thousands  starve  as  ‘green famine’  hits  southern  Ethiopia 
Each day people are dying from hunger in villages across the south as a 
‘green famine’  tightens  its  grip.  It  is  a  hidden  famine  in  part  of  the  country  
that has received little international  aid  in  response  to  Ethiopia’s  third  
consecutive year of drought (Reliefweb June 2000). 
 
Ethiopia  prey  to  a  deceptive  ‘green  famine’ 
Green famine confuses  outsiders.  People  visit  and  ask  ‘Where  is  the  
drought? It is very green, we can see crops.  How  come  there  is  famine?’  But  
when you scratch the surface, there is a huge problem (Ewing 2000). 
 
2003 Vicious circle traps starving Ethiopians 
Ethiopia’s  latest  drought-driven famine seems familiar at first: infants with 
pot-bellies suckling the emaciated breasts of mothers too tired to wave 
away flies crawling across their lips. Then you notice that the countryside is 
lush and green, damp from rain, with cattle and goats nibbling the foliage. 
Take away the fields of banana and pineapple and it could be the Lake 
District. Yet some villages seem to be replaying the grim images of 1984, 
when 1 million people starved and the world vowed that it would never 
happen again. Bob Geldof returned this week to highlight the disaster and 
plead for assistance (Carroll 2003). 
 
FEWS NET Special report 
Southern  Nations,  Nationalities  and  People’s  Region  (SNNPR)  is  an  area  
becoming  synonymous  with  the  term  ‘Green-Famine’  a  situation  in  which  
the rain is enough for the land to be green and crops are growing, but yields 
remain low. The paradox of green famine once again gripped the region in 
2002, the impact of which is still continuing (FEWS NET September 2003). 
 
2007–08 Desperation as Ethiopia's hunger grows 
‘It  is  a  strange  and  unsettling  ride  west  from  the  Ethiopian  town  of  
Shashamene. The fields are vibrant green. There is water in the creeks. The 
soil is a deep rich burgundy. However,  the  people  here  speak  of  a  ‘green  
drought’.  It  is  the  time  when  the  land  is  full  of  new  shoots  but  there  is  no  
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food. It happens because the last rains failed and few crops were planted 
(BBC 2008). 
 
Hunger is once again stalking Ethiopia 
They call  it  green  hunger  …  Four-foot cornstalks sprout from rain-soaked 
earth, and wind billows fields of teff, the staple Ethiopian grain. Goats and 
cattle are getting fat on lush grasses but the children are still dying. It's 
strange to see hunger when everything is so green (Sanders 2008). 
 
Ethiopia's green famine takes its toll 
In Wolaytta district, some 330 kilometres south of Addis Ababa, and most 
surrounding  areas,  it  is  a  crisis  of  a  different  kind  …  the  area's  apparent  
fertility is deceptive. Rains fell at the wrong time, reserves are dwindling 
and  50  percent  of  the  area’s  two  million  inhabitants  are  facing  what  aid  
workers  have  labelled  a  ‘green famine’  (AFP 2008). 
 
 
A number of observations are apparent from the media coverage highlighted in Box 4.1. First, 
most of the print and online media such as the Independent, BBC, Guardian, Los Angeles Times 
and Associated Press described the situation as more than just a food shortage and as being 
severe and causing death among the affected population. Second, there is no consensus 
among different actors and institutions that have reported the issue over time as they 
described  it  ‘hunger’,  ‘food  shortage’  and  ‘starvation’. Third, most concur that green famine is 
caused by irregular rainfall distribution and failure. Fourth, the  USAID’s  FEWS NET has signalled 
mixed  views  in  2003.  Despite  issuing  a  special  alert  stating  that  the  situation  is  ‘pre-famine’,  it  
used a softer tone and diplomatic terms attributing the cause to lower production and food 
shortage. Given  USAID’s  strategic  alliance  with  the  Government  of  Ethiopia  and  its  food-
dominant emergency response this is not a surprise. During this period, the Ethiopian 
government  was  actively  involved  in  supporting  the  US  government’s  action  of  ‘the  war  on  
terror’  in  East  Africa  (Lautze  et al. 2003: 119). Fifth, compared to 2000 and 2003, during the 
2007–08 green famine the international media coverage increased impressively and is quite 
diverse. 
 
Yet after three consecutive incidences of green famine in 2000, 2003 and 2008, the 
Government of Ethiopia and policy-makers have not recognised the situation as famine and 
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remain unclear about the underlying causes and how to respond appropriately and effectively 
to green famine. Can a green famine be categorised as famine or it is just a localised food 
shortage? This question will be addressed in Chapter 6. 
 
4.6 Underlying causes of green famine 
Any discussion about the causes of famine in Ethiopia is usually incomplete without pointing 
culpability towards what I call ‘the  usual  suspects  and  easy-to-blame  factors’.  As  a  result,  
associating the causes of famine with natural and demographic (neo-Malthusian) factors has 
been a dominant assumption among all the actors involved in policy process, research and 
bureaucrats at different levels over time (Lautze et al. 2003: 102). In the same manner, the 
occurrence of green famine in southern Ethiopia in general and the study area in particular is 
seen as a result of these factors. However, I argue that, although these factors alone or in 
combination could play a part in one way or another in the occurrence of famine, they cannot 
fully explain its cause, and the underlying causes of green famine go beyond these generic 
explanations of rain failure, population pressure and resultant land shortages or drought, as 
explained below.  
 
Table 4.4 summarises the multiple answers provided by government authorities (n=29), 
academics (n=6), UN agencies (n=3) and expatriate and local food security and famine experts 
(n=3). In this research, underlying factors are treated as those factors that make livelihoods 
vulnerable or increase their vulnerability to shocks and create an environment favourable to 
the occurrence of green famine, whereas trigger factors are those that have tipped these 
already weakened livelihoods over the edge and exposed them to green famine. 
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Table 4.4: Interlinked underlying causes of green famine 
Rank Perceived causes Number of times 
mentioned (N=41) 
 % 
1 Fragmented and small land size due to population pressure 13 32 
2 Dwindling enset production due to various shocks (over-reliance, 
disease outbreak) 
10 24 
3 Policy failure (weak extension services, in arrears debt and high 
input prices) 
9 22 
4 Reverse migration, restrictive labour movements, lack of local 
employment opportunities 
6 17 
4 Recurrent shocks and resultant asset depletion 6 17 
5 Extinction of indigenous trees and expansion of Eucalyptus and 
its effect on soil 
4 7 
6 Poor economic saving culture among the cash crop producing 
communities, particularly ginger and coffee communities 
3 7 
6 Change of livelihoods from enset to cereal, and focus on cash 
crops (coffee and ginger) 
3 7 
6 Lack of understanding of the livelihood context and 
misinterpretation of green surroundings 
3 7 
Source:  Author’s  fieldwork,  2011 
 
The issue of land shortage has been discussed more often as a cause for food shortage and 
resultant hunger in the highlands of Ethiopia. However, the question is how small is ‘too small’ 
for a land holding per household that would really matter and contribute to the occurrence of 
hunger? How small is the land size in the area of study relative to the regional and national 
level? As shown in Table 4.4, a significant number of respondents (32 per cent) indicated that 
fragmented land size due to the rapidly growing population is a major bottleneck for food 
production and ensuring food security in the study area. The enset-based farming system, a 
dominant livelihood system in the study area, traditionally supports one of the largest 
populations per square metre in Ethiopia, and one of the highest in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Dessalegn 1996, 2007; Mulugeta 2007). However, spiralling population growth and the 
household practice of splitting productive land among the children when establishing a new 
family have put much pressure and strain on the existing land and its productivity. As the land 
is divided and subdivided when families grow, the individual plots have become even more 
fragmented. Data from the K-T zone Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development in 2011 
indicate that the size of average land holding per household in Kacha-Bira, Kadida-Gamela and 
Doyo-Gena districts was equivalent to 0.25, 0.33 and 0.5 ha per household respectively. The 
size of land in these districts is below the regional (0.75 ha) and national (1 ha) average (see 
Table 2.2). From the production point of view, these plot sizes are sub-economic and in 
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Dessalegn’s  (1994) terminology  ‘starvation  plots’.  Further, there are a significant number of 
landless people in the study area (personal observation). This finding also confirms the results 
of a previous study of growing land scarcity in one of the current study kebeles (Bevan and 
Pankhurst 1996: 6). Bevan and Pankhurst’s  study  reported  on  the  alarming  trend  of  dwindling  
land holding in Aze-Dobo’o as follows: 
The most obvious change in land holdings is the size of holdings which is decreasing at an 
unprecedented rate. People's holdings have become so small that some farmers have less than ¼ 
of a hectare. If the current trend continues it is very shocking to imagine what would happen 
after a few years. 
 
The majority of respondents stressed that the shortage of farmland in the area means that 
households must produce crops twice a year, during both the belg and mehar seasons 
(described in more detail in Chapter 2), to meet the increasing food needs of the growing 
households. Households used to practice a sequential fallow system on their land in order to 
restore soil fertility. However, with such severe land shortages, households are repeatedly 
cultivating their plots with no fallow period to recover and replenish the nutrient content of 
the soils. Additionally, a lack of seeds and food reserves from the previous harvest makes 
households more vulnerable to food insecurity and shocks. In the past, despite a failure of one 
season’s  production  and  other  shocks,  households  used  to  absorb  and  bounce  back  without  
external support and with limited damage done to their livelihoods. Currently, by contrast, a 
single shock, such as the delay or failure of the belg or mehar rains, can cause severe livelihood 
stress (Woldeyesus 2008: 5). 
 
Dwindling of the enset crop as a household food source has been mentioned as another 
underlying cause that played a role in the occurrence of green famine. The Kambata people 
belong to the ‘enset-culture group’ or  the  ‘enset  farming  system’ in southern Ethiopia, where 
enset is considered a staple food and strategic food reserve (Shack 1966; Dessalegn 1996, 
2007: 13). This banana-like perennial tree is relatively drought resistant and staple source of 
food (Brandt et al. 1997: 5). In addition to being a source of food, its leaves, stem and corm are 
excellent livestock feed. Enset was a defensive shield against agricultural drought-triggered 
food crises and hunger in the past. However, respondents revealed that its role as a staple 
source of food has been compromised due to various factors such as the occurrence of wilt 
bacteria (Xanthomonas campestris pv. musacearum), which affects large enset farms in the 
area (see Chapter 5). In addition, as noted above, community elders stated that persistent rain 
failures in the area have had far-reaching consequences on the overall livelihood situation, and 
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particularly had a direct knock-on  effect  on  the  production  of  enset.  Given  enset’s  multi-
purpose roles, during recurrent agricultural droughts and resultant production failures, 
households have been forced to rely heavily on enset as the only source of both household 
food and livestock feed. Further, the dwindling size of land holdings has played a negative role 
on the overall production of enset in the area (Dessalegn 1996, 2007; Brandt 1996). Thus, 
many poor households with smaller enset farms over time have become partially or fully 
enset-less and subsequently switched their small plots to early maturing cereals as they can be 
planted and harvested twice a year compared to the longer maturation period of enset, which 
takes up to six years to fully mature. Frequently changing rainfall patterns and subsequent and 
sequential production failures have made households that switched to cereal become more 
vulnerable to food crises and green famine than those that have retained some enset in their 
backyards. Due to these factors, a well-balanced production and harvesting pattern of enset 
has been disrupted. As Tadesse (2002: 108) noted, ‘planting and harvesting of enset are 
synchronized so that the approximate number of harvested plants correspond to the number 
to  be  planted’. 
 
Other structural factors have also affected the ability of some households to withstand food 
crises. For instance, peasants in the study area practise an integrated farming system, which 
involves mixing crop production and livestock rearing, using the latter as a source of draught 
power, manure, food and a symbol of status and recognition. Further, enset requires frequent 
application of manure for better growth and yield production (Dessalegn 1996: 91; Dougherty 
2002: 139). Over the last 15 years, this systematic integration between farming and cattle 
rearing has been interrupted due to various factors. For instance, as population pressure 
grows on farming lands, households are forced to search for new plots, and it was vividly 
noticeable during the fieldwork that every corner of land, including areas that used to be 
communal grazing land, is now cultivated. I personally witnessed this trend when growing up 
and working in the study area. This in turn negatively affects the availability of pasture, and as 
a result many households are forced to decrease the size of their livestock herds.16 The 
reduction of household livestock ownership and the complete lack of livestock among many 
poorer  households  affect  the  performance  of  the  enset  crop  and  disrupt  the  ‘delicate  balance’  
between those two elements at the household level (Dessalegn 1996; Dougherty 2002). The 
                                                             
 
16 For various reasons, such as distress sales in case of shocks, many poor households do not own 
livestock. 
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absence and loss of mature enset for the majority of poor and very poor groups of the 
community have resulted in endowment failure and production-based entitlement failure. As a 
result many households have become vulnerable to increased food insecurity and green 
famine. 
 
The Ethiopian peasants have witnessed ever-changing agriculture and rural development 
policies over the last six decades and many have been affected negatively due to the fast 
changing policy environment. The detailed policy processes and changes are discussed further 
in Chapter 7. The main area where policy change has taken place since the previous political 
regime is the supply and distribution of agricultural inputs, particularly fertilisers, which seems 
to have had a direct impact on crop production and the peasant livelihood system in rural 
Ethiopia in general, and in the study area in particular. Prior to 1992, the Agricultural Input 
Supply Corporation (AISCO), a state parastatal, was the sole supplier and distributor of 
fertiliser in Ethiopia. However, in 1993 the central government removed the ban on private 
sector involvement in the fertiliser business and opened it up for traders to get involved in the 
supply business. Further, in 1997 the Government of Ethiopia announced that it would remove 
the fertiliser subsidies that had been in effect (Jayne et al. 2003: 300). This policy change has 
had a knock-on effect on the purchase of and access to inputs for many middle-level and poor 
peasant households. Since the lifting of the fertiliser subsidies, the price of fertiliser has 
increased (see Table 7.2), and as a result more and more households have become unable to 
afford and use the recommended amount of fertilisers on their plots. The inability to apply the 
recommended amount, or not applying any at all, has serious effects on the productivity of the 
land and hence food production. Interestingly, none of the government authorities and 
government-affiliated actors interviewed (n=29) for this study, mentioned policy failure as a 
cause for green famine. However, those affiliated with the UN agencies, academics, research 
institutions and food security and famine experts (n=9) stated that policy failure played a role 
in the occurrence of green famine. The following comment summarises this: 
‘For  me  it  is  a  policy  failure.  No  more,  no  less!  The  government’s  agriculture  policy  is  not  sound  
and lacks many important aspects of rural development. It is inclined more towards the supply 
side of food security that focuses more on production increase without addressing the demand 
side’  (KI-HA/HU-AC-1/05/05/2011). 
 
Another policy factor that has contributed to the occurrence of green famine is the 
introduction of restrictive labour movements and reverse migration of thousands of people 
back to the study area. Following the regime change in 1991, the new administration 
60 
 
abandoned a centralised governance system and introduced a new policy of decentralisation 
based along ethnic lines (Lautze and Maxwell 2007: 229). As Alemayehu (2001: 10) noted, 
‘under this system, members of one ethnic group are expected not to settle or work in another 
ethnic  group’s  jurisdiction’. In effect, this policy restricted the movement of people from one 
region to another and created immense tension among different ethnic groups. Prior to this 
policy, many people from the study area used to go to live among the Oromo and Sidama 
ethnic groups in different parts of the country (Belachew 2001; Yacob 2002: 45). However, 
after the introduction of the policy, many people have returned to K-T. A document from the 
office of the Gogota Care, a local NGO in K-T zone, indicated that in 1993–94, two years after 
the current government assumed power, about 152,095 people returned to their original 
districts in K-T zone from Arsi Negele and Shashamene areas, where they had settled. Of these, 
3,834 returned to Kadida-Gamela district (Gogota Care 2011).17 In addition, in 1984, the Derg 
government implemented a forced resettlement programme, moving people from densely 
populated parts to sparsely populated areas of Metekel and Gambela (Wolde-Selassie 2002; 
Dessalegn 2007). Following the fall of the regime in 1991, most of these settlers returned to 
their places of origin and settled with their close relatives. The impact of such reverse 
migration had multiple social and economic effects on both the displaced returnees and 
receiving communities. It strained already meagre available land. Due to the sudden eruption 
of ethnic tension and subsequent displacement, many of the returnee households had come 
back to their places of origin with empty hands after years of building their livelihoods and 
hard-earned resources. Upon their return, no reintegration efforts were made by the central, 
regional or local authorities. As a result, the returnees had to start their livelihood from scratch 
on small plots of land, which they received from their immediate relatives and patrons.  
 
Another important demographic factor that affected the livelihoods in the study area was the 
return in 1991 of demobilised soldiers from the previous regime. Dercon and Daniel (1998: 
1662) estimated that at the national level some 509,200 were demobilised and reintegrated 
into their respective communities. Many young Kambata from the study area had joined the 
army both voluntarily and under conscription during the protracted conflict of 17 years.18 
                                                             
 
17 The accuracy of these figures should be treated carefully as there was no proper registration and 
documentation undertaken upon the return of these people. The document contains the list of 
returnees, their family size, places they were displaced, and current kebeles.  
18 Personal communication with a former senior government official. 
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When the current administration overthrew the previous administration, thousands of ex-
military servicemen returned to their places of origin, creating considerable social and 
economic disruption in the area (Yacob 2002: 45). No appropriate reintegration programmes 
and efforts were undertaken, and the local authorities provided just a piece of land from 
communal lands used for communal grazing. As these former servicemen started establishing 
livelihood from scratch, most of them faced serious challenges and became ‘vulnerable  
groups’.  This  situation  had  far-reaching social and economic impacts on the study area 
(Dessalegn 2007). 
 
4.7 The trigger factors of green famine 
As noted earlier, underlying causes of green famine are vulnerability factors that have 
progressively  weakened  and  disabled  livelihoods’  capacity  to  absorb  shocks.  Trigger  factors  are  
shocks that have tipped these already weakened livelihoods over the edge and exposed them 
to green famine. Among different actors in Ethiopia green famine triggers are often mistaken 
for its causes. This can in part be explained by the fact that trigger factors are exogenous and 
overt in nature compared to underlying factors, which tend to be endogenous and occur over 
long period of time. In K-T zone, triggers of green famines include weather-induced agricultural 
production shocks, market shocks, the occurrence of sweet potato blight and failure of 
government response. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2 the study area receives a bi-modal pattern of yearly rainfall. In 2007–
08 it faced a belg rain failure. This rain normally falls in January–March/April and supports the 
production of maize, Irish potato, haricot bean and sweet potato. These are usually referred to 
as  ‘bridging’ foods and are normally consumed during the ‘hunger gap’  months between 
March and July, covering household food consumption needs until the mehar crops are ready. 
Respondents emphasised the significance of the belg produce for household consumption 
saying ‘gillalu  hallalinna’, which means belg produce  is  solely  ‘ours  and  private’.  The  
expression indicates that the belg produce is used for home consumption while the mehar is 
mostly for market as a source of cash. 
 
As the respondents described above, the mehar crops are planted as sources of cash, and 
households already earmark the cash earned from the mehar produce to cover the cash needs 
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of the household such as the expenses of festivities such as Meskel,19 school fees, agriculture 
input loans, land taxes and other expenditures. Against this well-planned and interlinked food 
production system, 2007–08 saw the complete failure of the belg rain and subsequent failure 
of production of the bridging foods as a result. This situation can be metaphorically explained 
as a sudden collapse of the bridge (belg failure), causing many people to fall into the river with 
the flash flood of famine washing many away. According to the community elders and 
different households, the rain failure had a serious knock-on effect on households, particularly 
those already in a precarious state of food insecurity and weak livelihoods. Different 
respondents in the study area explained the situation as follows: 
 
‘The  mehar rain failed and as a result we could not produce all the belg crops, particularly the 
root and tuber crops, especially sweet potato and taro20 that used to be ready for consumption in 
three to four months starting March–June. It also affected the production of maize that is 
consumed until the summer harvest is in ’  (FG_KB/AS-CEM/ 27/1/2011). 
 
‘The  cause  of  food  crisis  was  the  failure  of  rain  during  both  mehar and belg periods. As a result all 
the belg dependent areas missed out on the belg production and this had a wider impact on the 
food security situation of many households in the region’  (KI_HA/RG-FSEW/04/05/2011). 
 
‘Overall,  the  changing  weather  condition  has  an  impact  in  triggering  the  situation  particularly  in  
the lowland areas. However, in a situation where most households are at the edge of collapse, 
even a small shock is enough to push these people over the edge. Upon deterioration of the 
situation, up to 35 therapeutic feeding centres (TFCs) were established across the region and the 
mortality  rate  was  shocking’ (KI-AA/UN-FAO/FSE/06/09/2011). 
 
In addition to the production shocks, market shocks and particularly the sudden surge of food 
prices for a sustained period in 2008 were major trigger factors of green famine in the area. As 
shown in Figure 4.1, in Kacha-Bira the prices of staple food commodities began increasing in 
December 2006, considered as the pre-green famine period, until August 2008, which was the 
                                                             
 
19 Meskel is one of the biggest traditional festivals celebrated in the area. It falls on 27/28 September 
and everyone spends a considerable amount of cash for the festivity. 
20 Taro (Colocasia esculenta) is a root crop that grows in the study area and plays a significant role in 
household food security. Its roots (corms) are edible and rich in starch. (For more on this, see Fujimoto 
2009). 
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height of the green famine. The prices of all three staple food commodities increased 
continuously and hit record highs at the peak of the crisis. The price hike of food commodities 
and the inability of households to access food caused a trade-based entitlement failure. 
 
Figure 4.1: Kacha-Bira district price comparison of staple foods before and during green 
famine (December 2006 – August 2008) 
 
Note: All the food item prices are indicated in Ethiopian birr (ETB), 1 USD was 9 ETB in February 2008. 
Source: Computed from K-T Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development market assessment reports, 
2011a. Data for September–October 2007 were not available. 
 
In addition to this price hike, in 2007, peasants suffered a big loss of sweet potato due to an 
outbreak of sweet potato blight, a bacterial disease that affects production. Moreover, in early 
2008 (February) the belg rain that is critically important for planting and production of sweet 
potato had failed to come on time, causing a sharp drop in production.  
 
As discussed in chapters 2 and 3,  Sen’s  ‘entitlement to  food’ analytical framework underlines 
that people face famine when their different sets of entitlements fail due to various factors. 
Resonating with this view, green famine occurred for a variety of policy, political, natural, 
demographic and market oriented factors. These causal factors have affected the entitlements 
of people’s access to food. For instance, the introduction of restrictive ethnic-based policies 
has resulted in loss of income to households through seasonal employment. This caused the 
failure of ‘labour-based entitlement’ to those households who are usually dependent on it. The 
occurrence of enset bacterial wilt and lack of policy attention contributed to a dwindling 
production of enset that normally served as ‘a buffer against’ shocks and source of food 
security (Bush 2002: 11). The reduction in availability of enset affected  the  ‘production-based 
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entitlement’ of households. The increasing population and resultant land fragmentation has 
reduced the production and availability of food at the household level, also affecting their 
‘production-based entitlement’ of food. The increasing price of agricultural inputs (see Chapter 
7), failure of production to different risks and forced repayment of loans affected the asset 
bases of households. Further, the outbreak of sweet potato disease, belg rain failure and 
unusual spike in food prices has affected household ‘production and trade-based entitlements’ 
to food. Failure to recognise growing vulnerability, underreporting by policy-makers and local 
authorities and failure to provide assistance on time  resulted  in  the  failure  of  ‘transfer  
entitlements’  of  households.  In  summary,  the  failure  of  entitlements  of  households  due  to  the 
various factors mentioned above resulted in the occurrence of green famine in 2007–08. 
Based on the preceding discussion and fieldwork data, the schematic diagram in Figure 4.2 
summarises the underlying and trigger factors of green famine in the study area. 
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Figure 4.2: Schematic presentation of the causal factors of green famine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Author’s  fieldwork,  2011  
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4.8 Socially differentiated impacts of green famine 
The occurrence of green famine has caused serious damage with far-reaching consequences to 
the lives and livelihoods of people in the study area. However, a closer investigation shows 
that the impacts of green famine vary widely according to the type of household livelihood 
strategy, wealth group, demographic group and social and cultural background. The socially 
differentiated impacts of green famine are examined below. 
 
4.8.1 Social impact of green famine 
The Kambata community is very persevering and industrious; they are people who believe in 
the values of hard work and education. As noted by Yacob (2002: 48): 
Despite successive changes in state and political structure of the country, the Kambata people 
have maintained their important traditional institutions such as kokata, heera and seera. Seera is 
the code of conduct practiced and internalized among the Kambata and governs the cooperation 
and relationship between individuals, tribes and territorial units. 
 
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, affected households have deployed various 
common (reversible) and unusual (irreversible) coping strategies to overcome green famine. 
Taking such unusual and extreme measures has disrupted a tight-knit social structure and 
important values of the Kambata people who have ‘endured the most turbulent times in the 
history of Ethiopia’ (Yacob 2002). During focus group discussions with the community elders, 
both men and women, respondents revealed that during the green famine, many people 
engaged in anti-social behaviours such as stealing enset and kocho, which had never been 
practised in the past and is an unacceptable action according to their seera rules. In addition, 
the occurrence of green famine weakens social cohesion and disrupts the social network that 
connects people together affecting values such as mutual help, solidarity and trust. This is 
captured in the following quotes: 
 
‘It  used  to  be  part  of  our  social  support  system  to  support  and  help  when  someone  runs  into  
some kind of trouble, such as loss of livelihood assets due to fire, disease, death or others. 
However, currently, there is a trend of erosion of informal social support systems in the 
community since the incidence of the green famine and  it  is  really  a  worrying  situation’ 
(FG_KB/ME-CEM/10/02/2011). 
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‘In  the  past,  the  poor  households  used  to  depend  on  the  better-off households through different 
informal social networks such as fo’tino, sharing of grain after someone lends his hands or 
happens to arrive during the threshing of grains. Also, the poor could help the better-off in land 
preparation, weeding, harvesting or threshing the produce and would receive a good amount of 
food as a return. However, currently such informal networks are disappearing as the 
redistributive capacity of these households have already weakened and have reached a tipping 
point’  (KI-AA/UN-FAO/FSE/06/09/2011). 
 
‘During  the  Millennium famine [2007–08], we even stopped paying a contribution for those 
households who have lost their livestock due to death [informal insurance system paid in the 
case of sudden asset loss] as we could not afford to do. Many people have dropped out from our 
herra iddir membership [local funeral association] as they could no longer contribute 5 ETB and 
coffee or dinner for the family of the deceased’  (FG_KB/AS-CEM/29/01/2011). 
 
As can be seen from the comments above, green famine disrupted traditional institutions and 
informal social networks of the Kambata. In particular, the disruption and failure of an 
informal social support network had serious implications for households from poor and 
destitute  wealth  categories,  as  they  could  not  access  their  ‘transfer-based entitlements’  from  
the wider community. Furthermore, despite the fact that green famine affected everyone, as 
reflected by the local name ‘Hundannka dedek  aafe  gorru/yewulitta’ (a famine that affected 
everyone across the wealth groups), it is also noted that the occurrence of green famine 
created a few opportunities for certain wealth groups (particularly for the better off) of the 
community. As the severity of the situation intensified, households resorted to leasing out 
their critical assets such as land, selling of young seedlings of enset and this increased the 
availability of land and enset for a few better-off households in the area. A response from 
community elders aptly captures this:  
‘People  have  become  very  self-centred and individualistic focusing on own problems rather than 
others. Particularly, people do not lend money, instead they ask you if you could rent out your 
land instead of borrowing. When you go to seek a temporary support, they even persuade you to 
consider leasing out your land for one year or more. They also ask you to do a shared plough so 
that  they  can  share  the  output’  (FG_KG/AD-CEW/25/02/2011). 
 
In summary, despite the fact that green famine caused widespread damages to the lives and 
livelihoods of people in K-T zone, the impacts were socially differentiated.   
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4.8.2 Economic impact of green famine 
The impacts  of  famine  are  long  lasting  even  after  the  famine  has  ‘ended’.  It  pushes  many  
deeper into destitution, thereby making them more vulnerable to food insecurity in the future. 
As von Clausewitz (1832, cited in Webb et al. 1992: 90) declared: 
The aftermath of famine is not the aftermath of war. No enemy has been defeated. There is no 
elation of the victor. Food may become less scarce again, but food insecurity remains. The next 
crisis looms just around the corner. 
 
Once famine sets in, it leaves households with very few options, particularly for the poor and 
destitute who have a very small asset base. As a result, the affected households put their best 
efforts into dealing with it by selling any assets and resources that are at hand. However, if the 
famine situation persists and there is inadequate external help, such distress sales can lead to 
a  complete  depletion  of  a  household’s  assets,  leaving  them  in  an  even  worse  position  to  
rebuild once famine conditions abate. The situation forces households to re-start their 
livelihood from scratch and the recovery process is lengthy (Dessalegn 1991: 193). Thus, 
understanding famine as a process that results in destitution, social support breakdown and 
experience of severe and extended hunger, as opposed to a sudden event that explodes when 
a trigger factor occurs and causes elevated malnutrition and mortality due to starvation on 
certain segments of the society, has theoretical and practical significance in the understanding 
and prevention of famine in the 21st century (De Waal 1989; Howe and Devereux 2004). 
 
As noted earlier and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, during green famine, many 
households undertake extreme and irreversible coping strategies. Many sell their productive 
assets such as livestock and some even lease out their land for an extended period. Leasing 
land for an extended period imposes a severe and far-reaching consequence on the lives of the 
poor who out their land. It affects the present food supply of households; it also makes a 
household more vulnerable to any future shocks (see boxes 4.2 and 4.3) 
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Box 4.2: Case study: Vulnerable and famine-affected household, Ashira kebele 
 
Detame is a 45-year-old widow who lives with her daughter aged 12 in Hego village of Ashira 
kebele in Kacha-Bira district. Currently she owns one timad of land and grows taro, enset, 
maize, beans and cabbage, beetroot and carrots. The number of enset plants in her backyard 
does not exceed 30 and they are not ready to be consumed at this stage. She used to engage 
in different income-generating activities such as petty trade and sometimes in seasonal casual 
labour to earn money, but now since employment opportunities have become very scarce her 
only income source is the PSNP transfer. As her farm plot is very small, she obtains most of her 
food from the local market. 
 
The famine of 2007–08 was the most severe crisis she could remember facing. She vividly 
recalled  the  situation  and  said  ‘everyone  became  equal,  no  one  was  better  to  provide  support  
for others. The community survived due to the food aid obtained from the government and 
NGOs. The emergency feeding centre opened in nearby town of Shinshicho and rescued many 
lives.’  She  thinks  the  causes  for  the  worst  famine  in  her  case  were  disease,  loss  of  assets  and  
the diminishing of her enset production. The community’s  informal  support  system  collapsed  
and except for very few households no one was in a better condition to lend a hand to others. 
 
In early 2007, her husband got sick and became bedridden. As his health deteriorated she 
decided to sell an ox that had been given to her daughter through an NGO child sponsorship 
programme, in order to seek medical support. She took her husband to the health centre in 
town where he received some medical treatment, but after some improvement, he became 
again very sick. She and her husband agreed to lease 2 timad (0.5 ha), a large portion of their 
land, to a better-off neighbour. The neighbour prepared the underwriting and they leased out 
the land for six years worth a total of 400 ETB (about 45 USD at that time). As she is illiterate 
and did not understand the terms and conditions of the agreement, the underwriting 
remained in the hands of the renter. Two years ago, the renter wanted to plant eucalyptus 
trees on the land that she used to grow her food crops, but she complained to the local elders 
and they stopped him from planting the trees. Recently, she has tried to get her land back 
after she had saved some money from the PSNP transfer. However, the renter refused to give 
back the land saying the agreement was made for six years. Currently, she has summoned him 
to a local court and the community elders are investigating the case and she hopes it will be 
resolved soon. After suffering another setback, her husband passed away during early 2008. 
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During the crisis, it had become impossible to get food as the prices increased and relatives 
also stopped supporting her. The situation became even more complicated when she 
contracted malaria. She was able to receive free malaria treatment at the local health centre. 
Later, her daughter also fell sick. After many days without food, her body had started swelling 
particularly her face and legs. When she went and presented her case to the local authorities 
they admitted her daughter to the emergency feeding programme but rejected her as being 
too old to get emergency support that was targeting mostly children under five and pregnant 
and lactating women. When she heard that there were ferenjis (Western aid workers) helping 
people like her in town, she went to seek support. When the emergency aid people saw her 
condition, they put her on a medical treatment and feeding programme. After some time she 
showed impressive progress and was discharged from the treatment along with her daughter. 
She was given an additional 50 kg wheat ration upon discharge. 
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Box 4.3: Case study: Economic impact of green famine on vulnerable households 
 
Dakute is a 48-year-old man with four children aged between 3 and 15 years. Currently, he 
lives with his wife, mother and two children in Ashira kebele, Kacha-Bira district. Dakute owns 
4 timad of land (1 ha) and grows enset, sweet potato, potato, cabbage, beans, taro and a few 
eucalyptus trees. He owns two cows with a young calf. The cows are reared on a shared raising 
arrangement (kabbe/koda),21 meaning that he takes care of the cows from better-off 
households in return for the milk and a share of the offspring. He used to draw much of the 
household food from his land and some six years back, enset was the staple food crop. 
However, currently his enset does not support his household food needs as it used to due to 
the decreasing size of enset harvest due to diseases and over reliance on it. The food drawn 
from other farm crops only covers his family food needs for 3–4 months a year. For the 
remaining 8–9 months of the year, his family are dependent on food from the market. For 5–6 
months of the year, particularly during the peak seasons of agriculture production such as 
weeding and harvesting, he works as a daily labourer. He normally wakes up at 6:00 a.m. and 
starts the journey to the next town and arrives around 7:00 a.m. at the central location where 
many other labourers are waiting for potential recruiters. If he is lucky, someone will hire him 
for the day at a wage of 15 ETB (about 1 USD in 2011) depending on the type of work. As his 
age  advances,  he  explained  his  frustration  as  ‘recruiters  often  look  for and prefer younger and 
physically  stronger  workers  over  older  looking  guys  like  me’.  He  explained,  ‘the  2007–08 was 
the most severe hunger and famine in my life. All the local job opportunities had been lost. I 
vividly recall that after two days without food at home, I lost my consciousness and become 
somehow crazy. There was just nothing to give to my children and I was scared that I was 
going to lose them to death. As a result I have sent away two of my daughters to a better-off 
household in the nearby town of Shinshicho. It was better to give away your kids to someone 
who takes care of them than watching them hungry. After that, I rented out half of my land for 
100 ETB (about 12 USD at the time) per year for a total of four years to a better-off person in 
the village. It was the only thing I could do at that moment and it did help me to feed and save 
my family and overcome the most difficult time. However, renting out half of my land put me 
in a very difficult situation after the crisis time is over. Recently, my older son has gone to the 
newly established sugar cane plantation in the west and I hope he will be able to earn some 
money  and  support  us.’ 
                                                             
 
21 Widely practised arrangements in Kambata society. 
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The case studies above show how leasing out land, while it helps poor households to get 
through the worst period of the famine, increases their vulnerability to future shocks and 
crises. The life story in Box 4.2 also sheds light on the dilemma and challenges that external 
actors cause during the targeting process of vulnerable groups in a food crisis situation. As 
happened  in  this  case,  interventions  that  target  ‘vulnerable  groups’  overlook  the  fact  that  
everyone in food-insecure households need assistance, especially during food crises – but even 
in poor households during ‘normal’  times.  Further,  the  recovery  from  a  famine  situation  is  a  
complicated and long process that requires support from outside and within the household. 
Coping strategies deployed by households during a food crisis have a direct relation to 
vulnerability; in other words, it is not the actual shock that makes them vulnerable but the 
inability of households to absorb the shock and bounce back.  
 
4.8.3 Malnutrition impact 
As noted earlier, one of the coping strategies adopted by both the affected and non-affected 
households during the green famine is to change the consumption patterns. This includes 
reducing consumption, going without food for longer than usual and relying more on cheaper 
food sources. Many households used this option and relied heavily on consumption of enset-
based food sources such as kocho and hammicho without supplementing with other protein 
sources. However, coping with food shortage and famine by increasing their dependence on 
enset-based foods has had a wider implication for the health and well-being of the 
households, particularly of children and pregnant and lactating women. Brandt et al. (1997: 
49) argued the significance of the presence of protein-rich foods to balance the nutritional 
needs of households in enset-dependent areas and expressed concern if such balance is not 
maintained: 
A diet with a large proportion of enset may require the addition of a higher protein source than 
beans, which is why high-protein animal products are so important in this [enset-based farming] 
system. A serious concern in enset producing regions is that as population density or poverty 
increases, the opposite may be occurring – consumption of kocho increases while consumption 
of animal products decreases. 
 
In a similar manner, as most of the poor households have already disposed of or lost their 
livestock due to recurrent food shortages, their access to milk, cheese, butter and other dairy 
products that usually supplement the enset food is greatly reduced. As a result, many 
households, particularly the poor and vulnerable households had few options left in their daily 
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food intake to complement kocho/hammicho with protein-rich foods. Such a dire shortage 
leaves these households with no option but to consume kocho alone as their sole diet. As 
noted earlier, although they produce higher energy per hectare than cereals, enset-based 
foods have a very poor record in their protein content. The Ethiopian Institute of Nutrition 
(ENI) 1981 cited in Dougherty (2002: 123) estimated  that  only  ‘12-gram protein can be 
obtained  from  a  kg  of  dry  processed  enset  compared  to  100  gram  protein  per  kg  of  dry  maize’. 
 
Extensive  and  frequent  consumption  of  enset  alone  contributes  to  the  weakening  of  people’s  
immune system and makes them vulnerable to diseases and malnutrition. This trend of 
increasing malnutrition has been documented in nutrition surveys undertaken by various 
NGOs since 2003 in the enset-based livelihood zones. A senior food security expert who was 
part of the coordination team of the UNOCHA emergency response in the study area during 
the green famine in 2003 pointed out the strong relationship between frequent consumption 
of only enset-driven foods and the occurrence of malnutrition: 
‘Despite  it  being  an  important  food  source,  enset  does  have  its  deficiency.  Enset  has  a  very  poor  
nutritional value if consumed alone. As other sources were exhausted, many poor households 
turned to enset and its effect was clearly visible during the 2003 green famine time in Sidama, 
Gedeo, Kambata, Hadiya, Wolita areas, where you could see a green surrounding but when you 
go  inside,  you  can  find  children  who  are  extremely  hungry,  with  bloated  belly  and  swollen  feet’  
(KI-AA/UN-FAO/FSE/06/09/2011). 
 
However, it should be noted that the impact of malnutrition is socially differentiated and 
affects certain demographic and age groups (children, pregnant and lactating women) more 
than other groups of the community (Young and Jaspars 2006). During the green famine 
period acute malnutrition was quite widespread in the enset-dominant livelihood zones, with 
some cases beyond WHO emergency thresholds. Figure 4.3 shows the findings from selected 
nutrition surveys conducted during the peak of the 2008 green famine across different 
livelihood settings in Ethiopia. As can be seen, the prevalence of GAM and SAM is considerably 
higher in enset-dominant livelihood zones compared to the cereal-dominant areas of Oromia 
and Amhara regions. In the case of East Bedewecho, Damot Pullasa and Boricha districts in 
SNNPR, the GAM and SAM rates have surpassed the WHO thresholds. The first two districts 
are neighbours to the study area (30 km away) and the third is located in Sidama zone (see 
Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 4.3: Various nutrition survey results, Ethiopia, April–June 2008 
 
Source: ENCU (2008:1) 
 
In response to the prevalence of malnutrition and reduce mortality risks, a large number of 
international humanitarian agencies, UNICEF, WHO, WFP, and the government undertook 
large-scale nutrition treatment interventions. The WFP supported by providing a food ration 
for  Targeted  Supplementary  Feeding  Programmes  (TSFP)  for  those  ‘moderately’  malnourished  
children and PLW. Table 4.5 shows the amount of specialised nutritious food distributed over 
the period of six months for TSFP in Ethiopia. 
 
Table 4.5: WFP TSF food dispatches per region, January–June 2008 
Region Beneficiary category Food distributed in MT 
Under 5 PLW Total Under 5 PLW Total MT 
Afar 35,414 16,665 52,079 986.5 464.2 1,450.7 
Amhara 77,415 36,431 113,846 2,156.5 1,014.8 3,171.3 
B/Gumuz 5,033 2,369 7,402 140,2 66.0 206.2 
Dire Dawa 842 471 1,312 23.5 13.1 36.6 
Gambela 2,872 1,351 4,223 80.0 37.6 117.6 
Hareri 1,440 678 2,117 40.1 18.9 59.0 
Oromia 110,929 52,202 163,130 3,090.0 1,454.1 4,544.2 
SNNPR 245,081 115,332 360,414 6,827.0 3,212.7 10,039.7 
Tigray 53,128 25,001 78,129 1,479.9 696.4 2,176.4 
Somali 36,169 17,020 53,189 1,007.5 474.1 1,481.6 
Total 568,322 267,520 835,842 15,831.2 7,452.0 23,283.2 
Source: ENCU 2008:10. 
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A quick glance at the food TSFP distribution data in Table 4.5 indicates that more people 
required nutritional emergency support in SNNPR than in the other regions. It also suggests 
that the problem of hunger and malnutrition was widespread across the country in 2008. 
Further, the figures also confirm the malnutrition was quite serious and highlights the green 
famine theory in SNNPR as nearly 50 per cent of the treatment resources were allocated 
compared to other regions. 
 
4.9 Conclusions 
Despite impressive efforts made to understand the causes of famine and alleviate famine 
occurrence, the concept of famine is still contested. In Ethiopia, famine is conventionally 
understood amongst the experts and policy-makers as an extreme event of food crisis leading 
to higher than normal mortality rates. However, famine-affected people have different views. 
For Kambata people, hunger is regarded as a short-term food shortage that happens due to 
various factors that disrupt the process of agricultural production. However, they do not 
categorise any seasonal or normal food shortage as hunger. 
 
In a similar manner, Kambata people explain that famine is a sequenced process and there are 
a series of stages that take place before an actual famine happens. There is a clear boundary 
between more general conditions of famine and hunger. They  differentiate  between  a  ‘killing’  
and  a  ‘swelling’  famine. Local people have their own taxonomy of hunger/famine conditions, 
which depends on tracking a variety of indicators. This sophisticated system for understanding 
the different stages of hunger leading to famine is mostly ignored by aid planners, even though 
it is obviously of value in crafting more effective responses to green famine. 
 
The causes of hunger and famine in general are mainly associated with natural factors such as 
drought and rain failure and demographic (neo-Malthusian) factors. The causes of green 
famine are no exception from such thinking, particularly among those in policy circles. This 
chapter argued that green famine results from a web of complex and intertwined natural, 
political, policy-related,  socio-­‐economic  and  demographic  factors. The recurrence of policy-
related and natural shocks significantly affected the asset base of households and as a result 
many households had already been living in a state of chronic vulnerability. The poor 
understanding of policy-makers and other actors of the local livelihood conditions and the 
growing acute and chronic vulnerability in the enset-dominant livelihood zones was also a 
factor contributing to the occurrence of green famine. 
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The occurrence of green famine reinforces the significance of the entitlement approach in 
understanding the causes of famine. People starve when their different sets of entitlements 
fail due to various factors. Different shocks have affected all four sets of entitlements of 
people in the study area and have subsequently exposed them to the green famine. This also 
highlights the importance of understanding various sources of vulnerability that push people 
into hunger and famine. 
 
Progressive livelihood vulnerability pushed many households to the edge and exposed them to 
the impending shocks. As a result, the natural (climate-related), and market-related factors 
have played a trigger role in the occurrence of green famine. More specifically, green famine 
was triggered by the occurrence of belg rain failure, price hikes in food commodities, and 
failure of sweet potato production due to diseases. Further, response failure at the zone, 
regional and federal government levels to acknowledge the existence of food crisis and green 
famine in the ethnic minority and politically less powerful region of the country exacerbated 
the situation. The occurrence of green famine caused wider economic, nutritional and social 
impacts and effects on the well-being of current and future generations in the study area. 
However, the impacts of green famine vary widely according to the type of household 
livelihood strategy, wealth category, and demographic group, social and cultural background.  
 
The next chapter discusses the trends in livelihood vulnerability, identifies sources of livelihood 
risk and vulnerability and which livelihoods are the most vulnerable to food insecurity and 
future green famine in the area. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Already at a tipping point? Vulnerability to food insecurity and hunger in 
enset-dominant livelihood zones in southern Ethiopia 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Vulnerability in the Kambata-Tembaro Zone is increasing and livelihoods are becoming more 
insecure, as the occurrence of three green famines within the space of a 15-year period 
suggests. This chapter identifies different livelihood types evident in the study area across 
different wealth categories. It also examines the types of risks and vulnerability factors 
affecting different livelihoods and their trends over time.  Further, it investigates which 
livelihoods are becoming more or less vulnerable to different shocks and are susceptible to 
food insecurity and green famine. Finally, it examines the types of responses undertaken by 
households against the prevailing livelihood crises and how these responses are playing a role 
in the resilience or vulnerability of livelihoods.  
 
5.2 Overview of livelihood system in the study area 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the K-T administrative zone falls under enset-dominant livelihood 
system of southern Ethiopia and most parts of the three woredas under investigation are 
categorised as Hadiya-Kambata cereal and enset livelihood zone (DPPC 2005b: 1). In general, 
the enset-based livelihood system is relatively resilient and food-secure compared to cereal-
based areas. However, over the last two decades or so, the resilience of the enset-based 
livelihood system has weakened due to various factors (Dessalegn 1996, 2007; Mulugeta 2007) 
in turn compromising the food security of many households.  
 
Various livelihood studies indicate that households are in an unceasing struggle to build and 
secure their livelihoods by using diverse existing options and resources in their specific context 
and settings. Devereux  (1999:  8)  argued  that  ‘poor  households  everywhere  survive  by  pursuing  
a mix of livelihood strategies that aimed at increasing income and assets, spreading and 
minimizing risks  and  preventing  destitution  and  death’.  During this study, community focus 
group discussions were undertaken in six kebeles to understand different types of livelihood 
strategies that households are involved in. The community discussions and consultations 
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indicated that livelihoods that are based on a mix of farming and herding (mixed farming), is 
the dominant type of livelihoods across the three districts, and households pursue a range of 
additional activities both on and off-farm. Respondents also indicated that due to persistent 
livelihood crises there is an emergent distinct livelihood category, which is the undertaking of 
certain types of activities. For instance, in the past only a few groups used to be engaged as 
full-time daily labourers (labour-based livelihood activities) in towns and rural areas, but now 
there are a large number of people who are actively pursuing this activity year round. Similarly, 
selling fuel woods and fresh grass (trade-based livelihood activities) was a supporting type of 
livelihood strategy for a few poor and very poor groups. However, this group is currently 
growing in size and pursuing these activities actively. Significant variations were observed 
regarding the importance of different livelihood strategies across the three woredas. As can be 
seen in Table 5.1, for instance, in Kacha-Bira woreda daily labour was ranked as the second 
most important livelihood strategy whereas in Kadida-Gamela and Doyo-Gena, it was ranked 
fourth. Similarly, international migration was the second most important livelihood strategy in 
Doyo-Gena woreda but it is reported as less important in Kacha-Bira and Kadida-Gamela 
woredas respectively. The reasons for this variation are discussed in Chapter 2 and in section 
5.5 below.  
 
Table 5.1: Different livelihood types in the study area (ranked according to their importance) 
 Woreda 
Kacha-Bira Kadida-Gamela Doyo-Gena 
Livelihood 
activities 
Mixed farming  Mixed farming  Mixed farming  
Daily labouring Cash crops (coffee and 
eucalyptus) production 
International migration 
Cash crops (coffee and 
eucalyptus) production 
Seasonal migration Seasonal migration 
Seasonal migration Daily labouring Daily labouring 
Caste-based occupations International migration Eucalyptus production 
Trade-based occupations Caste-based occupations Caste-based occupations 
International migration Trade-based occupations Trade-based occupations 
Source:  Author’s  fieldwork,  2011. 
 
Community members were asked to identify different types of risks and vulnerability factors 
that are impeding  households’ efforts in ensuring their food security and eroding their 
livelihood resilience over time. The results indicated that households with different types of 
livelihood categories have experienced different types of covariate and idiosyncratic risks and 
vulnerability factors in the study area. In general, these factors could be broadly categorised as 
natural, socio-economic and political or policy oriented (see Table 5.2). 
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Table 5.2: Types of risks for different livelihood groups according to community members 
Source:  Author’s  fieldwork,  2011. 
 
Table 5.2 shows disaggregated different risk and vulnerability factors affecting diverse 
livelihoods in the study area. Rainfall variability and failure, often described by peasants as 
‘drought’,  is  the  most  important  shock  that  is  increasing  the  vulnerability of households 
engaged in mixed farming livelihoods to seasonal food insecurity and hunger. The importance 
of rainfall variability or drought, as described by different actors, is not surprising as the 
livelihood activities in the area revolve around rain-fed agriculture and any factor that affects 
this sector has a direct knock-on effect on livelihoods. However, it should be noted that the 
concept of drought is different compare to lowland and drought prone areas that often 
confronted with actual drought. In this context, the timely arrival and cessation of rainfall 
critically important to maintain the production calendar and ensuring availability of food at 
household level (see Chapter 2). The second main vulnerability factor that is affecting 
households in their efforts is the surging price of agricultural inputs. Households have 
indicated that the increasing prices of chemical fertilisers and seeds, in particular, are a 
significant risk and vulnerability factor as inputs are unaffordable for the middle-income and 
Livelihood category Types of risk factors Ranked in order of 
importance 
Mixed farming Rainfall variability and failures (drought) 1 
Input price hike 2 
Land shortage 3 
Market uncertainty 4 
Restricted movement to other parts of the country in 
search of employment 
5 
Outstanding debts from the past (mostly input related) 6 
Occurrence of disease and pests (human, livestock and 
crop) 
7 
Daily labouring Limited job opportunities 1 
Seasonality  2 
Growing competition for local labour employment 2 
Rain failure and drought 3 
Food price hike 4 
Pottery Restricted access to production material (proper clay) 1 
Lower or no demand for products during lean seasons 2 
Taste and preference changing away from earth-made 
materials due to emergence of plastic products 
3 
Blacksmithing Material cost 1 
Decreasing demand particularly during drought 
seasons 
2 
Seasonality of demand 3 
Tanning Shortage of materials (hides and skins) 1 
Decreasing demand 2 
Fuel wood and fresh 
grass selling 
Lack of access to resources 1 
Lower demand during food crises 2 
Increasing food prices 3 
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poor groups. As a result, households fail to access sufficient inputs to cultivate their land and 
hence produce insufficient outputs from their farms. Trends on agricultural input prices are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7. Additionally, general land shortage due to rapidly growing 
population, market uncertainty, restricted movements to other parts of the country in search 
of employment (see Chapter 4), indebtedness and seasonal disease outbreaks for humans 
(malaria, acute watery diarrhoea), livestock (Trypanosomiasis, and Anthrax) crops (coffee 
berry disease, enset wilt, wheat rust, sweet potato butterfly) are sources of vulnerability 
among households dependent on mixed farming livelihood (DPPC 2005b: 7). 
 
As mentioned earlier, a growing number of households depend on labour-based occupations 
mainly on daily labouring as their main income source, due to renting out their land to better-
off households, lack of enset on their farms or because young couples have very small plots of 
land, or people are returnees from other regions due to conflict, etc. For these households 
who are pursuing labour-based livelihoods, employment opportunities are very limited, 
particularly during failed rains when the availability decreases significantly as most of the daily 
labour jobs are agriculture oriented. Seasonality is also mentioned as another important 
source of livelihood vulnerability. And as many households, particularly the young, are 
resorting to daily labour activities, there is growing competition. Failure of rain not only may 
cause shortages of employment opportunities, but also contributes to increasing market food 
prices. As daily labourers are mainly dependent on markets for their daily food, the failure of 
rain  has  a  ‘double-edged  sword  effect’  on  their food security. 
 
Among the Kambata ethnic groups, the Fuga clan are considered a lower caste group, who 
have been subjected to discrimination and unfair treatment for many years, despite their 
significant contribution to their society through their distinctive skills (Pankhurst 2001; Wolde-
Selassie 2001). Studies by Belachew (2001) and Wolde-Selassie (2001: 67) provided some 
insights about the unfair treatment, socially constructed stereotypes and discrimination of the 
Fuga attributed to their pursuit of  ‘different  livelihood  strategy’  from  dominantly  agriculture-
based livelihoods of the majority of the Kambata clans. Despite some improvements, the Fuga 
are denied equal access and opportunities of education and involvement in social and political 
activities in the area. They pursue unique and specialised livelihood activities such as pottery, 
tannery, blacksmithing, traditional healing, public announcement and circumcision. These are 
smaller groups but they are spread across all districts. As farming is not their primary 
livelihood activity, historically these groups often own smaller plots of unfertile land. Despite 
their unique livelihood system, they are also involved in different agricultural activities. A focus 
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group discussion with the community representatives and case studies with households from 
the Fuga clan indicated that their livelihood is severely strained. For households engaged in 
pottery-making, limited access to raw materials such as clay and wild grass, decreasing 
demand for their products during times of crisis and hunger, and changing customer 
preferences towards plastic-based products are the major vulnerability factors. Similarly, the 
blacksmiths indicated that increasing costs of scrap metals, decreasing demand for their 
products during food crises and the seasonality of their work are main sources of vulnerability. 
The tanners are a very small group facing challenges due to shortage of materials (hides and 
skins) and decreasing demand for their products as people start depending more on factory-
made materials. They indicated that in recent years, the price of hides and skins has increased 
significantly  due  to  a  growing  number  of  traders  at  local  markets.  ‘People  are  willing  to  sell  
their products to the traders who offer higher prices than to us; hence we are not able to 
compete  with  them  and  this  is  seriously  affecting  our  business.’  In  the  past,  there  was  only  one  
local hides and skins trader, but now there are more than ten coming from neighbouring 
towns. The increasing demand for hides and skins is due to a booming leather sector in 
Ethiopia as local and global firms are increasingly involved and this opens up opportunities to 
small-scale suppliers from local markets.  
 
Lack of access to resources due to decreasing communal lands, lower market demand during 
failed rainy seasons and increasing food prices are the major sources of livelihood shocks for 
those who are engaged in the sale of fresh grass and fuel woods. In the past, these groups 
collected grass and fuel woods from communal lands and forest areas. Now that these 
communal lands are not available any more as they were divided and given to demobilised 
soldiers and displaced returnee households after 1991 by kebele authorities, access to these 
resources has become a major challenge for fresh grass and fuel wood sellers. (See Box 5.4) for 
more details on shocks facing households whose livelihood is based on pottery production. 
 
Table 5.3: Prices for pottery products before and during the green famine period 
Clay products 2006–07 
Average price (in birr) 
2007–08 
Average price (in birr) 
Water pot  8 4 
Coffee pot 8 3 
Saucepan  10 5 
Earthen tripod oven 3 1  
Source:  Author’s  fieldwork,  2011. 
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5.2.1 Livelihood strategies across wealth categories in the study area 
Different wealth categories that exist in the study area are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
Focus group discussions with different community groups indicated that households from 
different wealth categories are engaged in different types of livelihood strategies. The results 
indicated that the majority of households from the better-off and middle-wealth categories 
tend to engage in more specialised and less diversified livelihood activities. Further, they 
produce more cash and cereal crops (coffee and eucalyptus) compared to poor and destitute 
households. In contrast, the majority of households from poor and destitute wealth categories 
are engaged in diverse livelihood activities such as seasonal migration, daily labouring, trade-
based activities, and caste-based activities to make ends meet. As discussed earlier, caste-
based occupations (pottery, tanning and blacksmithing) are specialised activities undertaken 
by certain clan members of the Kambata ethnic groups. Table 5.4 illustrates livelihood 
types/strategies undertaken across wealth categories in the study area.   
 
Table 5.4: Livelihood types across wealth categories in the study area 
 
Livelihood types 
Wealth categories 
 Better-off  Middle Poor Destitute 
Mixed farming     
Migration- based (seasonal and local migration)     
Daily labouring     
Caste-based occupations     
Cash crops (coffee and eucalyptus)     
International migration based     
Fuel woods and grass selling      
Source:  Author’s  fieldwork,  2011. 
 
In-depth case studies with households from different livelihood and wealth categories 
highlighted the main sources of household income across the study area. Households from 
better-off and middle-wealth categories and whose main livelihood is based on mixed farming 
and migration (seasonal and international), drawn their income from sales of agriculture 
products (coffee, teff, wheat, enset products, eucalyptus, livestock and livestock products), 
migration and remittances (see Boxes 5.1 and 5.6). In contrast, for households from poor and 
destitute wealth groups whose livelihood is mainly based on daily labour, selling of grass and 
firewood and caste-based activities, their income draws from casual employment, sale of their 
products, PSNP transfers and other sources (see Boxes 4.2 and 4.3). A baseline study by the 
Livelihoods Integration Unit (LIU) of the Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector 
(DRMFSS) of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) using the Household Economy Analysis (HEA) 
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approach in Kacha-Bira woreda in 2003–04 indicated similar results to the findings of the 
current study (see Table 5.5).  
 
Table 5.5: Household sources of income in Kacha-Bira woreda across wealth categories 
 
Sources of income  
Wealth categories and estimated level of income in percent 
Better-off Middle Poor Very Poor 
Sales of crops  58% 55% 20% 18% 
Petty trade 35% 35% 35% 12% 
Sales of livestock   4%  
Sales of livestock 
products 
7% 10% 11%  
Casual employment   30% 68% 
Self-employment    2% 
Source: DPPC (2005b: 4). 
 
5.2.2 Changes in wealth groups and indicators in the study area over time 
As discussed in Chapter 2, during a wealth-ranking exercise, community representatives 
divided households in their communities into four types of wealth categories according to 
locally set indicators across the study area. Additionally, the community representatives were 
asked:  ‘What are the main wealth groups in your locality – currently [2011], five and ten years 
ago?  What  proportions  of  your  community  belongs  to  these  groups?’  The  community  
responses indicated that there had been significant changes in the wealth groups over the last 
decade, although some variations were observed across the three woredas. In Kacha-Bira, 
both men and women divided their communities into three wealth groups currently, 
compared to four groups five and ten years ago. They indicated that in the past there were few 
and easily identifiable destitute groups in their community, but currently these groups are 
already included in the PSNP and their economic status is improved and subsequently they 
moved up to the poor groups. However, they reiterated that more and more people who are 
not targeted by the PSNP are becoming poor and sliding into destitution from the middle class 
over time. The following comment illustrates this claim: 
 
‘The  poor  group  is  becoming  more  destitute  since  the  incidence  of  green famine in 2008. Most of 
these groups either have disposed their productive assets including land and recovering and 
rebuilding  these  assets  will  take  many  years’  (FG_KB/AS-CEM/ 12/02/2011). 
 
‘I  think  we  are  becoming  incapable  and  less  resilient  “eyaku  yoneebea” literally means  “Our  
resilience  has  weakened”. For instance, this year [2011] the belg rain was delayed and many 
people  were  on  the  verge  of  starvation  because  “ko’rune  shaashefage  ”  means  “our  belt  is  
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loose”.  We  are  not  strong  enough  to  fend  off  the  effects  of  shocks  because  we  don’t  have  any  
more  livestock  assets  as  we  used  to  have.  We  don’t  produce  surplus  and  store  food  for  the  
future, we live simply on daily basis. We do not have an ability to save, because it is not enough 
to  save’  (FG_KG/AD-CEW/24/02/2011). 
 
In contrast to Kacha-Bira woreda, Kadida-Gamela and Doyo-Gena woredas each currently have 
four wealth groups. There are more destitute people now than five and ten years ago. The 
respondents signalled that in the past there was a clear cut-off in wealth groups, and 
community members were poor but very few were destitute. However, over the last ten years 
or so this trend has been reversed and more people from the middle and poor levels are 
sliding into the poor and destitute group. In addition, the community elders were asked if 
there have been changes in social and economic characteristics of each wealth group over 
time, particularly since the occurrence of the green famine of 2007–08. They indicated the 
following: 
 
‘In  the  past,  having  a  large  number  of  enset  trees  in  one’s  backyard  used  to  be  a  good  indicator  
of  one’s  wealth.  However,  currently  people  value  eucalyptus  tree  more  than  enset  due  to  its  
market  value’  (FG-KB/AS-CEW/12/02/2011). 
 
‘Sending  a  member  of  a  household  to  South  Africa  has  become an important indicator of wealth 
and  status,  thus  if  you  are  able  to  do  so,  you  are  considered  wealthy’  (FG_KB/AS-CEM/ 
12/02/2011). 
 
‘The  changing  value  of  farm  produce  is  making  people  rich  or  poor  in  a  short  time.  These  days  the  
price of agricultural produce has increased significantly while the cost of production also has 
surged disturbingly. So, those who have both land and enough capital to invest in their farm 
could  suddenly  become  richer  over  a  short  period  of  time’  (FG_KG/AD-CEM/24/02/2011). 
 
Respondents were asked how many months in a year each wealth group would face food 
shortage. Here, food shortage is defined in purely descriptive form as a gap in the food 
requirements of a household. The answers were similar across the three districts. According to 
the respondents the better-off households may not necessarily face food shortages during the 
entire year. They may run out of food stocks produced from their land, but during such 
circumstances they can sell small ruminants and purchase food. The middle-wealth households 
group may face food shortage for on average 4–5 months. The poor group faces food 
shortages for 6–8 months of the year, whereas destitute households face food shortages 
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almost the entire year, regardless of changes in weather conditions and food prices at the 
markets. 
 
5.2.3 Livelihood vulnerability and changes 
In order to understand and investigate the livelihoods in enset-dominant areas in general and 
in K-T zone in particular, different actors in the region were asked whether, overall, livelihoods 
were becoming more or less vulnerable to hunger and periodic famines, or if there was no 
change at all. Key informant interviews were conducted with senior experts of food security 
and livelihoods working at academic institutions, research centres and the UN agencies. These 
key informants who have significant knowledge about the region in general and had worked in 
the study area for many years. They indicated that the livelihoods in southern Ethiopia, 
particularly in the enset-dominant livelihood zones, have seen a very rapid change over time 
and become increasingly vulnerable to food insecurity and periodic famines for a variety of 
reasons. Overall, most respondents shared that this historically resilient and complex 
livelihood system has lost its strength against different chains of shocks that have been 
occurring over time. The following quotes reflect the prevalent situation of livelihood 
vulnerability, particularly in enset-dominant livelihood zones in the study region: 
 
‘From  my  experience  and  engagement  in  various  development  and  emergency  programmes  in  
southern Ethiopia, the livelihoods in southern Ethiopia are becoming more and more vulnerable 
over time. Various factors contribute to the vulnerability of livelihoods in the area. We can look 
into  three  categories  such  as  demographic,  natural  (climatic)  and  policy  related’  (KI_AA/UN-
OCHA/12/08/2011). 
 
‘I  don’t  think  they  are  becoming  resilient  because  in  the  last  ten  years  there  have been lots of 
emergency and development interventions in the region. Despite all these initiatives, despite all 
these efforts, you see the capacity of livelihoods to absorb shocks is still very limited. I think 
livelihoods have lost their resilience. In the past, livelihoods used to cope with shocks without 
external intervention, but recently even a single season rain failure is causing havoc and turning 
to  emergency’  (KI_HA/UN-WFP/03/05/2011). 
 
‘Livelihoods,  particularly  in  areas  where  I  have  carried  out my research, particularly in enset–
cereal livelihood zones, the livelihoods are becoming more vulnerable to food insecurity and 
periodic  hunger  over  time  due  to  multiple  factors’  (KI-HA/HU-AC-1/05/05/2011). 
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These responses indicate that livelihoods in the enset-based livelihood system are becoming 
less secure, less resilient and more vulnerable. As discussed in Chapter 4, various factors such 
as restrictive labour movement, agricultural input prices, land shortages, dwindling enset 
production due to bacterial wilt, poor extension services and over-reliance and severe land 
shortages have all contributed to the long decline in livelihoods in K-T zone. In a nutshell, the 
sources of vulnerability have two dimensions: socio-economic and policy-oriented. 
 
Table 5.6 below provides a snapshot of the state of food insecurity in the study area. It can be 
argued that this condition is a reflection of stressed livelihood systems. As the figures from the 
UNOCHA emergency food security assessment undertaken during the 2008 green famine 
indicate, a significant number of people were affected in K-T zone. Of the total 783,610 people 
in the zone, 26 per cent faced extreme food shortage and survived through emergency food 
relief and 13 per cent through the regular government PSNP that has targeted chronically food 
insecure households in chronically food insecure woredas in different regions of the country 
since 2005. The PSNP is discussed in detail in Chapter 7. Further, the assessment report 
estimated that 42,000 people (5 per cent) were at risk of a deterioration of the situation and 
possibly needed emergency support. Of the seven districts in the zone, Kacha-Bira, Kadida-
Gamela and Hadero-Tunto suffered the largest number of people affected by the green 
famine. Thus, livelihoods in K-T zone are growing more insecure, vulnerability is increasing and 
it is likely that another green famine will occur in the future. In order to better understand this 
state of affairs, the following section provides a detailed assessment of enset-based livelihoods 
and explains the role and contribution of enset in this zone.  
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Table 5.6: Breakdown of total population in K-T zone of those requiring emergency relief, at risk of emergency and existing PSNP beneficiaries 
(BNFs) during the green famine period, May 2008 
District Total 
population 
PSNP 
BNFs 
Affected 
population 
Required 
emergency aid 
(affected + PSNP 
BNFs) 
Population at risk of 
emergency 
% of population 
in PSNP 
% of population in 
emergency response 
% of population in 
PSNP and requiring 
emergency response  
Tembaro 124,980 24,210 56,241 32,031 12,500 19% 26% 45% 
Kadida-
Gamela 
111,535 15,564 50,191 34,627 5,000 14% 31% 45% 
Hadero-
Tunto 
103,750 15,346 46,688 31,342 7,500 15% 30% 45% 
Kacha-
Bira 
149,000 18,498 67,050 48,552 5,000 12% 32% 44% 
Damboya 97,505 14,966 29,252 14,286 4,000 15% 15% 30% 
Angecha 100,940 8,470 30,282 21,812 4,000 8% 22% 30% 
Doyo-
Gena 
95,900 4,671 28,770 24,099 4,000 5% 25% 30% 
Total 783,610 101,725 308,474 206,749 42,000 13% 26% 39% 
Note: Some discrepancy observed in the total population figures of K-T zone. According to the data from the Regional Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, 
the total estimated population projection based on the 2007 national census for K-T zone in 2008 is 723,558 people. Thus, this data was based on the figures 
obtained from the K-T zone office of agriculture and rural development and UNOCHA assessment reports. This difference could be due to an error of population 
projection. 
Source: UN-OCHA 2011a; K-T Zone BoARD 2011a
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5.3 Introduction to the enset tree in enset-based livelihood system 
This section introduces the enset tree in enset-based livelihood system, its role and 
contribution to household food security in the study area. It also investigates factors affecting 
the resilience of the enset-based livelihood system and implications for the increasing 
vulnerability to food crises and periodic green famines. 
 
5.3.1 Enset tree 
Enset, often referred to as false banana (Ensete ventricosum), is an indigenous food crop that 
traditionally grows in southern, south-western and some eastern parts of Ethiopia (See Fig. 
5.1). It is a multi-purpose tree that is consumed by an estimated 12–1522 million people in the 
country (Dessalegn 1996; Brandt et al. 1997; Tadesse 2002). As noted earlier, the study area 
falls  within  the  variously  described  ‘enset  based  farming  system/culture’  (Dessalegn  2007: 13), 
‘enset  complex’  (Brandt 1996: 37)  or  ‘enset–cereal  livelihood  zone’  (DPPC 2005a: 23). Enset is 
a culturally and socially valued staple food crop among the Sidama, Gedeo, Wolita, Hadiya, 
Kambata, Guraghe, Dorze, and other ethnic groups in the region. Historically, this farming 
system has been known for supporting a larger population density compared to cereal-based 
livelihood zones yet it has been relatively hunger- and famine-free and resilient against shocks 
and food crises (Dessalegn 1996, 2007; Seifu 1996; Brandt et al. 1997; Tadesse 2002; Mulugeta 
2007). 
 
Enset is planted through a vegetative propagation process and the suckers/seedlings are 
transplanted from the nursery to the main field after one or two years. Different studies 
suggest that a corm/underground stem of a single mother plant aged 3–6 years could yield 
100–150 suckers/seedlings (Seifu 1996: 206). The nursery is prepared in the backyard, very 
close to the tukul (hamlet) where it is closely and carefully managed through application of 
manure, compost and ashes, while older trees are transplanted further away from the tukul 
and are intercropped with maize, green cabbage or haricot beans (Dessalegn 1996: 88). Enset 
has a longer maturity period (up to six years) compared to cereals, but it can be harvested and 
                                                             
 
22 The exact number of people who depend on enset is still contested. Some studies (e.g. Tsedeke et al. 
1996) estimate that enset supports 20 percent of  Ethiopia’s  population. 
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consumed at any stage of growth starting from its second year in an extreme hunger situation 
and from its third year during a moderate food shortage (Brandt et al. 1997: 44). As in other 
enset-dependent areas, in Kambata women  undertake  the  lion’s  share  of  enset  processing,  
marketing and preparing. It is very labour-intensive so the women often pool their labour as a 
group or hire others to perform the processing. Once it is pulverised and chopped finely it is 
buried in a storage pit lined with fresh enset leaves for fermentation (Seifu 1996; Brandt et al. 
1997; Dougherty 2002). Chernet and Shank (1996) noted that once enset is processed and 
stored  in  a  pit,  it  serves  as  ‘a  living  refrigerator’, which households can tap into at any time to 
cover their food and energy needs. If a household decides to store it for a very long period, 
they can easily take it out of the pit, clean and replace the lining of the pit with fresh leaves 
and store it again. Like a good wine, the quality increases with the duration it remains in 
fermentation.   
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Figure 5.1: The enset plant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top: Enset and coffee farm. Centre: Enset seedlings and tress around the house (photography by Author 
2011). Bottom: Parts of the enset plant (from Brandt et al. 1997: 3). 
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5.3.2 Enset as a strategic household food reserve against hunger and famine 
Various empirical studies have indicated that enset produces significantly higher calories per 
hectare per year than cereals. Alemu and Sandford 1991 (quoted in Pankhurst 1996: 76) in 
their assessment in North Omo area estimated that ‘the average yield of enset per hectare per 
year is equal to 66–230 quintals, equivalent  in  terms  of  energy  to  39  to  137  quintals  of  grain’.  
Similar to this, Tadesse (2002: 166), based on his work in the Gedeo zone, estimated that 
having  ‘42  mature  enset  trees can cover a yearly food need for a household of seven 
members’. Dessalegn Rahmato is one of the leading and pioneer researchers in the country on 
the role of enset farming systems in southern Ethiopia. In his study, (Dessalegn 1992: 35) 
compared its significance as:  ‘Enset  is  to  the  Wolita  diet  what  rice  is  to  Asians’. In addition to 
being a strategic household food reserve, enset also has a strong cultural significance among 
the Kambata people. The size of an enset plot (number of enset trees) in the backyard 
indicates wealth and social status (as honourable man/household) in the community (see 
Chapter 2). The Kambata people appreciate the multiple uses and capacity of enset (wesse) 
and  express  it  through  a  song:  ‘wesse wesse, haberchuukin merraba, hamichukin buskuuta, 
qaanchichukin musmarra,  wassichukin  injerra’  (literally  translated  as:  ‘enset,  your  leaf  is  a  
handkerchief, the corm is like a biscuit, the fibre is like a nail [for construction], the processed 
enset is like a pancake’)  (personal  experience). Similarly a Guraghe (another enset-dependent 
ethnic  group  in  southern  Ethiopia)  poem  recorded  by  Strelcyn  notes  ‘the  horse  of  Ato Cheggar 
(i.e. Mr Hunger) broke its leg when it arrived at Guraghe’  (Strelcyn  quoted  in  Pankhurst  1996:  
79). To sum up, these quotes and songs clearly highlight the central role of enset as a source of 
household food security. 
 
Despite deteriorating livelihoods and food insecurity in the study area, households with a good 
reserve of enset in their yard have successfully kept the threat of hunger and periodic famines 
at bay (see Box 5.1). As noted earlier, enset is a strategic food reserve and a safety net against 
different shocks for all households across all wealth categories. However, it should be noted 
that the significance of enset as a source of food at household level changes according to 
seasonality, social, and wealth status and availability of supplements, particularly animal 
products (Pankhurst 1996: 74). In times of good rainfall distribution and better production of 
cereals and other crops and pasture available, enset becomes a co-staple food and feed source 
for both people and livestock respectively. However, in the face of rain failure and subsequent 
production failure of cereals and poor availability of pasture and also during lean periods, its 
importance increases and it becomes a staple source of food and feed. When milk and milk 
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products are available at a household level, enset becomes a regular food source. The case 
study in Box 5.1 shows how having a large number of enset trees on its farm helped a 
household to avoid seasonal hunger and famine. 
 
Box 5.1: Case study: The role of enset in household food security 
 
Ato Shaemelo is a 56-year-old peasant, married with eight children, who resides in Kadida-
Gamela woreda. Currently, he owns 3 timad (0.75 ha) of land and divides his land equally to 
grow cereals on 0.25 ha, coffee on 0.25 ha and enset on 0.25 ha. He used to own 6 timad (1.5 
ha) of land, but since 1991 his land size has reduced to 3 timad as he had to share half of it 
with his brother who had been living in the Oromia region and returned to Kadida-Gamela due 
to ethnic conflict that had erupted following the introduction of ethnic-based regionalisation in 
the country. His household food supply comes from own production, and his family relies on 
enset as its staple food crop, supplemented by milk and milk products. He owns a milking cow, 
a calf and an ox. He revealed that his extended family had never faced serious hunger or food 
insecurity in his lifetime. The main source of income is drawn from sales of agricultural 
products, particularly coffee and cereals; the main expenses are for fertiliser, improved seed, 
school fees and festivities, as well as local burial association contribution fees. He said that the 
changing rainfall pattern is a main source of shock affecting his agriculture-based livelihood. 
The increasing price of fertiliser is a main concern and he fears that, if it continues at the 
current rate, he may not be able to afford it and may be forced to focus on enset and coffee 
production only.  
 
Enset wilt is another challenge he is facing. He is self-sufficient and food secure according to 
locally defined indicators, as he possess large area of enset trees in his backyard. When asked 
what his secret is to being food self-sufficient despite having little land and a large family, he 
replied  ‘growing  more  enset  as  a  source  of  food  and  having  a  good  number of coffee trees on 
my  farm  as  a  source  of  cash’.  He  explained  that  enset  covers  the  lion’s  share  of  his  family’s  
food needs while the income from coffee sales covers all other major expenses that occur in 
the household. Despite his current situation, he explained that the situation is getting more 
difficult and that the future seems to be bleak. His argument is based on the growing 
fragmentation of land and ever-increasing prices of agriculture inputs, particularly fertiliser. He 
hopes that his children will continue their education and find work somewhere else, and do 
not need to come back to share the piece of land with him. 
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5.3.3 Challenges to enset-based livelihood resilience 
According to the community members, development agents (DAs), local authorities and 
researchers, enset production has faced complex and interlinked challenges ranging across 
natural, demographic, socio-economic and policy-oriented factors, heavily affecting the 
resilience and productivity of the enset-based livelihood system over the last decade. These 
are discussed in detail below. 
 
5.3.3.1 Natural factors 
The resilience and sturdiness of enset resembles that of a camel in the case of pastoralism. As 
Tadesse (2002: 75) noted,  ‘through its funnel-like leaves, enset collects rainwater towards a 
barrel-like pseudo-stem’  and  conserves its body structure (see Figure 5.1) for longer periods’.  
Hence, even during drought periods when other cereals easily succumb to drought, enset-can 
survive and maintain its green and lush appearance. However, enset is susceptible to various 
diseases and pests. Bacterial wilt disease (Xanthomonas campestris pv. musacearum) is a 
major threat that is seriously affecting enset production (Brandt et al. 1997;Tadesse 2002). 
According to the enset researchers at Areka research centre, bacterial wilt is a primary concern 
for enset production and it can attack at any stage of its growth, although the scale of damage 
is greater when it happens at the later stages. This could have serious consequences, 
particularly for middle-income and poor households who have limited enset trees and could 
lose their most important food source (Dessalegn 1996: 93). Wilt is a very contagious disease 
and easily transmits through insect vectors and contaminated tools used for cutting and other 
purposes. Due to lack of policy attention, any research on enset is at a very early stage and 
primarily focuses on identification, multiplication and preservation of clones with different 
attributes such as high yield, disease resistance, early maturing and medicinal value, while the 
prevalence of the disease is increasing over time (Brandt et al. 1997: 2). As a result, thus far 
the research centres cannot deliver scientific solutions to wilt, except for promoting cultural 
practices and methods that have already been applied by farmers for many years.23 Such lack 
of policy focus towards enset production by policy makers and agricultural research centres is 
partly due to the overall agricultural policy of the country that focuses on cereals and cash 
crops. This is discussed in great detail in chapter 7. Given that enset is a perennial crop that 
takes up to 4–6 years to fully mature, wilt is a threat that discourages many households from 
                                                             
 
23 Personal communication with a senior researcher at Areka enset research centre, May 2011. 
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investing in cultivation and risking losing it all. As a result, many middle-level and poor 
households are forced to resort to short-maturing cereals rather than enset. 
 
5.3.3.2 Demographic factors 
As noted earlier, the enset-based livelihood zones of Ethiopia are historically known for 
supporting large populations per square kilometre. As a result of a growing population in these 
areas, the average size of land allocated to enset crop has decreased significantly while the 
reliance on enset has increased over the last few years. Focus group discussions with 
communities across three districts indicated that enset production is decreasing in their 
respective areas over time (Table 5.9). Further, data from the K-T zone Bureau of Agriculture 
indicated that the average production of enset in Kadida-Gamela has shown a decreasing 
trend over time  (Figures 5.6 and also see Belachew (2001: 165-174).  Overall, this situation has 
created an unbalanced relationship between enset production and the cultivated land size. 
This trend has been emerging for a long time and is negatively affecting the resilience of the 
enset farming communities. 
 
5.3.3.3 Policy-related challenges 
As noted earlier, enset is a staple and a co-staple food for a large majority of people in 
southern Ethiopia. However, despite playing such an important role in household food 
security, enset does not receive the national and international research and policy attention 
given to other cereals and cash crops (Brandt et al. 1997: 2). As a result, the enset tree has 
been neglected for many years and no intensive research has been conducted on different 
attributes of the tree. Currently, the only enset research centre in the country (Areka 
Agricultural Research Centre) is struggling with various challenges including lack of funding and 
staff shortages. A key informant at the regional agricultural centre has summed up the 
challenges faced by the overall enset research and production as follows: 
‘Enset  crop lacks attention at various levels including the regional and national government, 
international donors and researchers despite its commendable role for household food security. 
The budget allocated by the Government is very minimal compared to the research budget to 
cereals and other root and tuber crops. Further, given it is as a regionally specific crop consumed 
among the minority populations of SNNPR, it lacks attention and focus by the political and policy-
making actors at the national level. It can be argued that there is less political will and interest to 
promote this crop at the national level. The current agricultural and rural development policies of 
Ethiopia favour cash crops to food crops. The promotion of cash crops like coffee, ginger and 
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wheat had a negative effect on the cultural value and paradoxically affected as well its food 
security  role.  In  the  international  research  arena,  enset  is  an  “orphan”  crop  and  is not widely 
known outside Ethiopia’ (KI_HA/SARI-DG/17/05/2011). 
 
Thus, poor policy and research focus towards enset by the central and regional governments 
has significantly affected the production of enset in the study area. In summary, due to the 
recurrence of the above factors over time, the enset-based livelihood system in K-T zone has 
lost its resilience. Other previous researches that have been undertaken in enset-based 
livelihood zones in SNNPR have shown similar findings. The findings by Dessalegn in Wolita 
(1992, 1994, 1996, 2007) and by Dougherty in Sidama (2002: 140) have concluded  that,  ‘the  
historically enset based resilient livelihood system has lost its capacity and is no longer able to 
ensure  household  food  security  as  it  once  did’. 
 
5.4 Risks and vulnerability factors and their trends 
As Chambers (1989) and Ellis (2000) noted, livelihoods are resilient when they are able to cope 
with various shocks and stresses over time without external intervention and without 
jeopardising their long-term capacity. Like food insecurity and famine, vulnerability is 
multidimensional, and thus it is imperative to focus not only on environmental or natural 
factors such as drought and rainfall conditions but also to look further into other aspects that 
increase vulnerability, such as ‘social inequalities among different ethnic groups and classes, 
and struggles over land rights and natural resources’ (Blaikie 1985, cited in Baro and Deubel 
2006: 527). 
 
In order to investigate if there have been significant divergences in the perception of livelihood 
risks and shocks in the study area between communities and government actors, the same 
questions were posed. Table 5.7 disaggregates perceived livelihood risks and shocks and their 
importance in terms of effects on livelihoods and overall trends by different actors at different 
levels in the study area. The actors involved in this research were asked to list the types of 
shocks affecting the local mixed farming livelihood system. Once completed, they were asked 
to discuss the overall trend and rank the shocks according to their importance (see Table 5.7). 
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Table 5.7: Perceived livelihood risks and shocks by different actors at different levels 
Source:  Author’s  fieldwork,  2011. 
 
In general, the views of zone, woreda and kebele actors were similar to the views of the 
general community in the study area. Of a total of 11 DAs interviewed in all six kebeles in the 
three woredas, most claimed that inadequate and irregular rainfall distribution is the main 
livelihood shock causing vulnerability to food insecurity. Similarly, this have been indicated the 
most significant shock and source of livelihood vulnerability among all actors in interviews and 
discussions in this research across all levels of administrative hierarchy.  
 
In order to test if these claims and perceptions are supported by meteorological observation, 
long-term rainfall data from 1980 to 2008 from the Ethiopian Metrological Agency (EMA) were 
analysed and compared, based on data from the local rainfall station in Kadida-Gamela24 
                                                             
 
24The Metrological station of Kadida-Gamela district is used for the analysis of the overall rainfall trend 
in the study area as all three districts have similar agro-ecology and livelihood systems. Further, of the 
three districts, only Kadida-Gamela has historic rainfall data.  
Respondents Shocks No. of times 
mentioned 
Rank 
according to 
importance 
Perceived 
trends 
Development 
agents 
Change of rainfall pattern, 
‘drought’ 
7 1 Increasing 
Increase of agriculture input price  5 2 Increasing 
Reduced soil fertility 1 4 Increasing 
Presence of army worms 1 4 Increasing 
Presence of wheat rust 1 4 No change 
Occurrence of erosion 1 4 Decreasing 
Woreda-level 
technocrats 
Change of rainfall pattern 3 1 Increasing 
Decrease of enset production due 
to disease and population pressure 
2 2 Increasing 
Shortage of farmland due to 
population pressure  
1 3 Increasing 
Woreda-level 
experts 
Change of rainfall pattern 
(inadequate and irregular rainfall 
distribution) 
3 1 Increasing 
Shrinkage of land size per 
household 
2 2 Increasing 
Presence of sweet potato butterfly 2 2 Increasing 
Increase of agriculture input price  1 3 Increasing 
Zone-level 
experts 
Change of rainfall pattern 2 1 Increasing 
Increase of land shortage 2 1 Increasing 
Increase of agriculture input price  1 2 Increasing 
Presence of plant diseases 1 2 Increasing 
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district. The recorded data indicates that the average annual rainfall between 1980 and 2008 
was 1,083 mm for Kadida-Gamela district, as shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2: Annual rainfall trends in Kadida-Gamela district, 1980–2008 (mm) 
 
 
Close examination of the annual rainfall data for 29 years (Figure 5.2) leads to the following 
key observations about the trends of rainfall variability in the study area: (1) The first decade 
experienced relatively higher rainfall than the next two decades; (2) The study area received a 
relatively higher and evenly distributed rainfall, except in 1984, which coincided with the 
occurrence of the 1984 famine; (3) Over the three decades, the largest amount of rain was 
recorded in 1989, followed by 1982 and 2005, with rainfall of 1,581, 1,398 and 1,394 mm 
respectively; (4) In the same period the lowest amounts of rainfall were recorded in 1984, 
1994 with rainfalls of 750 and 813 mm respectively. 
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Figure 5.3: Average annual rainfall by decade in Kadida-Gamela district 
  
 
In order to see if there has been a big change in the average annual rainfall over the past three 
decades, the data were analysed by decades. The results indicated that the average rainfall in 
1980–89 was above the overall mean annual rainfall and the lowest rainfall was exhibited from 
1990 to 1999. However, the average annual rainfall for the last decade (2000–2008) has shown 
an increasing trend compare to the previous decade.  
 
In order to further investigate claims about the changing rain patterns and increasing 
unpredictability the long-term data was analysed according to the two main rainy seasons (see 
Table 5.8).  
 
Table 5.8: Long-term trends and variability of belg and mehar rains in Kadida-Gamela 
district, 1980–2008 
Years Belg season Mehar season 
Mean in mm SD CV% Mean in mm SD CV% 
1980–2008 318.19 91.65 28.80 659.10 117.92 17.89 
1980–1989 325.79 103.76 31.84 694.36 137.24 19.76 
1990–1999 315.2 83.93 26.62 628.89 119.20 18.95 
2000–2008 313.08 96.17 30.71 653.5 93.64 14.32 
Source: Computed from the Ethiopian Meteorological Agency rainfall data 2011. 
 
Table 5.8 indicates that the mean belg rains in 1980–89  were  higher  than  the  29  years’  annual  
mean.  The  29  years’  annual  mean  of  belg and mehar was 318.19 mm and 659.10 mm 
respectively. The decade of 2000–2008 recorded comparatively lower belg rainfall than the 
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previous decades. Similar patterns were observed in the mean mehar rainy seasons where the 
highest amount was recorded between 1980 and 1989, which is above the total mean.  
 
In order to analyse the variability in belg and mehar rains distribution over time, a coefficient 
of variation (CV%) technique was used. The results of the analysis indicate, overall, the belg 
rains exhibited higher coefficient variations indicating higher rainfall variability and 
unpredictability compared to the mehar rains. Further, although the overall variability of belg 
rains has shown a decreasing trend in 1990–99, it has picked up slightly more in the last 
decade compared to the previous decade. In contrast, the mehar rains have shown 
consistently decreasing trend of variability since 1980s. Therefore an argument can be made 
that there has been a change in the pattern of belg rains over the last ten years in the area. 
These findings correspond with the perceptions and claims made by peasants and other 
actors. As observed above, peasants, DAs, local authorities and food security experts in the 
area of study have unanimously agreed that the amount and distribution of rainfall for both 
the belg and mehar rains have changed significantly over time. It should be noted that despite 
a declining trend, the change of the total monthly belg rain over the last 29 years is not as 
dramatic as often presented by different actors, asserting that drought has become a frequent 
incident in the study area. However, it should equally be noted that it is not the quantity of 
rain that matters for rain-fed farming livelihood, which has a very tight farming calendar, but 
its distribution over time (Menfese 2010: 90). In the study area, peasants have a very well-
balanced and busy farming calendar (Figure 2.2) so, the timely arrival, distribution over time 
and cessation of both belg and mehar rains is one of the most influential determinants of 
household food production and food security. For instance, a delay of belg rains by two to 
three weeks could seriously affect the land preparation, planting calendar and overall 
performance of the crops. In a similar manner, if the rain abruptly ceases after two or three 
weeks of planting, it also affects the performance of crops and the yield. This may also force 
households to replant part of their farm, incurring unexpected additional costs for inputs, 
which has a knock-on  effect  on  the  peasant’s  hard-earned financial capital or last remaining 
assets. In general, if the rain delays, fails or ceases in a continuous trend, it can cause a long-
lasting effect on the overall agricultural production and food security of small peasant farmers. 
The analysis of the long-term trend indicates that these incidences have happened recurrently 
and as a result many households have been affected and become vulnerable. 
 
The DAs indicated that the increase of agriculture input prices and shortages of farmland are 
other very important sources of livelihood shocks for peasant households in the study area. 
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Interestingly, the woreda-level authorities indicated that the dwindling enset crop is an 
important source of covariate shock that is affecting livelihoods in the area. However, other 
actors did not mention this, as it is often seen as an idiosyncratic shock affecting only those 
households who are at the middle and poor economic level with relatively fewer enset trees 
on their farm. The occurrence of plant diseases, particularly sweet potato butterfly, coffee 
berry disease, wheat rust and animal diseases, were mentioned as additional livelihood shocks 
in the area. Except for the occurrence of wheat rust and erosion, all other shocks mentioned 
are indicated as increasing compared to the past five years. The possible explanation is that 
the government has launched nationwide extensive soil and water conservation activities 
through the PSNP and as a result the effect of erosion is controlled and managed. 
 
5.4.1 Households’  perception  of  agricultural  production 
Households in the study area produce a variety of crops to ensure a regular availability of 
diverse types of food (see Chapter 2). Households were asked if they had observed changes 
over the last five years in the overall production of important food and cash crops on their 
farms, and the reasons for changes, and to rank the factors causing changes in order of 
importance. Table 5.9 illustrates the results from this discussion. 
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Table 5.9: Perceived trends in agricultural production 
Respondents Type of 
crop 
Perceived 
trend 
Reasons Overall 
rank 
Vulnerable 
households 
Cereals 
(maize, 
teff, 
wheat, 
barley and 
others) 
Decreasing Increase of agriculture input price  1 
Change of rainfall pattern 2 
Shortage of land 3 
Occurrence of seasonal flooding 4 
Coffee Decreasing Occurrence of coffee berry disease 1 
Failure of rain during the flowering stage 2 
The new varieties not adapted to the area 3 
Enset Decreasing Occurrence of drought and resultant over-
reliance on enset 
1 
Occurrence of bacterial wilt 2 
Shortage of manure due to shortage of 
livestock 
3 
Shrinkage of land size 4 
Taro Increasing Production high on small plot 1 
Consumption possible without supplementary 
foods 
2 
Fast maturation period 3 
Good growth with low fertiliser application 4 
Eucalyptus Increasing Good source of cash 1 
Drought resistance and does not require 
fertiliser to grow 
2 
Improved access to market 3 
Ownership perceived as status symbol 4 
Faster compared to other indigenous trees 5 
Not edible during crop failure like enset thus its 
production continues without disruption 
6 
Resilient 
households 
Cereals 
(maize, 
teff, 
wheat, 
barley and 
others 
Decreasing Increase of agriculture input price  1 
Change of rainfall pattern 2 
Shortage of land 3 
Occurrence of seasonal flooding 4 
Occurrence of crop disease (wheat rust) 5 
Coffee Decreasing Occurrence of coffee berry disease 1 
Failure of rain during flowering stage 2 
Occurrence of frost and hails  3 
Enset Decreasing Occurrence of bacterial wilt 1 
Drought and resultant over-reliance on enset 2 
Increased market access and demand in urban 
areas 
3 
Taro Increasing Produce more from small plot 1 
Consumable without supplementary foods 2 
Fast maturing 3 
Source of cash 4 
Eucalyptus Increasing Source of fuel 1 
Source of cash 2 
Increasing demand in urban areas (construction 
boom/urbanisation and improved road access 
3 
Grows on unfertile plots and does not require 
fertiliser 
4 
Source:  Author’s  fieldwork,  2011. 
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The responses from both vulnerable and resilient households25 in the study area indicated a 
similar trend in agricultural production over the last five years. Due to the surging agricultural 
input prices, particularly for fertiliser, changing pattern of rainfall and a shortage of farmland, 
the production of major cereal crops is perceived as decreasing. Coffee is an important crop in 
the area and is produced for market (cash) and household consumption. Despite its 
significantly increased price over the last five years and the establishment of wet and dry 
coffee washing and processing stations locally, peasants perceived that overall production is 
dwindling, mainly due to the occurrence of coffee berry disease and rain failures during the 
flowering stage. Enset bacterial wilt and over-reliance on enset as food and fodder during 
seasonal drought and hunger periods played a negative role on the production of enset. 
However, the vulnerable households ranked over-reliance on enset as the main cause whereas 
the resilient households ranked the occurrence of bacterial wilt as the most important factor 
for the reduced production of enset. This could be explained by the fact that, during seasonal 
drought and hunger periods, resilient households have more options of food sources to 
depend on than the vulnerable groups whose main food source is enset and whose food from 
cereals is very small to cover their food needs. 
 
Interestingly, however, the production of eucalyptus is increasing across the three districts 
among both vulnerable and resilient households. The reasons according to both types of 
households are the advantages offered by eucalyptus compared to other farm produce. 
Households mentioned the following advantages. Over recent years, the eucalyptus market 
and its value have increased due to a growing construction sector in urban areas, as all the 
kebeles are located between 5 and 10 km from urban centres and feeder roads have also 
improved significantly. It has become a main source of fuel as other natural fuels are 
disappearing fast and therefore market demand has improved. Eucalyptus does not require 
fertiliser and grows on marginal plots and soils compared to other crops. For these reasons, 
eucalyptus production has increased significantly over the last five years. In a similar manner, 
the production of taro is increasing among both vulnerable and resilient households. The 
reasons mentioned are its yield capacity on small plots, its ability to be consumed without 
requiring other supplementary foods and its performance with less fertiliser. It should be 
                                                             
 
25 Vulnerable and green famine affected and resilient and non-affected households are used 
interchangeably through out the thesis (see the indicators applied and categorisation process in Chapter 
2). 
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noted that due to these attributes, farmers have successfully adapted the cultivation and 
consumption of taro in the recent years, as compared to other crops. The diversification of 
grown crops and eucalyptus over time has been a strategic response and adaptive mechanism 
to the reducing size of land and recurrent failure of rains and increasing price of inputs. 
 
Figure 5.4: Total surface areas (ha) planted with major food and cash crops in Kacha-Bira 
woreda over 8- year period 
 
Source: Computed from K-T Zone Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development 2011a. 
 
Figure 5.4 indicates that the total areas cultivated to major crops in Kacha-Bira district have 
decreased over the last seven-year  period.  This  corresponds  with  households’  claims  that  the  
production of major crops in terms of area covered has been decreasing since 2008 due to the 
various reasons mentioned in Table 5.9. This might signal that the land is being used for the 
production of eucalyptus or taro as their demand has increased over time. Compared to other 
food and cash crops, the total surface area of enset planted has shown an increasing trend 
starting in 2003–04. The reason could be that when confronted with frequent failures of rains 
and increasing input price for cereals, households are returning the production of enset.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
1000 
2000 
3000 
4000 
5000 
6000 
A
re
a 
in
 h
a 
Year 
Total area cultivated with major crops in Kacha-Bira woreda 2000-
2008 
Maize 
Wheat 
Coffee 
Enset 
 104 
 
Figure 5.5: Total surface areas (ha) planted with major food and cash crops in Kadida-Gamela 
woreda over 8-year period  
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Average production of major food and cash crops in Kadida-Gamela woreda over 
8-year period (quintal/ha)  
Source: Computed from K-T zone Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development 2011a. 
 
As shown in figures 5.5 and 5.6, the trend of major food and cash crops production and 
productivity in Kadida-Gamela district has shown mixed results. The total area for wheat 
production was more than the average for the first six consecutive years but after that it 
shows a sharp downward trend in 2006–07 and 2007–08. On the other hand, the area covered 
by coffee increased progressively for seven years and showed a steep decline in 2007–08. 
Despite the area planted with enset showing an increasing trend, the productivity per hectare 
did not keep up with the area coverage. This could be explained by the fact that enset is a 
perennial crop and it will take up to five years to fully mature and produce a full yield. As seen 
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above, on enset production a similar trend was observed in Kacha-Bira district. The increase in 
total area surface of enset also indicates that after a decline in the production of cereals due to 
reasons mentioned above, households have started moving back to growing enset to minimise 
risk because enset grows even in poor rain conditions. This was also indicated by a senior 
enset researcher at Areka Research Centre discussing a reversal back to enset after they had 
switched from enset to cereals: 
‘Since the beginning, the ongoing agricultural extension programme neglected enset in its 
package and households were very much encouraged to focus on the production of cereals and 
cash crops; as a result many people switched to cereals. However, due to the recurring rain 
failures and drought, cereals could not deliver the promise. Households have learned a hard 
lesson and now they are requesting us to provide them new enset seedlings. When you go to 
traditionally enset-dependent areas, you could see peasant farmers are growing more enset than 
before  particularly  since  the  last  four  years  ’  (KI_ARC/15/05/2011). 
 
The productivity of coffee per hectare has shown a continuous upward trend over the period 
of observation. This could possibly be due to the fact that, as with cereals, the ongoing 
agricultural extension programme gave priority to coffee production. Cash crops, particularly 
coffee, are the primary source of foreign currency, and therefore of national interest. The 
productivity for maize was above average for five years and wheat has maintained above-
average production for four years out of eight. Overall, the productivity of the main crops has 
shown a mixed picture of increase and decrease. 
 
5.4.2 Changing trends in the significance of crops 
The decisions on household crop production are dictated by both internal and external factors. 
Internal factors include changes in taste and crop preference, availability of labour, access to 
seeds, the cultural value and significance of the crop and the characteristics of each crop. 
External factors could be market value, weather conditions, availability of extension services, 
input availability and delivery on time and others. Households often make decisions on what 
to grow as a unit and decisions are very calculated and based on their short- and long-term 
implications for household food security. In contrast to internal factors, decisions and changes 
dictated by external factors are often beyond the control of households and their 
consequences for household food security and income tend to be negative. In order to 
understand if there had been a change in the significance of important crops on their farms, 
households  were  asked  the  following  question:  ‘What  are  the  three  most  valuable  crops  on  
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your farm, now [2011] and five years ago? Importance could be as a source of cash income, a 
source  of  food,  ease  of  use,  cultural  importance,  drought  tolerance  and  others.’  The  
respondents have signalled that the significance of some crops has changed over the course of 
time. Interestingly, both vulnerable and resilient households across the three districts have 
indicated that despite the threat of bacterial wilt, enset has remained the major important 
crop. A comment from the group participants in Kacha-Bira district sums up the unchanging 
importance of enset despite its dwindling production and other challenges faced. 
‘We  always  wanted  to  have  enset  in  our  backyard.  However  it  is  running  away  from  us.  The  
disease is really making it difficult to retain enset. All crops except enset grow only in the 
presence of sufficient rain. It is our only reliable friend. All cereal crops can disappear in the 
failure of rain; however, enset never betrays us. Even if we passed away, it will remain in our 
backyard’  (FG_KB/ME-VCG/11/02/2011). 
 
Interestingly, five years ago sweet potato used to be the second most important crop for 
vulnerable households and fourth most important for resilient households. However, currently 
it is less important and, since 2008, the study area has suffered a sweet potato disease caused 
by sweet potato butterfly (acrea acereta); recurrent failure of belg rains also contributed to 
the shortage of sweet potato cuttings. Among the resilient households, the importance of 
cereal crops (maize and teff) have shown a slight decrease compared to five years ago due to 
reasons related to sharply increasing prices of fertilisers and unpredictability of rainfall. In 
contrast, despite dwindling production, the significance of coffee has increased, particularly 
among the resilient households. The reasons for this are attributed to the fact that the 
increasing price of coffee in national and global markets facilitates a better market access for 
the producers. Particularly, after the establishment of the Ethiopian Commodities Exchange 
(ECX) in 2008 and opening its branches in the neighbouring towns have played a role for coffee 
producers to get a fair price for their produce. In addition, the respondents have indicated that 
over the last five years, the number of wet coffee washing and processing stations has 
increased from one to five and is still growing. In addition, dry coffee processing stations have 
also increased in the area and other neighbouring districts. As a result, they have a very good 
market opportunity despite facing problems with coffee berry disease. 
 
In a similar fashion, compared to other crops, the importance of taro has significantly 
increased over the past five years, particularly for the vulnerable and famine-affected 
households. The reasons for the increasing importance of taro are explained as follows: 
 
 107 
 
‘We  have  a  new  variety  of  taro  which  matures  very  fast.  If  you  plant  it  in  January,  you  could  start  
consuming in June/July. Enset grows very slow and is consumed only after two to three years of 
planting, thus it is not a life-saver’  (FG_KB/ME-VCG/11/02/2011). 
 
‘Taro  has  currently  become  the  most  valuable  crop  due  to  the  introduction  of  the  new  variety  by  
the agriculture office that is also early maturing as compared to the previous variety. The 
community’s  dependency on enset as a food source was substituted by taro due to its early 
maturity and unlike enset it can be consumed without needing a side dish or sauce. It is also 
cheaper  compared  to  enset  and  other  food  sources’  (FG_KB/AS-VCG/15/02/2011). 
 
‘Taro  is  a  very  “generous”  crop.  You  can  get  a  lot  from  a  small  plot  of  land  and  it  is  not  
susceptible to a disease like sweet potato. There is a growing market demand and as a result it is 
becoming  a  source  of  income’  (FG_DG/DI-RCG/30/03/2011). 
 
These findings illustrate how in the face of diverse impediments and shocks, peasant households are 
strategically managing and responding to maintain their livelihood intact and ensure their food security. 
It also sheds light on how these decisions and strategies that are taken by households are mediated and 
influenced by institutions and external factors.  
 
5.5 Migration as a response to livelihood crises 
This section looks at how migration has become a response to livelihood crises and how it is 
facilitating livelihood resilience in the area of study. As discussed in Chapter 4, people in the 
enset-based  livelihood  system  have  developed  a  long  tradition  of  ‘seasonal  and  permanent  
migration’  from  their  places  of  origin  as  part  of  their  regular  livelihood  strategy,  and  such 
movements have been used to diffuse the pressure on limited land (Alemayehu 2001:10; 
Pankhurst 1996:75). As discussed earlier, in the enset-based farming system in general and the 
study  area  in  particular,  men’s  involvement  in  enset  processing  is  limited  compared to cereal-
based farming systems. Hence, this arrangement provides opportunities for household 
members, particularly men, to migrate to areas where they can pick up seasonal jobs and earn 
additional income to increase their overall livelihood income (Shack 1966; Pankhurst 1996:73). 
As a result, migration on a permanent, seasonal and circular basis to Arsi Negele, Shashamene 
area, Hawassa, Wondo, Wonji, Methahara and Tendaho sugarcane and cotton plantations, 
Upper Awash Agro-Processing areas, state Coffee plantations in Jimma and other south 
western regions and many more has always been an integral part of the local livelihood system 
for households in enset-based livelihood zones and in the study area in particular (Alemayehu 
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2001: 9). It can be argued that this has been one of the main reasons that the enset-based 
livelihood system has maintained its resilience and has been less affected by frequent hunger 
and famines compared to the cereal-based farming systems in other parts of the country. 
Against this systematic and well-integrated  livelihood  system,  the  introduction  of  ‘ethnic-
based  regionalisation’  two  decades  ago  in  the  country  has  restricted  the  movement  of  people  
(Lautze and Maxwell 2007) and negatively affected their livelihoods (see Chapter 4 for more 
details on this). How have households been responding to the dynamics of changing policies of 
movement and livelihood crises? In order to understand this process, communities were asked 
if there have been any changes in the movement of people outside their area to other regions 
and, if so, how have such changes affected the livelihoods of people? these issues are 
discussed in detail below. 
 
Restrictions on internal movement did not stop many households from leaving their area and 
new opportunities and new challenges have emerged over the period of time. During the last 
ten years or so, the nature and direction of movement and migration of people from the study 
area and other neighbouring enset-growing districts have changed from local and seasonal to 
regional and international/cross national boarder (Solomon 2011: 12; Dome et al. 2012: 88). 
Of the three study woredas, Doyo-Gena was chosen for the case study on how the migration 
of young men and women to the Republic of South Africa, North Sudan, the Middle East and 
Gulf states is undertaken and how it is affecting the resilience of the local livelihood system. 
Doyo-Gena is a highland district, bordering Hadiya zone and is 15 km from the town of 
Hosanna, the biggest urban centre in the area (see Figure 2.1). The district has one urban and 
13 rural kebeles with a total population of 91,186 people in 2012. The data were collected in 
August 2011, in collaboration with the District Office for Agriculture and Rural Development, 
by visiting all the local kebeles accompanied by the DAs for each kebele (see Chapter 2). Table 
5.10 shows disaggregated data on the number of people migrating from the district over the 
last ten years and their final destinations. 
 
Table 5.10: Total number of migrants from Doyo-Gena district by sex and destination 
Migrant’s  destination Migrants 
Male Female Total 
Republic of South Africa 2,180 74 2,254 
North Sudan  3 83 86 
Middle East and other Gulf states (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Dubai and others) 
0 142 142 
Total 2,183 299 2,482 
Source:  Author’s  fieldwork,  2011. 
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The results in Table 5.10 show that significant number of people have migrated to different 
countries outside the study area. The data also shows that South Africa is the top final 
destination for the migrants. It should be noted that the data do not include domestic labour 
migration: urban migration is a growing trend particularly among younger, high school drop-
outs and graduates seeking seasonal employment such as lottery vending and shoe shining in 
bigger urban centres. FGDs with households who have one or more members who have 
migrated indicated that the international migration is a recent trend. The figures indicate that 
overall migration is male-dominated, attributed to cultural and other socio-economic factors, 
which make it easier for men to travel than women. The migration process is very 
sophisticated and in the case of South Africa involves crossing international borders of four or 
five countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe by road and on 
foot before they reach their final destination (Liqu 2007: 36; Dome et al. 2012: 90). There are 
three dominant ways of out-migration to South Africa: by air, by land and a mix of both means. 
The former is more expensive and the chances of securing an entry visa are limited but it is less 
risky and the success rate of arriving at final destination is very high, whereas the second 
option is the more widely applied method for those who cannot afford to pay for the process 
and airfare. The third option is relatively expensive, fast and provides a better chance of 
arriving at final destination than the second option. Migration to the Middle East and Gulf 
states is only undertaken by air and through legally registered agents who handle the entire 
process. 
 
Different actors are involved in the facilitation of the migration process, such as delalas 
(brokers). The household case studies with migrant households indicated that it takes on 
average 2–3 months or even longer on the road to reach the final destination. Many die on the 
way as a result of this long and dangerous situation, suffering from lack of water and food, and 
many get caught by border patrols in different countries and are deported (personal 
experience and discussion with returnees).26 The number of migrant deaths on route to South 
Africa in particular is increasing shockingly. For instance, the BBC (2012) reported that in June 
2012,  ‘of  127  migrants  who  started  their  journey  from  Ethiopia  to  South  Africa  by  truck,  42  
died from  asphyxiation  after  they  arrived  in  Tanzania’. 
                                                             
 
26 Dome et al. (2012:92) case study reported similar incidence of migration related deaths (on route and 
inside South Africa) in one of the study woreda. During my field, I have also attended both farewell 
parties and funerals related to migration to South Africa. 
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The study also shows there is a growing trend of out-migration to North Sudan and the Middle 
East and Gulf states. These are destinations mainly preferred by women who go to work as 
housemaids.  In  these  cases,  there  are  specialised  and  ‘legally  registered’  agents  operating  in  
the capital, Addis Ababa, who organise such trips for young women who go to work for some 
time and come back with some income. North Sudan is easily accessible by road through 
northern Ethiopia and preferred by those who cannot afford to pay the migration fees 
required by agents. The sending households indicated that there are both push and pull 
factors that are forcing people, mainly the young, from the area. The main push described is 
economic factors that arise from lack of local employment opportunities and restricted 
movements domestically. The pull factors are diverse employment and cash-earning 
opportunities that exist in the receiving countries. Further, those who have made it to South 
Africa in the past have been able to create and accumulate good wealth in their home country 
and particularly in their place of birth through remittances and have successfully changed the 
economic conditions of their families and extended families. As a result, by looking at some of 
the success cases, young men are motivated to do the same. Despite it being a very difficult, 
risky and expensive response, there is a very strong and growing trend of out-migration from 
the study area to the destinations mentioned above (see Boxes 5.2 and 5.3). 
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Box 5.2: Case study: Household with four members migrated to South Africa 
 
Mrs Chufamo is a married woman with eight children, five boys and three girls, and lives with 
her husband in Doyo-Gena district. She owns 1.25 ha of land. She explained why her children 
decided to migrate to South Africa. All her children have completed high school and one is a 
college graduate. They knew how little land each would get if they remained in their village. 
She said her first-born son is a diploma graduate, married with two children and had been 
looking for work in the area. He finally decided to migrate after knocking on many doors in 
search of a job in the area with government and private institutions. She said she did not help 
her children to go to South Africa because they already spent all their money in covering 
school fees and providing support while they studied. Two of their sons covered their travel 
expenses through the money they earned working as part-time hairdressers in Hosanna while 
they were at high school. Once they decided to migrate, they came to their parents and asked 
them to draw lots to decide which one of them should go first and asked for their blessing. The 
parents drew lots and the chance came out for the youngest, and he went when the travel 
cost was 12,000 Ethiopian birr some nine years ago. After he was settled, he sent some money 
to his brother to follow him, which is how they started helping each other, and as a result 
currently four sons are living in South Africa and one is living in Addis Ababa. She indicated 
three years ago she and her husband went to South Africa to attend the wedding of her son. 
 
‘The  migration  to  South  Africa  has  given  both  advantages  and  disadvantages.  Security  is  a  
problem once they arrive in South Africa. For instance, while I was there, thieves killed a friend 
of my son while he was working in his shop. In order to stop such desperate action of going to 
other places, government should create opportunities here like factories and other 
opportunities locally. I think our government should look into the situation and find a way to 
go there in a legal and recognised way without such suffering. Although they support us 
financially, it is a really difficult decision to send your children far away into uncertainty. 
However, that being said we are better off afterwards because our children are in South Africa 
as they send us money for everything we need. Mini kursu, mini kollu affamimba “we do not 
sell what we produced or other assets  to  cover  our  food  needs”. Basically, now we are self-
sufficient. Again, I would prefer if my children stay here and be at  my  funeral.’  She  said  ‘Betobe 
ello kesano’,  meaning  that  according  to  Kambata  culture,  it  is  your  elder  child  who  chooses  
where you [parents] should be buried and takes care of you while you become old. 
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Box 5.3: Case study: Migration to South Africa from a poor household 
 
Ato Mancho is a 45-year-old peasant, married with 12 children, three male and nine female. 
He owns a hectare of land and practises both agriculture and blacksmithing on a seasonal 
basis. He grows wheat, beans, maize, enset, eucalyptus trees and some 20 coffee trees (only 
for home consumption). Blacksmithing is a skill he inherited from his father passed down 
through different generations. During peak agricultural season and festivities, he earns up to 
50 birr per day and shares this with two co-workers. He indicated that despite owning a 
hectare of farmland and producing many types of crop, the output is very low due to the 
decreasing  productivity  of  the  land.  He  said,  ‘We  work  hard  and  produce  some,  but  we  need  to  
pay back these input loans.  We  are  left  only  with  crop  residue  for  our  cattle.’   
 
His second son who is a high school graduate left for South Africa in 2008. When asked how he 
managed  to  send  him,  he  explained  that  ‘it  was  a  long  process  …  some  five  years  ago,  I  gave  
my son a plot of land so that he can grow Irish potato. He prepared the land very well and 
planted the potato and had a very good harvest. He sold the produce and gave the earnings to 
his best friend who was in the process of emigrating to South Africa. He continued planting 
potato for three consecutive seasons and was able to make up to 8,000 birr, which covered 
half of the cost for his trip. According to the personal arrangement he made with the friend he 
helped earlier, he received a payback to cover half of his trip cost. Once he managed to get the 
required amount, he started his journey by road and arrived in South Africa nine months later. 
His friend welcomed him and facilitated him to settle in and start a business. He told me he 
suffered a lot on the road and as result it took him almost four months to recover from his 
condition.  Since  he  arrived  in  South  Africa,  he  hasn’t  sent  much remittance to us. However, he 
is covering the cost of Meskel [traditional festival held in September] every year, which is also 
a big  help  for  us.’ 
 
The conventional understanding and debate around migration is that only those who can 
afford the costs of travel can take part in cross-boundary/international migration. Despite this 
argument, even people who are in the lower economic strata also take part in international 
migration by using their extended networks (see Box 5.3) and informal support systems. The 
various household case studies suggest that the ongoing rural out-migration has a wide-scale 
benefit for the livelihoods in the area of study. Despite being very expensive, a reasonable 
number of poor households are taking part in this process.  
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It should be noted that ongoing out-migration, particularly international migration from the 
enset-dominant livelihood zones of the Kambata highlands, has two general explanations. (1) 
Localised and seasonal migration of people in enset-dominant livelihood zones is not a new 
trend but rather is a continuation of a generations-long livelihood strategy. It is a strategy that 
is adopted by households as a means to diffuse pressure on farmland (demographic response) 
as Dessalegn (2007), Alemayehu (2001) and others claim, the income drawn from it is used to 
increase the agricultural income, ensure household food security and increase livelihood 
resilience against shocks. (2) Confronted with restricted movement and increased livelihood 
crises and food insecurity, people are using migration as a coping strategy. However, the 
increasing out-migration by young Kambata women to wealthy Middle East and Gulf states to 
work as housemaids is a very new trend. It is an intriguing development that young girls are 
out-migrating in an increasing numbers. In their recent study in one of the study kebeles (Aze-
Dobo’a),  Dome et al. (2012: 146) investigated the trajectory of increasing numbers of women 
migrating  locally  and  internationally,  noted  it  as  ‘a  new  trend’ and something unthinkable 
some ten years ago, and attributed the causes to increased population, lack of local labour 
opportunities and access to information and increased access to education for girls.27  
 
Even though the underlying causes of migration are diverse and complex, the ongoing 
migration in the study area is a response against the restrictive policy that had been imposed 
on traditionally mobile people and an adaptive mechanism towards the inherently small land 
size. Further, lack of local employment opportunities outside the agriculture sector, increasing 
vulnerability to food insecurity and periodic famines due to various covariate and idiosyncratic 
shocks, inability of the enset-based livelihood system to sustain a growing population and lack 
of secure livelihood systems are push factors that are forcing people to resort to expensive and 
risky migration. Economic factors such as the existence of better job opportunities and 
economic gains (remittances, new cars, houses and other wealth) that are achieved by those 
who have migrated in the past, the emergence of actors who are involved in the migration 
business and improved access to information are seen as pull factors. 
 
                                                             
 
27 This is part of Wellbeing in Developing Countries (WIDE) research project that has been ongoing since 
1995 in selected rural villages in Ethiopia documenting long-term perspectives on development impacts. 
See more on www.wed-ethiopia.org. 
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5.6 From vulnerable livelihoods to vulnerability to green famine 
As noted in Table 5.2, households with different types of livelihood categories have 
experienced different types of covariate and idiosyncratic risks and vulnerability factors over 
time in the study area. The recurrence of these vulnerability factors has resulted in a 
progressive loss of livelihood resources and entitlements over the last two decades and 
subsequently  increased  people’s  vulnerability  to  recurrent  food  insecurity  and  green famine. 
Thus, as noted in Figure 4.2 and Table 5.6 respectively, recently the occurrence of a single or 
combination of trigger factors such as irregular distribution and failure of belg rains, sudden 
price hike of food items or the outbreak of sweet potato disease and subsequent loss of 
production are pushing households to the edge and are causing serious food crises and 
localised famine situations (Woldeyesus 2008: 5).  However, these risks are regular 
phenomena and features of the local smallholder and rain-fed agriculture production and 
livelihood system, which have occurred in the past. The majority of interviewed households 
and different actors indicated that in the past these shocks were not strong enough to push 
the majority of households to the edge of food insecurity and cause a famine. It should be 
noted that the progression and transition from being historically food secure and resilient to 
becoming increasingly vulnerable to food insecurity and green famine is not a rapid and 
sudden process. As noted in Chapter 4, the changing agricultural policy environment and 
political process of regionalisation since the early 1990s had a knock on effect on the 
livelihoods of households that are primarily dependent on mixed farming that is characterised 
by enset, cereal and livestock production supported by seasonal migration. Further, this 
dominant livelihood group was affected by covariate shocks that are related to unpredictable 
and uneven distribution of rainfall, drought, and incidence of enset bacterial wilt. Green 
famine is a cumulative effect of several vulnerability factors that have occurred in K-T zone 
over a long period of time. Thus, understanding the significance of these vulnerability factors 
that had been recurring for many years before the actual deterioration to acute food 
insecurity and green famine situation occurs helps to improve the conceptualisation of famine 
as a process and an outcome of extended periods of vulnerability factors over time, rather 
than sudden and unpredicted events. For instance, Hall-Matthews (2002: 10), examining the 
complex famine process and famine policy in Ahmedenagar district of India in the 1870s, 
succinctly captured this aspect as:   
The famine process implies an incremental series of small occurrences, triggered by various 
agents, which make the risk of starvation more likely. It is multifaceted; a thousand cuts coming 
from  many  directions  and  affecting  different  aspects  of  peasants’  livelihoods  and  strategies. 
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It is widely evidenced that not all households of different types of livelihoods and wealth 
categories are vulnerable to similar types of shocks and are affected at the same level even in 
similar livelihood zones or social, economic and political contexts. The occurrence of similar 
covariate shocks (e.g. rain failures, drought, market price hike, conflict) and the level of 
affectedness significantly vary among different wealth categories and livelihoods groups. For 
instance, as the case study in Box 5.4 indicates, for households pursuing caste-based livelihood 
strategies, the occurrence of failure in demand for their products, limited access to production 
materials and lack of other income sources in combination with social and cultural 
marginalisation over time increased their vulnerability to food insecurity and green famine. 
 
Box 5.4: Case study: Caste-based livelihood 
 
Ato Fayiso is a 40-year-old peasant, married with eight children. His main livelihood is pottery. 
In addition to making pottery, he grows different crops on his 0.25 ha of land. Five of his 
children and his wife are involved in making pottery products. He draws income from PSNP 
transfer, sales of pottery products and pension. Pottery alone generates about 1,600 birr 
income annually. As a retired ex-military service personnel, wounded in combat, he receives 
150 birr per month as a pension. Since his land is very small, the food produced covers 
household food needs for only about three to four months per year. He explained the 
challenges he now faces as follows. 
 
During the Derg regime, there was communal land everywhere. However, over the last two 
decades, these lands have been divided and given to individual households. He used to access 
clay soil, grass and fuel woods from designated communal lands for free. Now, however, he is 
facing problems in getting these essential resources to pursue his livelihood activities. He said 
that currently he pays 10 birr to an owner of land with good-quality clay soils for a one-time 
collection of clay. During the 2008 hunger (green famine), his family suffered a great loss of 
income due to a drastic decrease of demand for his (see Table 5.3). The demand was so low 
that he even gave out produce on credit or in exchange for very small food items. He also 
highlighted that currently he is facing stiff competition from cheap plastic products imported 
from abroad, particularly from China. As a result the preference of customers is shifting to the 
cheaper  products  and  demand  for  his  clay  products  decreasing  significantly.  ‘Life for potters 
has  become  an  uphill  struggle,  and  I  don’t  see  much  hope  in  the  future  for  significant  
improvements.’ 
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Similarly, as indicated in Table 5.6, the size of the total population affected by the 2007–08 
green famine and the required emergency relief in the seven woredas in K-T zone varied 
significantly. For instance, the lowland woredas of Tembaro and Hadero-Tunto and some of 
the lowland kebeles in Kacha-Bira and Kadida-Gamela were the hardest hit by green famine. 
One of the explanations for this is that these areas are more cereal and cash crop dominant 
(coffee and ginger) as well as sweet potato than the highland woredas which have larger enset 
coverage and are more diversified and subsistence-production oriented. In a similar manner, 
as noted during the fieldwork of this study, even within the three study woredas, those kebeles 
and villages located in the lowland areas and cereal and cash crop dependent were affected 
more severely than those in the highlands. For instance, Messena and Awaywee, two lowland 
kebeles in Kacha-Bira woreda, disproportionally experienced severe food crisis and mortality 
rates as evidenced by the personal visit of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Health to 
these areas after the severity of the situation was reported by international humanitarian 
agencies on the ground. During their visit, they were shown many new graves that are 
believed to be of famine victims.28 
 
Further, an in-depth investigation of coping strategies adopted by households during the green 
famine reflected a closer linkage between the severity of coping strategies and different types 
of livelihood groups and wealth categories in the study areas (this is discussed in greater 
details in Chapter 6). In general, households who pursued caste-based occupations, labour-
based occupations and trade-based occupations (selling of fuel woods and fresh grass) mainly 
from the poor and destitute economic and social wealth categories adopted one or more 
irreversible coping strategies such as consumption of unusual foods, begging for food, selling 
of young and immature enset trees, leasing out farm plots for extended period (see Box 4.2), 
engaging in activities that are culturally unacceptable (stealing enset, kocho and others) (See 
Figure 6.2 and Box 6.1). The case study presented in Box 5.5 reflects a type of coping strategy 
adopted by a vulnerable household whose main livelihood strategy depends on farming and 
casual labour during the 2007–08 green famine period. 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
28 Personal communication with the K-T zone early warning and food security expert, February 2011. 
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Box 5.5: Case study: Vulnerable household 
 
Yiimma is a 35-year-old peasant farmer who resides in Wagebatta kebele along with her 
husband   and   five   children.   The   family’s   livelihood   is   based   on   farming   and   casual   labour.  
Harvesting enset, cleaning house, collecting water and disposing of livestock manure are 
among the casual work that she does for better-off households. Similarly, her husband tills 
land, harvests and plasters mud for newly built houses. However, currently he is not able to do 
these as his health has deteriorated over time. As a result, all the household responsibility falls 
on Yiimma. She has 0.25 ha of land. However, she rented out half of this land to a better-off 
household for five years following the 2008 green famine. She said that she is not using the 
agriculture extension package (seed and fertilisers) for various reasons. Foremost, she fears 
defaulting and its consequences. Also she cannot afford to make the advance payment that is 
required to access the inputs. In addition, given the size of her land (with half already rented 
out), she does not see the need to invest more on the remaining small plot. She said that due 
to these factors she is not benefiting from the extension system. 
 
 
The case study also reflects how vulnerability and poverty are intertwined and how the 
baseline vulnerability of a household had become a barrier to accessing and adopting the 
agricultural extension package that could have play a significant role in improving household 
food availability and access. As Pankhurst (2009: 9) noted, generally poor and vulnerable 
households are ‘risk-averters’, proposing possible reasons as ‘off-track vulnerable households 
can even be made more insecure by taking loans, if they face shocks, particularly illness of 
household members and death of livestock bought through loans’. 
 
In contrast, households from better-off and middle-wealth categories adopted a combination 
of one or more precautionary types of coping strategies indicated at the lower level of the 
sequence of coping strategy ladder. These coping strategies bear less effect on the overall 
asset base and well-being of adopting households (see Figure 6.2). The case study in Box 5.6 
narrates how a household from a better-off household with a large coverage of eucalyptus 
trees on his farm has coped with acute food insecurity and green famine. 
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Box 5.6: Case study: Better-off household with a large eucalyptus tree coverage 
 
Ato Larebo is a 69 years old farmer married with 12 children (6 male and 6 female) who resides 
in Aze-Dobo kebele. All the children are well educated and are employed in various 
organisations. His older son is a pastor and religious teacher based in America and often sends 
remittances home. He has 6 timad of land but also rents additional land from the poor 
households in the community and a nearby public school. He grows enset, fruits (banana, 
avocado, mango, lemon and orange), maize, beans, teff and coffee. His enset farm size has not 
changed over the last ten years and he is still doing routine farming practices. A quarter of his 
farm is allocated to eucalyptus. In the past, his main income derived from coffee, teff, sales of 
livestock, remittance, salary and concrete and sand production. However, recently, sales from 
eucalyptus have become an important source of income. As he revealed, in September 2011, 
he earned 100,000 ETB or the equivalent of 6,153 USD from eucalyptus sales. He indicated, 
‘this  amount  of  money  I  have  never  earned  from  my  land  in  my  entire  life’.  He  indicated  his  
family was not affected severely by green famine in 2003 and 2007–08 compared to others in 
his village as he had a large number of mature enset and financial resources to access food. 
Particularly during the 2007–08 green famine, enset-based foods become a frequent source of 
food at his household. Further, he indicated he did not sell his productive assets to cope with a 
food crisis and to access food. Despite the price of food increasing sharply, he went to the 
nearest big market and purchased 6 quintals of maize and wheat at wholesale prices and 
utilised them in a prudent manner. 
 
5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter sought to show the types of household livelihood strategies in the enset-
dominant livelihood zone in southern Ethiopia. It also attempted to introduce the roles played 
by the enset crop in household food security and identified factors affecting the resilience of 
this farming system and implications for increasing vulnerability to food crises and periodic 
green famines. This livelihood system used to be resilient and relatively hunger- and famine-
free compared to other, cereal-based, livelihood systems. Enset  used  to  be  a  ‘secret  weapon’  
and a shield that protected households against seasonal and periodic hunger and famine in the 
area. Currently, however, this livelihood cannot support the people and has reached a tipping 
point and is severely stressed due to a chain of recurrent shocks and stressors over time. 
Community and different actors at different levels have identified various livelihood risks and 
shocks.  These livelihood risks and shocks stem from natural/climatic, demographic, socio-
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economic and policy-oriented factors. Thus, the prevailing food crises and green famine are a 
result of long-term processes of multiple vulnerability factors that have occurred in K-T zone 
over a long period of time. In a similar vein, understanding the significance of these 
vulnerability factors that had been recurring for many years before the actual green famine 
situation occurs helps to improve the conceptualisation of famine as a process and an 
outcome of extended periods of vulnerability factors over time, rather than a sudden and 
unpredicted event. 
 
Different livelihoods experience different types of risks and shocks and the importance and 
effect of these vulnerability factors on the livelihood system varies significantly. Communities 
identified that currently there are four wealth categories across three woredas. The livelihood 
analysis identified and situated different types of livelihoods across different wealth categories 
across the study area. The majority of households from better-off and middle wealth 
categories pursue more specialised and less diversified livelihood activities. Further, they 
produce more enset, cereal and cash crops (coffee and eucalyptus) than poor and destitute 
households. In contrast, the majority of households from the poor and destitute wealth 
categories are engaged in diverse livelihood activities such as seasonal migration, daily 
labouring, trade-based activities (selling fuel woods and grass) and caste-based occupations to 
make the ends meet. 
 
Results of community FGDs indicated that there had been significant changes in the wealth 
groups over the last decades. They have claimed that there is a growing trend of more people 
becoming poor and sliding into destitution from the middle class over time. This growing 
number of poor and destitute people is an indicator of livelihood failure due to recurring 
shocks over time in the area. The production of main food crops has shown a decreasing trend 
while the overall productivity is failing to keep up with growing demand. In a similar manner, 
the price of inputs has increased progressively and negatively affects the middle-income and 
poor households. The significance of some valuable crops has changed over time and new 
crops have emerged as a result. For instance, the overall production and significance of 
eucalyptus and taro has increased among all wealth groups across all the research sites. On the 
other hand, the production of enset, sweet potato and cereals has decreased over time.  
 
Different actors and the community at large have perceived and claimed that the amount and 
distribution of both the belg and mehar rains have changed significantly over time and 
identified this as a main culprit for the prevailing livelihood crises and resultant food insecurity 
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in the study area. Analysis of a longer-term rain pattern from 1980 to 2008 indicated that the 
average annual rainfall has shown a slightly decreasing trend in the last two decades (1990-
1999 and 2000-2008). In general, the belg rains has shown more variability or unpredictability 
during the period observation compare to mehar rains and the later has shown consistently 
decreasing variability. Further, despite the overall variability of belg rains has shown a 
decreasing trend in 1990-1999, it has picked up slightly more in the last decade compared to 
the previous decade. Overall, despite a slight declining trend, the change in average annual 
rainfall and the two rainy seasons (belg and mehar) over the last 29 years is not as dramatic as 
is often presented.  
 
Different types of shocks are affecting the livelihoods in the area. These livelihood shocks are 
multifaceted and interlinked and they have different dimensions such as natural (changing 
rainfall patterns), economic (deepening destitution and poverty), social (demographic 
pressure) and political (policy-oriented such as restrictive movements and lack of alternative 
local labour opportunities, less or no attention to traditional food sources). The sources of 
vulnerability for the households whose livelihoods are based on daily and seasonal labour are 
limited job opportunities, seasonality, stiff competition and higher demand for local jobs, 
occurrence of drought and increasing price of food items. For caste groups, restricted access to 
productive materials (for example, clay for potters), shortage and cost of materials (scrap 
metals, hides and skins) and changing product preferences of consumers are factors that 
significantly affect their livelihood system. 
 
As livelihood crises deepen, households respond through different strategies such as 
diversification of agricultural production and adaptive strategies such as migration. In the 
enset-dominant livelihood zone, migration (both short-term and permanent) has been and still 
is a part of the regular livelihood strategy that supports the resilience of the system. However, 
due to the introduction of an ethnic-based administrative system, internal and seasonal 
migration have been severely affected and people are forced to stay in their own area or 
region. More recently this trend has started to change and currently migration is happening in 
two forms: domestic migration to larger urban centres and cross-national border 
(international), for example, to South Africa (mostly by young male household members), the 
Middle East and oil-rich Gulf States (preferred by young women). Both forms of migration are 
occurring partially as a response to the deteriorating livelihood system. Overall, both types of 
migration are playing an increasingly important role in strengthening the resilience of 
livelihood systems for many households in the study area.  
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The next chapter discusses the similarities and differences between the famines of 1984 and 
green famine. It also explores how the occurrence of green famine in enset-dominant 
livelihood zones can challenge the conventional narratives of the causes of famine. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Green famine and the 1984 famine in Ethiopia: similarities, differences 
and measurement of famine 
 
The people who suffer famines are rarely, if ever, given the opportunity to define the event as 
they see fit and respond using their expertise (Alex de Waal, Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, 
1989: viii). 
 
A famine on the scale of 1984, when Band Aid and Live Aid raised about $150m in relief for 
Ethiopia, is still unlikely. Logistics and medical understanding have improved. Yet, sadly, some of 
the conditions that created that  famine  have  not  really  changed  (‘Ethiopia:  Will  it  ever  be  able  to  
stave off starvation? (The Economist, July 2008). 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter critically examines the theoretical and causal similarities and differences that exist 
between the green famine of 2007–08, which occurred in the enset-dominant livelihood zone 
in southern Ethiopia, and the ‘great  famine’  of 1984 that affected many parts of Ethiopia. It 
identifies the types of coping strategies adopted by household during normal food crises and 
green famine period and explores their role and significance in famine analysis and 
classification. Further, it reviews and critiques how scientific and standardised anthropometric 
and  mortality  measurements  of  famine  (as  ‘objective’  indicators)  have  become dominant 
parameters in defining and categorising famine and explores alternative indicators and 
measurements. By proposing an alternative famine scale, the chapter investigates whether the 
green famine should  be  categorised  as  ‘famine’  or  as  a  localised food crisis that affected a 
segment of the population in southern Ethiopia. It explores how the occurrence of green 
famine challenges the conventional discourse and understanding of the causes of hunger and 
famine in Ethiopia, as well as global famine measurements and scales. 
 
6.2 Documented famines in Ethiopia: their causes and effects 
As noted in Chapter 4, the causes of famines that struck Ethiopia have been attributed to 
seasonal rain failures/drought, disease outbreak (in both humans and livestock), population 
pressure and land shortage, subsistence economy characterized by subsistence agricultural 
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practices and other natural factors (Mesfin 1984; Pankhurst 1985; Von Braun 1991). In 
addition to this dominant view and explanation of why famines occur in Ethiopia, famine itself 
is seen as a one-off event that occurs due to food shortages in a given period of time resulting 
in excess mortality (Lautze et al. 2003: 19; Lautze and Maxwell 2007: 238).  
 
Lautze et al. further explained that, as a result of such understanding, famine responses in 
Ethiopia  have  been  heavily  dominated  by  a  ‘food  first  bias’,  and  government  policies  have  also  
been geared towards addressing the issue of food shortages for a very long time. The history 
of famine in Ethiopia indicates that prior to the 1970s, famines have been mainly concentrated 
in the northern, central highlands and lowlands of the country often referred to as drought- 
and famine-prone areas, where famines have inflicted countless damage to livelihoods and 
lives of Ethiopians over time (Aklilu 2000: 49; Degefa 2005: 21; Lautze and Maxwell 2007: 223). 
As explained previously, the enset–dominant livelihood systems, in southern Ethiopia have 
been regarded as relatively  ‘food  crises  and  famine-free’  compared  to  the  cereal-based 
livelihood zones of the country (Dessalegn 1996: 84). However, in the last two decades, this 
part of the country has become increasingly vulnerable to persistent food insecurity and green 
famines. 
 
6.2.1 The 1984 famine and its causes 
The 1984 famine in Ethiopia is categorically considered as the most severe famine that the 
country has suffered in its modern history since the famine period of 1888–92. Mesfin (1984: 
34), based on the historical accounts of Richard Pankhurst, a prominent historian based in 
Ethiopia, described the famine of 1888–92  as  ‘the  deadliest  famine  ever’.  Despite  the  fact  that  
the exact causes of this famine and its total mortality remain contested, Pankhurst (1972 cited 
in Mesfin 1984: 34) claims that it was triggered by a contagious rinderpest disease that was 
introduced by horses and mules belonging to Italians who were based in Massawa (the 
present-day port of Eritrea). The disease first transmitted to livestock in the surrounding area 
and rapidly spread across the whole country, killing about 90 per cent of the Ethiopian cattle 
that were a key pillar of agriculture production and source of food. The occurrence of severe 
drought exacerbated the situation and the subsequent famine claimed the lives of an 
estimated ‘one-third of the population of Ethiopia’ (Mesfin 1984: 32–34; Devereux 2001a: 117; 
Degefa 2005: 151). 
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The 1984 famine was an event that attracted global attention and resulted in an 
unprecedented international response (Clarke 1986: 3). As with other famines in Ethiopia, the 
exact figures of famine mortality are debatable. As noted in chapter 1, the UN and other 
sources estimated the death toll to one million while Africa Watch (1991: 172) and Dessalegn 
(1991: 108) estimated 590,000 and 400,000 respectively. The causes of famine were attributed 
to a severe and protracted drought, subsequent crop production failure, civil unrest 
(particularly protracted fighting between the central government and guerrilla fighters who 
stood against the Derg regime) and subsequent response failure by the central government 
(intentionally), poor economic development of the country (Webb and Von Braun 1994; 
Degefa 2005). Despite the wide geographical spread of the famine across the larger portion of 
the country, the severity of its effects were mainly concentrated on the northern, central and 
eastern highlands and lowlands (Mesfin 1984; Degefa 2005; Dessalegn 2007). Table 6.1 
summarises some of the major famines and food crises29 in Ethiopia since 1950, their 
geographic spread, perceived causes, estimated mortality and the classification of the crises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
29 Here, the term food crisis refers to the expression most often used by the government during food 
shortages in country. However, it should be noted that the magnitude of a food crisis is not known as 
they all tend to be termed food crisis. Famines are defined and declared in retrospective studies. 
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Table 6.1: Major famines and food crises in Ethiopia since 1950 
Note:  *  indicates  estimated  number  of  ‘affected  people’  not  mortality. 
Sources: DPPC/UN-OCHA joint government and humanitarian partners humanitarian requirement 
documents from 2000, 2003, 2008, various UN-OCHA Ethiopia office reports and Devereux (2000b, 
2001a: 118); Kaiser (2003); Salama et al., (2001: 568). 
 
6.2.2 Green famine and its multiple causes 
As with famines in general, the common explanation in Ethiopia of the causes of green famine 
is climate variation manifested through delay or failure of rains, often described as drought. 
However, as indicated in Chapter 4, green famine is caused by a combination of factors 
                                                             
 
30 Salama et al., (2001: 568) estimated the death toll of the famine of 2000 in Somali region at 98000 
and in Gode zone at 19,900. 
Period Regions affected Perceived causes/ 
triggers 
Estimated 
mortality 
Category of 
crises 
1957–58 Tigray Drought and locusts 250,000 people Famine 
1966 Wollo Drought 50,000 people Famine 
1972–75 Wollo and Tigray  Drought 350,000 people Famine 
1978–79 Southern Ethiopia Belg (short rain) failure No data Food crisis 
1982 Northern Ethiopia Mehar (long rain) delay No data Food crisis 
1984–85 All regions but severe 
in the north, central 
and eastern parts 
(Wollo and Tigray) 
Consecutive drought, 
armed conflict between 
the rebels and central 
government, deliberate 
response failure 
Estimated 600,000-
1 million people  
Major famine  
1990–92 SNNPR, Somali, 
Oromia and parts of 
Amhara and Tigray 
highlands 
Belg and mehar failure 
and regional conflict 
Estimated 4 million 
people* 
Food crisis 
1999–
2000 
SNNPR, Somali, 
Oromia and parts of 
Amhara and Tigray 
highlands 
Drought, particularly the 
failure of short-season 
rains 
607030 Serious food 
crises, near 
famine 
situation, 
moderate 
famine 
2002–03 SNNPR, Somali, 
Oromia and 
traditionally famine 
prone areas of Tigray 
and Amhara regions 
Poor performance of 
seasonal rains, Saudi 
Arabia imposed an 
import ban on livestock 
from Ethiopia, global 
coffee price decline 
 21,795 child 
deaths 
Food crises 
(GoE) 
2007–08 SNNPR, Somali, 
Oromia, traditionally 
famine-prone areas 
of Tigray and Amhara 
regions 
Poor performance of 
belg and mehar rains, 
resultant poor cereal 
and root crop 
production, and food 
price increase 
4.6 million people 
affected, but no 
data on mortality* 
Food crises 
‘Near  famine  
situation 
Famine 
Green famine  
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(political, policy-related, socio-economic, natural and demographic) that have occurred 
simultaneously and successively. Table 6.1 above shows that Ethiopia has suffered from 
recurrent food crises and famine conditions over time. The data also indicates that the 
geographic distribution of famine was concentrated in the northern, central highlands and 
lowlands (Lautze and Maxwell 2007: 223). Earlier famines in Ethiopia particularly prior to the 
1970s have been solely confined to the northern parts of the country, which are historically 
prone to food crises and famine (Dessalegn 1991: 14). In a similar manner, the food crises that 
occurred over time have also been concentrated in these regions. However, after the 1970s, 
famines have started spreading towards other regions of the country Ogaden (Somali) and 
Hararghe (Oromia) regions (Sen 1981). Further, the post-millennium food crises and famines 
have shifted towards wider parts Oromia and SNNPR, which historically have been considered 
less vulnerable to food crises and famines in the past (Degefa 2005: 126; Lautze and Maxwell 
2007: 230). 
 
Figure 6.1: Geographic distribution of food crises and famine in Ethiopia since 1950 
 
Source: DPPC/UNOCHA reports; Devereux (2000b, 2001a: 118); Kaiser (2003); Salama et al. (2001). 
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6.3 Overview of emergency food aid in selected regions of Ethiopia, 1995–2011 
The humanitarian and emergency food assistance appeal documents from the Disaster 
Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) of the Government of Ethiopia from 1995-
2011 indicate the scale of people becoming vulnerable to chronic and acute food insecurity, 
and the required emergency food aid in Ethiopia in general and in southern Ethiopia in 
particular. Table 6.2 presents the trend of a growing number of vulnerable people identified as 
needing emergency food over the past 17 years across the four biggest regions in the country. 
The data indicate that the total number and the percentage of the regional population who 
required emergency food aid showed a sudden increase in 2000, 2003 and 2008 across all four 
regions. The average percentage of population requiring emergency food aid in SNNPR post-
millennium is not as great as in Amhara and Tigray regions. However, given the historical food 
crises and famine situation in the latter two regions, it is not a surprise that the situation is 
worse there. Further, since 1999, with the exception of 2007, compared to the other three 
regions, the number of vulnerable people requiring emergency food aid in southern Ethiopia 
has shown an increasing trend. Overall, however, the total number and the percentage of the 
regional population that required emergency food aid across all regions have shown a slowing 
trend since 2005. It should be noted that, since 2005, the Ethiopian government, in 
partnership with donors, has introduced a large-scale Productive Safety Net Programme 
(PSNP) countrywide, reaching over 8 million people per year in some years, and the latest 
figures indicate that in 2012 the number of PSNP beneficiaries has decreased to 7.5 million 
(Ellis and White 2012: 4). This programme will be discussed further in Chapter 7. 
 
 The humanitarian appeal documents of the Government of Ethiopia and development 
partners have also indicated that the reasons for the increasing food insecurity and the 
subsequent increase of emergency food aid needs were mainly due to the failure of seasonal 
rains in different regions of the country. 
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Table 6.2: Number and percentage of vulnerable people requiring emergency food aid in selected regions of Ethiopia, 1995–2011 
Year Regions 
Amhara Oromia SNNPR Tigray 
No. of 
people 
requiring 
food aid 
Percentage 
of regional 
population 
No. of 
people 
requiring 
food aid 
Percentage 
of regional 
population 
No. of people 
requiring food 
aid 
Percentage 
of regional 
population 
No. of 
people 
requiring 
food aid 
Percentage 
of regional 
population 
1995 1,201,600 9 902,000 5 822,000 8 764,400 24 
1996 868,000 6 395,400 2 361,400 3 751,200 23 
1997 822,120 5 547,780 3 331,700 3 675,000 20 
1998 2,022,200 13 709,614 3 N/A 0 1,201,000 34 
1999 2,786,803 18 1,562,451 7 725,617 6 998,439 28 
2000 3,569,820 22 1,902,824 9 1,410,008 11 1,717,756 47 
2001 2,130,000 13 1,129,000 5 869,800 7 938,500 25 
2002 1,724,800 10 1,051,1400 4 303,300 2 917,200 24 
2003 3,958,500 22 4,150,100 17 1,586,500 12 2,131,900 53 
2004 2,000,000 11 1,556,700 6 873,700 6 1,107,000 27 
2005 114,610 1 500,004 2 325,998 2 391,844 9 
2006 154,7000 1 733,780 3 35,910 0 0 0 
2007 87,600 0 131,500 0 38,800 0 0 0 
2008 814,572 4 1,521,590 5 1,485,396 9 601,435 13 
2009 995,095 5 683,839 2 881,739 5 674,304 14 
2010 994,800 5 1,088,903 4 852,020 5 641,949 14 
2011 420,045 2 1,889,267 6 252,236 1 399373 8 
Sources: DPPC/DPPA/DRMFSS and UNOCHA annual humanitarian appeals and reports 1995-2011.
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6.4 Comparison between the 1984 famine and the green famine of 2007–08  
This section maps the theoretical and causal similarities and differences between the 1984 
famine and the green famine of 2007–08 in southern Ethiopia. 
 
6.4.1 History of famine in the study area 
Except for the famine of 1984, people in the study area had not experienced famine situations 
before. During the field research, local people, particularly the community elders, both men 
and women, were asked to recall the times when the area/their particular woreda was 
affected by a famine situation. During the community focus group discussions and numerous 
ad hoc consultations, the elders said that they experienced food crises and normal seasonal 
hunger over the course of years of different scales and magnitude. But no famine situation 
(which they would call yewulle or udufunne) was indicated (except 2003 and 2008). They said 
that localised hunger often happened due to seasonal rain failures or disease outbreaks on 
crops, but they managed such temporary crises without external support through the adoption 
of different types of reversible coping mechanisms. The community members recalled that the 
1984 famine was their first experience of famine and further indicated that more recently they 
suffered famine situations in 2003 and 2007–08. However, it was said that the 2003 famine 
was slightly different and less severe than the 2008 famine. The response from a group of 
women in Ashira kebele shows how the 2007–08 green famine was different from others: 
‘The  most  serious  food  crisis  that  affected  this  community  in  the  last  15  years  was  the  2007–08 
famine. This was the worst by any measure. It was more serious and caused more suffering 
compared to all other previous famines and it also made us less resilient. For instance when 
death occurred, families did not even announce the situation and performed the burial ritual 
secretly’  (FG-KB/AS-CEW/12/02/2011). 
 
In Kambata culture, it is very important to organise an appropriate and elaborate funeral ritual 
when someone passes away; all the relatives are invited from near and far to attend the 
ceremony and the family of the deceased is responsible for preparing food and drink for 
everyone who attends the funeral. Further, the close relatives, particularly brothers- in-law 
and sisters-in law, of the deceased are expected to bring a sack of maize, wheat or other types 
of cereal grain to the deceased family. This is a critically important and much appreciated 
cultural practice among the Kambata ethnic groups. However, as the overall food security 
situation was extremely poor during the green famine period in 2007–08, people could not 
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follow this important tradition. Failing to perform such important cultural ceremonies is 
regarded as shameful and culturally and socially unacceptable. In Kambata the failure to 
perform such ceremonies not only indicates the severity of the famine situation, but also is 
used by local people to distinguish general hunger and famine.  
 
Table 6.3: Comparison of characteristics of the 1984 and 2007–08 famine situations in the 
study area as identified by community groups 
1984 famine  
 
2007–08 green famine 
 
Triggered by drought Triggered by drought and other interlinked 
vulnerability factors 
The price of food was reasonable Market dynamics, particularly the price hike, 
played  a  triggering  role.  ‘There  was  less  money  in  
our pocket and there was no food at market. The 
price  of  food  was  unreachable.’   
Social  support  available:  ‘One  could  call  upon  
friends  and  relatives  for  food  support/loan.’ 
A  collapse  of  social  support  occurred.  ‘There  was  
no  one  to  call  upon  for  food  and  support.’   
‘One  could  depend  on enset for long times and if 
he/she doesn't have matured enset, he/she 
could access through borrowing from relatives 
and  friends.’ 
‘There  was  less  and  immature  enset  and  that  could  
not support household food needs. People became 
more greedy and self-centred.’   
‘It  was  only  the  poorest  of  the  community  with  
fewer livelihood assets (physical, social, financial, 
political  etc.)  who  were  affected  severely.’ 
‘It  affected  everybody’.  ‘Hundannka dedek aafe 
gorru/yewulitta’, literally a famine that affected 
everyone across the wealth groups 
‘Mortality  was  high  for  both  people  and  
livestock; however it was severe among the 
poorest  of  poor.’ 
‘Less  people  and  livestock  death,  but  more  people  
suffered  from  the  experience.’ 
‘It  was  a  more  visible  and  recognisable  famine  
and it occurred across the nation. Government 
even moved those who were affected by force to 
the seffera (resettlement  sites).’ 
‘Silent  famine.  Arrived Slowly, happened in a 
deceiving way. It has gained momentum before it 
burst. It deceived the community not to look for 
escaping mechanism before it burst thus we called 
it a deceiving famine (malach aaggo udufuunita).’  
Women  groups  described  it  as  ‘Huundanka mexxu 
asse  gorru’: a famine that has made all equal 
despite wealth levels and social differences 
‘Poor  coordination  and  slow  response  …  more  
focus was given to the areas considered as the 
epicentre of famine in the north. Food was 
delivered but there were no emergency feeding 
centres.’   
Very good coordination once the news came out 
through the international media and the response 
was well coordinated; as a result it was possible to 
avoid severe mortality. Emergency feeding centres 
were established to treat severely malnourished 
children 
‘It  was  a  killing  famine.  Many  people  have  died  
as a result of the famine situation and poor 
external  support.’ 
‘It  was  a  swelling  famine.  Many  children,  pregnant  
and lactating mothers have shown a sign of 
swelling [oedema] on their legs and bellies.’ 
‘The  majority  of  people  in  the  area  were  not  so  
vulnerable and they had a better shock 
absorbing  capacity.’ 
The majority of people were already at the edge 
due to persistent shocks that have had happened 
over  time.  ‘Lenkenkin  fandeme’: we were already 
shaken before it happened. 
Source:  Author’s  fieldwork,  2011. 
 
 131 
 
6.5 The debate about famine and famine mortality: perceptions and accounts of 
affected people vs. external actors 
As discussed in Chapter 4, there are still divergent views regarding what exactly qualifies a 
given  food  crisis  as  ‘famine’  and  when  exactly  to  adopt  the  term  ‘famine’ thus different actors 
apply the term at different stages of food and humanitarian crises (Edkins 2000; Lautze et al. 
2003: 101; Howe and Devereux 2004). For instance, donors view famine as an event that 
results in mass starvation and mortality (often recognising the crisis only after it has resulted in 
excess mortality through media and assessment reports), while governments often refrain 
from using  the  ‘F’  word  altogether,  even  when  the  scale  and  magnitude  of  the  crisis  indicate  
otherwise.  Experts  and  aid  agencies  look  into  ‘objectively  and  statistically  measurable 
anthropometric indicators for malnutrition and use assessment reports consisting of acute 
malnutrition and mortality rates’ (Howe 2002: 21; de Waal 2007: 91). Hammond and Maxwell 
(2002:268) even went further in describing how the presence of higher mortality is considered 
as the strongest trigger factor to declare a food crisis and emergency as a famine as:  
…whether  an  ‘emergency’  is  broadly  perceived  by  the  international  community  to  be  a  ‘famine’  
depends not on the damage to livelihoods, the level of migration, or even the prevalence of 
malnutrition. It depends on the level of what is politely  termed  ‘excess  mortality’. 
 
But famine victims view it as a continuous process of ‘destitution  and  failure  of  coping  
strategies  and  failure  of  social  support  systems’  (de  Waal  1989:  76; Deng 1999: 9). Howe 
(2002) argued that such lack of consensus and uncertainties pertaining to the term famine 
often leads to a delay in responses and actions by responsible agencies and actors, and 
subsequently this causes more suffering for the victims. But, the fundamental question 
remains, paraphrasing Chambers (1997), ‘whose’ definition counts or is appropriate? How can 
all  actors  find  a  common  ground  to  talk  the  same  language?  Why  is  the  victim’s  perception  
given less weight than quantifiable indicators of famine? These questions will be analysed and 
discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
 
In famine analysis and humanitarian responses, anthropometric and mortality results, are 
widely used as direct and proxy indicators to define the severity of the food crisis and 
malnutrition. However, they do not yield a true picture of the causes of malnutrition or 
mortality since these are not necessarily related to a lack of food per se but are attributable to 
a host of other contributing factors (Young and Jaspars 1995). Yet, there is an ongoing debate 
on whether famine can occur without significantly causing excess mortality or whether famine 
by definition always results in excess mortality (Howe 2002; Lautze et al. 2003).  
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As discussed in Chapter 4 and above, the Kambata community has its own way of perceiving, 
understanding and defining hunger and famine. Famine is seen as a more complex process 
that often lasts for months as the affected people continue to suffer silently and slowly. Like 
other rural communities in Africa, they see famine as a process that breaks down the informal 
social safety net of society and causes heavy strain on the coping capacity of their livelihood 
systems, bringing subsequent destitution. In their classification, there is a killing famine 
(literally shanno gorru) and a swelling famine (yewulsanno gorru). Accordingly, death (rehuut) 
arrives only at the final stage of the process and hence, they can experience famine without 
large-scale mortality (see De Waal 1989; Deng 1999:7-9). 
 
A wide spectrum of respondents were interviewed to capture multiple perceptions about the 
issue of food crisis and to understand whether the 2007–08 crisis had reached a famine level 
or not. The answers varied widely. However, communities and famine-affected people who 
experienced the effects of the crisis first hand labelled it famine without necessarily 
experiencing  excess  mortality  in  their  households.  When  asked,  ‘Recall the years in your life 
time that this community was affected by famine. What do you recall about  those  years?’  the 
following responses were provided: 
 
‘We  faced  famine  in  1984.  In  the  last  15  years,  this  community  has  suffered  some  notable  food  
crises (gorri dolla – hunger years) and famines. The most prominent one was in 2007–08. During 
that time, many people suffered and some died due to famine. Food was in the markets, but the 
prices  rose  sharply  and  became  unbearable,  so  we  spent  everything  we  have  to  buy  food’  
(FG_KB/ME-CEM/03/02/2011). 
 
‘Except  the  1984  and  2007–08 starvation and hunger, we have never faced serious years, as we 
are  a  people  who  always  depend  on  enset.  We  haven’t  fully  recovered  from  the  effects  of  the  
2007–08  yet,  including  our  livestock’  (FG_KB/ME-CEW/04/02/2011). 
 
‘This  community  suffered  from  two  major  famines  in  the  past three decades or so. The first was 
during  the  regime  of  Derg  in  1984,  and  the  last  episode  of  famine  was  in  2008’  (FG-KB/AS-
CEW/12/02/2011). 
 
‘In  1984,  2003 and 2007–08  …  the  crisis  of  2007–08 was a serious famine (or udufunitta); 
however due to the coordinated and rapid medical and relief interventions from aid agencies and 
government,  large  scale  death  and  migration  was  prevented’  (FG_KG/AD-CEW/24/02/2011). 
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‘I  have  experienced  a  famine  twice  in  my  life.  The  1984  famine  was  severe,  but  I  had  enset  in  my  
backyard and we relied on it for food. By then, I was also able to seek support from my brother 
and other close relatives in degga (highland) kebeles for wheat. However, the 2008 famine was 
worse because it broke our bridge (support system and enset and sweet potato). It has left very 
bad  scars  in  my  life,  as  I  lost  my  child’  (CS_KB/AS-02/17/02/2011). 
 
The above comments from community members clearly indicate that they experienced a food 
crisis situation in 2003, and a famine situation in 1984 and in 2007–08. For the sufferers of 
famine it was not the number of deaths that have occurred due to a situation that classified a 
food  crisis  as  a  ‘famine’,  but  the  overall  experience  of  having  nothing  and  being  unable  to  be  
supported by their close relatives and patrons when they needed them most. It is the feeling 
of helplessness that counted significantly. The responses also indicate the difference between 
food crisis and famine. Despite its severity, during a food crisis the social support system still 
functions and people can claim their transfer entitlements, whereas during a famine these 
institutions have partially or completely collapsed. As one of the informants affected by green 
famine in 2007–08 reflected: 
‘It  was  during  the  middle  of  the  famine  that  I  woke up and knew that there was nothing at home 
that I could give to my children tomorrow or the coming days ahead. I was in a total state of 
confusion and contemplated to kill myself rather than seeing my children crying for something to 
eat while there is nothing  I  can  give  them  at  that  moment’ (FG_KB/AS-VCG/15/02/2011). 
 
Famine is a situation when people are left with no options for dealing with it. It is also a 
psychological state of distress that people go through during the crisis situation. As Mesfin 
(1984: 9)  noted,  famine  is  inherently  different  from  food  insecurity  and  hunger.  Famine  is  ‘a  
socio-economic crisis with profound consequences for the economic and social fabric of a 
society’. 
 
Despite famine victims and local people defining the experience of 2007–08 as a famine, the 
government did not declare it to be one. In a similar manner, despite the severity of the 
situation,  donors  also  downplayed  the  severity  of  the  crisis  and  declared  it  to  be  ‘normal  food  
shortage  crisis’  in  the  southern  parts  of  Ethiopia during 2003 (Lautze et al. 2003) and 2008. Can 
a green famine be  categorised  as  ‘famine’  as  described  both  by  the  victims  and  non-affected 
people in the area or it is rather a localised food crisis as defined by outsiders? Whose 
definition counts? In order to understand and classify the food crisis or green famine in the K-T 
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zone of southern Ethiopia, this research uses different famine scales in combination with local 
indicators and information. 
 
6.6  Famine measurements and scales 
The concept of measuring and classifying food crisis and famines is not a new development in 
the global food security and research arena. Over the last three decades, ‘comprehensive and 
universally valid food insecurity/crisis indicators’ and measurements have been developed 
(Maxwell et al. 2008: 534). However, despite longstanding efforts, developing a famine scale 
and measurements that apply globally across different livelihood, economic, social, cultural 
and political contexts has remained a major challenge. Currently there are two famine scales 
and indicators that have been developed and are widely applied across different institutions 
and actors to define and classify food crises and emergency situations as famine or not. 
 
6.6.1 Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) 
The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale is a comprehensive food security 
and famine analysis scale that was developed by the Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU)31 of 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Somalia in 2004. Drawing 
mainly on the earlier food insecurity and famine classification systems and scales (e.g. Darcy 
and Hofmann’s  (2003)  food  insecurity  classification  method,  Howe  and  Devereux’s  (2004)  
famine intensity and magnitude scales,  USAID’s  FEWS  NET  (2005) and MSF’s  nutrition  
guidelines (2000), the IPC particularly aims at developing a classification system with indicators 
and  thresholds  that  are  ‘quantified,  internationally  accepted  and  comparable  over space and 
time’  (IPC Global Partners 2008: 9). After its successful launch in Somalia, the IPC scale is being 
rolled out in many other African countries and recently it was used in the 2011 Greater Horn of 
Africa crisis, when it was applied to classify and  declare  the  situation  in  Somalia  as  ‘famine’ 
(IPC Global Partners 2012; Checchi and Robinson 2013). 
 
The IPC version 1.1 classifies the area/livelihood zone and the severity of corresponding acute 
food insecurity situation into five phases on scales 1 to 5 (IPC Global Partners 2008: 4). Phase 1 
                                                             
 
31 FSAU, now called FSNAU after merging with the Nutrition Analysis Unit in 2009, is a multi-donor-
funded project managed and implemented by the FAO (Hillbruner and Moloney 2012: 1) 
 135 
 
represents –generally food secure, 2 – moderate /borderline food insecure, 3 – acute food and 
livelihood crises, 4 – humanitarian emergency, and 5 – famine. The IPC scale uses the following 
criteria  to  define  ‘phase  5’-famine:  
 A minimum of 20 per cent of the total population of the area/country faces extreme 
food deficits and very limited ability to cope; and 
 Representative malnutrition survey results indicate the prevalence of acute 
malnutrition (GAM) of above 30 per cent and Crude Mortality Rate (CMR) exceeds 
2/10,000/day  
 Further, IPC looks into the situations of rapidly increasing destitution, the prevalence 
of hunger-related diseases, large-scale displacement of affected people from their 
places in search of food and effectively complete loss of livelihood assets and collapse 
of informal social networks (ibid.: 4). 
 
Since its inception, the IPC scale has been accepted by different stakeholders and institutions 
including  FAO,  WFP,  USAID’s  FEWS  NET, JRC-EC, regional organisations and leading 
humanitarian organisations (OXFAM, Save the Children and ACF International) (IPC Global 
Partners 2012: 3). The arrival of the IPC on the scene of food security and famine classification 
has helped to improve the overall understanding of famine progression process and narrow a 
gap that exists in food insecurity and famine thresholds that are applied by different actors. 
Further, IPC classification scale looks into multiple causes and indicators of food insecurity and 
famine  by  introducing  ‘the  concept  of  convergence  of  evidences’  stemming  from  areas  of  food  
access and availability, nutrition, health, water, vulnerability, hazards, civil security, destitution 
and displacement, livelihoods situation in its phase classification (ibid.: 17).  
 
As noted earlier, the association between famine and mortality is a contested and divisive area 
that continues affecting famine classification and response. Hence, there is no internationally 
accepted and agreed upon thresholds of ‘malnutrition and mortality rates that clearly define 
the onset of famine’ that can be applied in different livelihood, social, economical, political 
contexts (Howe and Devereux 2004: 359). Literature on thresholds of emergency and famine 
mortality reflects that there has not been a significant revision undertaken since the 1990s and 
the current famine mortality threshold (CMR >2 persons/10,000 people/day) widely adopted 
by the IPC, UN agencies and other actors is based on the estimates of the Toole and Waldman 
in 1990s who  suggested  a  threshold  of  CMR  of  >1/10,  000/day  for  declaring  an  ‘emergency  
level’. The normal/baseline CMR for sub-Saharan Africa by then was 0.44/10,000/day, thus 
they considered the doubling of the baseline as emergency (Checchi and Roberts 2005: 7). 
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For instance, the United Nations Standing Committee on Nutrition defines the threshold of 
CMR  2/10,000/day  ‘a  severe  situation’  (SCN  2004:  37)  whereas  the United Nations Refugee 
Nutrition Information System (RNIS) (2000) cited in (Howe and Devereux (2004: 359) defines a 
situation  as  ‘emergency  out  of  control’  when  the  CMR  reaches  >2/10,000/day. In contrast, 
Howe and Devereux (2004: 362), in their famine intensity scale, suggested a threshold of CMR 
>=1  but<5/10,000/day  as  ‘famine  conditions’. In contrast, Hakewill and Moren (1991: 24-28) 
suggested significantly higher thresholds of CMR of 5/ 10,000 per day than all the writers and 
institutions discussed above to declare a famine. Drawing on these various sources, the IPC 
attempted  to  establish  ‘standard  and  widely  applicable’  anthropometric  and  mortality  cut-offs, 
for different stages of food insecurity and famine (Young and Jaspars 2009: 26). 
 
Despite its contribution in food security and famine classification, the IPC scale has significant 
limitations and thus might not be the right measurement and appropriate scale to capture and 
reveal the prevailing food crisis and the severity of green famine in Ethiopia. These limitations 
include the following: 
 
(1) Despite the IPC claims that nutrition indicators do not have an outright weight in classifying 
the crisis situation, it gives more weight to anthropometric and mortality indicators with no 
recognition  of  the  victim’s  perception.  However, as discussed earlier malnutrition  is  a  ‘trailing  
indicator  of  food  insecurity’,  hence  heavily  focusing  on  it  in  classifying  a  situation  recognises  
the crisis too late and potentially affects the response by concealing the slow progression of 
destitution and famine until the malnutrition rate reaches the accepted threshold (Howe and 
Devereux 2004: 360). 
 
Further, conducting scientific and standardised nutrition surveys requires very elaborate 
logistic provisions and human and financial resources in place, which are often in short supply 
in the rural Ethiopian context. Even if some ad hoc nutrition survey reports exist, accessing 
them can be very difficult, and often it is impossible to get validation from the government 
authorities to publish and use the results. I have experienced this during my research fieldwork 
at different levels where the famine mortality figures were not made available and authorities 
were not willing to talk about any deaths related to famine. For instance, during the 2003 
famine situation in Ethiopia, when the then head of DPPC was asked by an IRIN journalist (on 
11 December 2003) about the number of deaths due to hunger, he said: 
We are not trying to hide facts – but we do not have concrete information related to lives lost 
because of lack of food, of emergency health (assistance) or lack of water assistance. There are 
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people who have lost children or their lives, but we do not have figures for that (cited in Degefa 
2005: 126). 
 
In a similar situation a senior food security expert and emergency coordinator in the study 
area during the 2008 green famine situation, when asked about the mortality figures in the 
area during the fieldwork of this study, responded: 
‘As  an  emergency  coordinator,  I  have  seen  many  children  particularly  the  under  five  years  of  age,  
die in the emergency feeding centres established during the crisis period of 2008. I would say we 
were losing two to three children per day. I have photos and reports about the incidences. 
However, when I presented the report to the zone administration and food security task force, I 
was told to hand over both the photos and the report to them (zone administration) and never 
talk to the local and international media about it. So, I am not going to give you further details on 
this’  (KI_KT/Z-FSEW/20/02/2011). 
 
This evidence clearly shows the existing political and statistical difficulties in relying on and 
using quantitative indicators for crisis and famine classification. 
 
 (2) IPC classifies the severity of a food crisis situation into five distinct phases and does not 
recognise famine until the crises reaches the final phase (see Table 6.9 later in this chapter). 
Such a classification has critical implications and consequences. First, having multiple phases 
and labelling system creates the potential for delay, providing an excuse for actors not to 
respond on time (Howe 2002). Second, waiting until these thresholds have been reached only 
increases the suffering of the victims while the situation is intensifying and affecting more lives 
and livelihoods. 
 
(3) The IPC standard cut-off references for the famine phase for the prevalence of GAM (>30 
per cent) and CMR (>2 persons/10,000/day) are excessively high and may not be applicable in 
the cases of slow-onset famine situations where the government and NGOs are readily 
available to take rapid action. Defining only these outcomes as a famine and acceptance of 
lower thresholds as emergencies promote the  discourse  of  ‘normalisation  of  crisis’,  which  has  
become a challenge in famine management and response (Bradbury 2000).  
 
In summary, due to the limitations mentioned above, the applicability of the IPC in different 
contexts and its use as a famine classification and management is very limited. 
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6.6.2 Howe and Devereux famine intensity and magnitude scales 
Howe and Devereux (2004: 353)  introduced  their  ‘famine  intensity  and  magnitude  scales’,  
which reviews the intensity and the magnitude of a given food crisis and help to identify and 
categorise it into different levels of famine. The intensity refers to ‘the severity of the crisis at a 
given location and point in time, whereas the magnitude looks into the aggregate impact of 
crisis’, which is normally assessed once the tide of famine has reduced or in retrospect. Howe 
and  Devereux’s  magnitude  scale  also  has  five  categories  but  here  designated  by  letters  and  the  
categorisation is based on the total mortality that occurred during the crisis: 
Category A – minor famine with a mortality range of 0–999, Category B – moderate famine with a 
mortality rate of 1,000–9,999, Category C – major famine with mortality range from 10,000-
99,999; Category D – great famine with mortality of 100,000–999,999 people, and the highest 
one is category E – catastrophic famine with an estimated mortality rate of 1,000,000 and above 
(Howe and Devereux 2004: 365). 
 
In principle, this famine scale is similar to the IPC scale as it focuses on anthropometric and 
mortality indicators to analyse the famine situation and establishes the intensity and 
magnitude of the situation (see Table 6.9). However, this scale identifies and proposes giving 
more  weight  to  ‘subjective’  indicators  of  food  crisis,  such  as  coping  strategies  adopted  by 
people during the crisis, along with food security and livelihood descriptors such as social 
system and market situations (Rubin 2009: 283). It also suggests that in order to determine the 
intensity of a given food crisis, one should use a mix of both objective and subjective indicators 
rather than looking at the anthropometric indicators only. This is a great contribution and 
starting point to narrow the existing confusion about famine and famine measurement. The 
inclusion of these aspects helps to better understand the social dimension of famine effects. 
 
Unlike the IPC, the intensity and magnitude scales were developed purely to measure and 
classify famines. However, like the IPC scale, they have their own limitations, as they heavily 
rely on anthropometric/mortality indicators to determine the intensity of the crisis and give 
little or no weight to the perception of famine victims in its analysis. Further, like the IPC, this 
scale also divides the phases of crises and famine into five categories, and, as discussed above, 
having so many phases negatively affects potential response and also reinforces ambiguities 
between  food  crisis  and  famine  level.  Despite  Devereux  and  Howe’s  famine  magnitude  scale  
proposing a reduced threshold mortality range to declare a situation as a famine, their 
intensity scale endorses higher thresholds of anthropometric outcomes than those used by 
other agencies (see Table 6.9). 
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In summary, the existing famine scales heavily rely on quantifiable indicators with less 
attention towards the experience and perceptions of the victims. In particular, the views of 
people suffering famines are rarely considered in famine classification. As de Waal (1989: 18) 
observed, these famine scales are influenced by a general understanding  of  famine  as  ‘a  
technical  malfunction  …  looking  on  externally  quantifiable  change  of  state  among  population  
such  as  malnutrition  rates,  mortality  …  rather  than  a  social breakdown’  (emphasis  added).  The  
conventional famine measurements that rely heavily on malnutrition outcomes and mortality 
rates during the crisis situation do not explain the full extent of the situation. Given its 
complexity and multidimensionality, some writers (e.g. S. Maxwell 1996: 160; Carr 2006: 18) 
have advocated the advancement of postmodernist thought in food security analysis and 
measurements. 
 
6.7 Nutritional indicators of green famine 
Despite there being no commonly agreed thresholds among the circles of international 
nutrition experts, the results of nutritional surveys and assessments are widely considered as 
‘objective  indicators’  of the state of food insecurity and provide a comparable and universally 
acceptable famine measurement (Howe and Devereux 2004: 359; Young and Jaspars 2006: 
12). As a result they have become a central parameter in famine analysis, study and response 
over time (De Waal 1989). Acquiring any consistent and high-quality data is a chronic problem 
in Ethiopia and it is even more complicated when it comes to data related to health and 
nutrition in food crisis and famine situations. However, despite such complex challenges, in the 
context of Ethiopia, health and nutrition survey results have remained critical and the 
‘strongest  trigger to arrive on a decision whether it is a food crisis or a famine and response for 
the  government  and  donors’  (Anderson  and  Choularton  2004:  13).  As noted earlier, during the 
fieldwork, I have attempted to access available emergency assessments and mortality reports 
from the woreda, zone and regional levels but the officials refused to provide due to the 
political sensitivity of the issue. Further, accessing emergency nutrition assessment reports 
undertaken by NGOs in the study area has proven very difficult. For instance, during the 
beginning of the 2008 green famine, Doctors without Borders (MSF) conducted a rapid 
nutrition assessment in Kacha-Bira district, one of the hardest-hit areas. However, the regional 
and central government banned the circulation of the report and its results, and issued a stark 
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warning to the agency.32 Similarly, as some international media reported during the famine, 
‘the  government has banned photographs of the starving and has told field workers not to give 
information  to  foreign  journalists’ (Economist 2008). 
 
Table 6.4: Selected nutrition survey results in K-T zone, 2003–08 
Survey 
area 
Date GAM (z-scores, 
95% CI) 
SAM (z-scores, 
95% CI) 
Oedema 
% 
Mortality 
/10,000/day 
CMR Under 5  
 
Kadida-
Gamela 
Dec. 
2003*** 
8.3% 
(6.6%–10.4%) 
1.1% 
(0.6%–2.2%) 
N/A 0.39 0.73 
May 
2006** 
8.5% 
(6.7%–10.4%) 
1.3% 
(0.6%–2.1%) 
0.8% 0.31 0.89 
Jun. 2008* 10.7% 
(8.4%–13.1%) 
2.3% 
(1.3%–3.3%) 
N/A 0.48 0.54 
 
Tembaro 
Jun. 
2003** 
13% 
(10.0%–16.4%) 
1.7% 
(0.4%–2.6%) 
0.4% 0.25 0.4 
Mar. 
2004** 
10% 
(7.5%–13.3%) 
1.8% 
(0.9%–3.7%) 
N/A 0.8 3.05 
Note: *Survey undertaken by RENCU/Samaritan's Purse ** by World Vision Ethiopia and *** by Save the 
Children-US (SC-USA) 
N/A data are not available. 
GAM: below <80% of the mean or<-2SD; SAM: below <70% of the mean or <-3SD. 
Data source: ENCU survey database 2011a. 
 
The results of surveys undertaken by various NGOs operating in Kadida-Gamela indicate the 
prevalence of the global and severe acute malnutrition rates showing an upward trend over a 
five-year period. In contrast to GAM and SAM rates, the trend of the crude and the under-five 
mortality rates show a mixed outcome and thus no clear trend emerged. The CMR rate 
decreased slightly in 2006 and picked up again in 2008 while the under-five mortality rate 
increased slightly in 2006 and showed a slowing trend in 2008. Even in less conservative 
estimate of malnutrition and mortality, these figures indicate that the nutrition situation had 
deteriorated and reached close to the emergency threshold set by the WHO. The WHO 
declares a nutrition emergency when the prevalence of GAM is >15 per cent, CMR 
>1/10,000/day and U5MR >2/10,000/day. The causes for the exceptionally high mortality rate 
for the under-fives in 2004 in Tembaro are not explained in the survey report. The possible 
                                                             
 
32 Personal communication with UNOCHA emergency team, May 2011. 
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explanations could be the timing of the survey (seasonality), which coincided with the annual 
hunger gap and perhaps households had not fully recovered from the 2003 green famine. 
Further, given it is a malaria prone area this might also have played a role in the high mortality. 
 
In addition to the nutrition surveys, World Vision Ethiopia (WVE) conducted rapid 
assessments/nutrition screenings among the under-five children in three districts in K-T zone 
in 2008 and 2009 (see Table 6.5). The rapid assessment among children aged 6–59 months in 
December 2008 using Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) measurement in Kadida-Gamela 
district shows the prevalence of proxy GAM and SAM rates of 28.9 per cent and 0.5 per cent 
respectively. Similar rapid assessment/screenings conducted in March 2009 in Kacha-Bira 
indicated an estimated GAM rate of 17.6 per cent and SAM of 1.5 per cent and in Tembaro 
district the prevalence of GAM and SAM rates of 24.9 per cent and 2.4 per cent respectively 
(Sisay and Gedion 2011: 53). Here, it should be noted that despite the fact that they are widely 
used in emergency settings, rapid assessments/screenings are not conducted according to 
international nutrition survey protocols and their accuracy is often questioned by nutrition 
experts on the grounds that they do not provide point estimates of GAM/SAM prevalence nor 
do they establish the crude and under-five mortality rates. However, such rapid screening and 
assessments during the peak of an emergency can give a reasonable estimate of malnutrition 
among certain age groups of children and indicate a severely deteriorating food insecurity and 
nutrition situation. As stated by Young and Jaspars (2006: 15), ‘the  results  of  screening  do  not  
provide a reliable population estimate of acute malnutrition, but they do allow an assessment 
of  the  potential  risk  of  acute  malnutrition’. 
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Table 6.5: Summary of nutrition screening results in selected districts in K-T zone during and 
after the green famine periods 
Name of 
ADP/district 
ADP total 
population 
Total 6–59 
months 
GAM SAM When data 
collected 
Data source 
Kacha-Bira 142,221 19,643 17.6% 1.5% Mar. 2009 Rapid 
nutrition 
assessment 
Tembaro 
Omo/sheleko 
204,571 34,771 24.9% 2.35% Mar. 2009 Rapid 
nutrition 
assessment 
Kadida-Gamela 
Durame 
171,968 29,235 28.9% 0.5% Dec. 2008 EOS mass 
screening 
Note: ADP = World Vision Area-based Development Programme; EOS = extended outreach strategy. 
Source: Sisay and Gedion 2011: 53. 
 
6.8 Trends in admissions to therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres 
Since its establishment in 2000 under the DRMFSS, the Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit 
(ENCU) has undertaken various tasks such as coordination of emergency nutrition assessment 
and quality assurance, collection and analysis of the data on admission trends of new severe 
acute malnutrition cases to the emergency feeding centres, collection and collation of reports 
and results of nutrition surveys conducted throughout the country and nutrition information 
database (Anderson and Choularton 2004; Manyama et al. 2011: 32). Table 6.6 shows trends 
in admission of malnourished children to the Therapeutic Feeding Programme (TFP)33 centers 
in the study area since 2008 and associated death rates. 
 
Although these figures (Table 6.6) are officially published, validated and obtained from 
government agencies, care should be exercised for analytical purposes. There is a general 
trend of underreporting from government agencies about malnutrition and mortality rates 
associated with hunger and famine. This has historically been a significant process and dates 
back to the Imperial times in the 1960s and 1970s (see also Dessalegn 1991: 101-102 for the 
1974 famine). During the 1966 Wollo famine local administrators and governors would often 
present good news and reports to the emperor despite the large number of peasants facing 
starvation. As Mesfin (1984: 107) succinctly described: 
                                                             
 
33 A malnutrition treatment program that combines both in-patient (TFU) and out-patient (OTP) 
therapeutic feeding for severely malnourished children.  It runs by the Ministry of Health of Ethiopia and 
INGOs in different regions of the country (see more Chamois 2011: 38). 
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Officials of the government were preoccupied more with competition for the favour of the 
Emperor rather than with carrying on their administrative functions. So, it was difficult for [them] 
to transmit information that might displease the Emperor. In their desire not to displease the 
Emperor, the Ministers often presented the problem of famine with extreme caution and 
understatement. 
 
Table 6.6: Trends in admission of malnourished children to the Therapeutic Feeding 
Programme centres in three districts in K-T zone, 2008–10 
District Years Total annual admission Total cured Total deaths 
Kacha-Bira 2008 4,187 1,549 57 
2009 514 370 N/A 
2010 229 106 3 
Tembaro 2008 4,119 1,496 33 
2009 1,679 1,157 0 
2010 568 550 0 
Kadida-Gamela 2008 764 631 8 
2009 512 465 0 
2010 875 834 0 
Source: ENCU TFP database 2011b. 
 
It was astonishing to witness almost the same attitude in the twenty-first century among 
government officials at different levels after all the lessons were learned about early response 
and ability to defer deterioration and prevent famine. Unless the crisis is very critical and 
media outlets capture the situation, government officials are hesitant to report the actual 
situation particularly in the current decentralised, ethnically based regional system where 
reporting such situations does not look good for the leaders of those regions.34 As noted 
above, establishing mortality outcomes during famine situations could prove challenging, 
particularly in a slow-onset famine situation like green famine, which silently and slowly affects 
and claims lives before it reaches the news. 
 
Famines that have occurred in the recent past (millennium and post-millennium), such as the 
Ethiopia famine in Somali region in 2000 (Salama et al. 2001), the Malawi famine of 2002 
(Devereux and Tiba 2007), Ethiopia green famine in SNNPR in 2003 (Kaiser 2003) and the Niger 
famine in 2005 (Reza et al. 2008; Rubin 2009), show recorded mortality rates below the pre-
millennium famine mortality rates. The factors attributed to a lower mortality rate in the case 
of the post-millennium famines are the significant improvements in emergency response 
                                                             
 
34 Personal communication with regional WFP regional team, July 2011. 
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mechanisms (logistics, communications, early warning systems, human resources, pre-
positioned strategic food reserves in country), technological advancement in malnutrition 
treatment and availability of ready to use therapeutic foods (RUTF), essential drugs, and 
existence of local and international NGOs at post and readily available to respond.  
 
Overall, in the case of most recent large-scale food crises and famines that have occurred in 
Africa, starvation deaths and excess mortality were lower as compared to the pre-millennium 
famines (see Table 6.7). However, in the Somalia famine of 2011, the mortality rates were 
considerably higher than in the other three post-millennium famines. A contributing factor to 
this was the limited humanitarian access to severely affected areas because of the ongoing 
conflict and violence between Al Shabab, the Islamist insurgent movement, and national and 
external security forces (Haan et al. 2012: 78).  
 
Table 6.7: Comparison of estimated mortality of selected pre- and post-millennium famines 
Pre- millennium famines Post-millennium famines 
Country affected and year  Estimated mortality Country affected and year  Estimated mortality 
Ethiopia 1984 600,000–1,000,000 Ethiopia (2000) 98,000 
Nigeria (Biafra) (1968–70) 1,000,000 Ethiopia (2003) 21,79535 
Rwanda (1943–44) 300,000 Malawi (2002) 46,000–85,000 
Somalia (1991–93) 400, 000 Somalia (2011) 244,000–273,000 
Sources: For Nigeria, Rwanda and Somalia 1991–93 (Devereux 2001a), Ethiopia 1984 (Dessalegn 1991 
and Kumar 1990), Ethiopia 2000 (Salama et al. 2001), Ethiopia 2003 (Kaiser 2003), Malawi 2002 
(Devereux and Tiba 2007), Somalia 2011 (Checchi and Robinson 2013). 
 
6.9 Household coping strategies as indicators of the severity of famine 
Generally, there are two competing schools of thought on the potential role of coping 
strategies as indicators of the severity of food crisis and famine. Advocates of coping strategies 
(Corbett 1988; Walker 1989; Devereux 1993a; Cuny 1999; D. Maxwell 1996: 300; Coates et al. 
2006) argue that they can help to capture social aspects of famine and ‘vulnerability that are 
very important in understanding food security’ and famine, but are often not captured by 
famine analysis and study. Thus these authors push for the greater inclusion and recognition of 
coping strategies in famine classification, measurement and response. 
                                                             
 
35 The 2003 crisis was not declared as a famine by the Ethiopian government despite the severity of the 
crisis indicates otherwise. See Andersen and Choularton (2004: 12) and Kaiser (2003: 7). 
 145 
 
Maxwell et al. (1999: 411) advocated that the severity and frequency of household coping 
strategies could be the best ‘alternative indicator to the conventional indicators36 in measuring 
the state of household food security, and, further, offer an insight into identifying sources of 
livelihood vulnerability’. In their recent work on the reduced coping strategy index (rCSI), 
Maxwell et al. (2008), based on 14 studies in ten different countries in Africa investigating 
common coping strategies applied in the face of a food crises, reached the following 
conclusions  regarding  the  potential  applicability  of  CSI  across  different  contexts:  ‘cross-
contextual comparison using the CSI as an indicator is indeed possible, and the results should 
adequately  correlate  with  other  food  security  indicators’  (ibid.: 538). 
 
In contrast, the counter school (Davies 1993; Swift 1993) argues that coping strategies are late 
outcomes/trailing indicators of a food crisis, and tend to change according to the type and 
magnitude of stress, and thus cannot be used to gauge the severity of a situation. Further, 
Swift raised reservations arguing that household coping strategies could not be good 
predictors of impending food crisis and potential famines due to their inherent complexity and 
contingent nature (Swift 1993: 14). On a similar note, Davies (1993:67) argues that coping 
strategies are not similar across different livelihood groups and the type of strategy considered 
as  ‘unusual’  by one group can be ‘normal’ by others hence this limits its applicability. 
 
Corbett (1988) identified and categorised the types of coping strategies in the order that 
households employed them when facing food crisis and famine into three stages: (1) insurance 
(adaptive), (2) disposal of productive assets, and (3) destitution and mass migration. Further, 
she argued that the different stages of coping strategies adopted by households not only help 
to understand the severity of the crisis but also help to indicate the onset of a famine situation 
in a given locality and livelihood zone. She described this as follows: 
Such  ‘distress  sales’  [irreversible  coping  strategy]  may  signal  that  households  have  exhausted  the  
range of possible actions open to them for gaining access to food at a smaller opportunity cost. 
Once a large number of households reaches this second stage in their coping strategies, famine 
conditions  in  the  sense  of  severe  economic  disruption,  may  be  said  to  have  set  in’  (ibid.: 1107). 
                                                             
 
36 The  ‘conventional’  household  food  security  indicators  are  established by measuring direct and proxy 
indicators such as food consumption level (2,100 kcal/person/day), dietary diversity and malnutrition 
status and poverty level (assets and income) of an individual/household. (For more on this, see D. 
Maxwell 1996; Maxwell et al. 1999: 412; 2008: 534.) 
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Curtis also suggested that households change the techniques or types of coping strategies as 
the situation and severity level of the food crisis progresses to the next level, arguing that 
‘households  evince  fairly  specific  coping  tactics that respond to the three different stages of 
famine; pre-crisis,  progression  and  zenith  of  a  famine’  (Curtis 1993: 6). Similarly, Watts (1983: 
434) argued that ‘households  do  not  respond  arbitrarily  to  a  food  crisis  for  which  they  are  in  
some sense conceptually prepared; rather they do so serially, with respect to the intensity of 
what  one  might  call  famine  signals’. 
 
Apart from the seminal work of Corbett (1988), Watts (1983) and Curtis (1993), Walker 1989, 
available empirical evidence is very scant on the role and contribution of the types of 
livelihood specific household coping strategies adopted by affected households as a 
measurement and indicator of the severity and magnitude of a given food crisis and famine in 
a given locality. 
 
In this study, communities and green famine affected households were asked to identify the 
differences  in  coping  strategies  that  have  been  deployed  during  a  period  of  ‘regular  food  
shortages’  and  during  extreme  situations  such  as  the  green famine. Regular food shortages in 
this context are treated as less prominent incidences of seasonal food shortages at the 
household and/or community levels. Figure 6.2 summarises locally adopted coping strategies 
during regular food shortages and green famine periods in the study area. As can be observed, 
the coping strategies undertaken by households can broadly be divided into two categories: 
precautionary and risk minimising strategies, and survival strategies. The types of coping 
strategies employed during the regular food shortage periods are more precautionary and are 
aimed at minimising risk whereas those employed during the green famine period  are  the  ‘last  
resort’  decisions  undertaken  in  an  attempt  to  ensure  survival.  As  indicated  above,  households  
do not easily arrive at decisions to employ these last resort or survival strategies as they not 
only affect the current situation but also would undermine the feasibility of future livelihoods 
and potentially incur a very high economic and social costs. Thus, households try to refrain 
from taking such drastic measures. 
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Figure 6.2: Stages of coping strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Author’s  fieldwork,  2011. 
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Resilient and non-affected households mainly adopted precautionary strategies, while the 
‘survival  strategies’  were  undertaken  by  the  most vulnerable and famine-affected households. 
This could be attributed to the fact that resilient and non-affected households have a relatively 
larger asset base that serves as a cushion against shocks and resultant food crisis, compared to 
the vulnerable households who have a much weaker asset base and hence coping capacity. 
Further, the former also have a stronger informal social network system – their extended 
network of relatives and patrons – that can be relied on in the face of food crisis. 
 
Despite progress made in recognising the role of multiple indicators of food security and 
famine, the role and significance of  famine  victims’  perception  and  locally  defined  coping  
strategies are still not well recognised and incorporated in famine definition, measurement 
and classification.  
 
As indicated above, existing famine scales tend to focus on and give more weight to the 
‘objective  indicators’ of standard nutrition surveys and assessments estimating a point 
prevalence of malnutrition and the number of fatalities (crude and under-five mortality rates), 
rather than the social sides of famine that are often manifested through the responses and 
coping strategies that are undertaken by the affected households. Anderson and Choularton 
(2004: 42) correctly captured how FEWS NET  opted  for  ‘pre-famine  condition’  rather than 
‘famine’ during 2003 as: 
In practice FEWS NET in Ethiopia was reporting all three types of indicators [vulnerability, 
imminent crisis and famine]. However, without the anthropometric data that is required by 
formal  definitions  of  famine,  including  USAID’s,  FEWS  NET  could  not  make  the  determination  that  
the situation was a famine. 
 
Similarly, in 2011, the UN and other actors by using the IPC scale upgraded and declared the 
food  crisis  in  Somalia  as  a  famine  only  after  ‘objective  and  standardised  thresholds’  had  been 
reached. On 20 July 2011, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia declared 
the  situation  in  Somalia  as  a  famine,  citing  the  following  thresholds  as  justification:  ‘Famine is 
declared when acute malnutrition rates among children exceed 30 per cent; more than 2 
people per 10,000 die per day; and people are not able to access food and other basic 
necessities’  (UNOCHA  2011c). 
 
Based on the experience of the recent famine situation in Somalia and previous famines 
globally, one could safely argue that most food crises that have been upgraded and declared 
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as famine were solely based on the excess mortality and malnutrition rates that were reported 
in assessment reports, on television and in newspapers, but not on the local events that lead 
to  the  situation.  This  means,  in  the  absence  of  such  ‘objective  and  standard’  nutrition  and  
mortality data indicating the prevalence of acute malnutrition and excess mortality, a food 
crisis cannot be categorised as a famine based on the response and coping strategies 
undertaken by famine-affected households.  
 
This study argues that despite their weaknesses as discussed above, localised and livelihood 
specific coping strategies, particularly irreversible coping strategies, are more relevant and can 
offer a clear indication about the onset of famine (time) and the severity of famine (scale). 
Thus, they can help to categorise a situation and whether it has evolved from a food crisis to a 
famine level. This is because localised and livelihood specific coping strategies are more overt 
in nature, and easily identified by famine victims who have experienced it. Further, as argued 
by the advocates of coping strategies, the identification and assessment of 
community/household-defined and localised coping strategies both in normal and crisis times 
require less resources and level of expertise and can be undertaken in a short span of time 
(Maxwell D 1996: 300). As discussed already, households do not easily resort to adopting 
irreversible coping strategies in case of food shortages and therefore this should be taken 
seriously in the famine categorisation process. A senior food security expert in K-T zone 
pointed out that in addition to formal early warning indicators such as market prices, rainfall 
distribution and crop production, the food security office also uses some coping strategies to 
predict the food security situation and to differentiate it from common seasonal hunger. He 
explained as follows: 
If the coping strategies fail to fully respond to the food crisis situation, households start adopting 
abnormal/unusual coping strategies such as selling their productive assets including their farming 
tools, excessively leasing out land (informally), wandering at public gathering places and market 
areas with empty baskets/sacks in their hands hoping for begging. Thus, if we notice such 
unusual responses, we assume that there is a pretty bad  situation  in  the  area’  (KI_KT/Z-
FSEW/20/02/2011). 
 
Thus, as argued by Davies (1993: 67), famine measurements such as poverty and rural 
development  indicators  should  adopt  the  principle  of  ‘optimal  ignorance’  (as  advanced  by  
Chambers 1981) that captures minimum yet important indicators. Further, the measurements 
should focus more on listening to the experience of the sufferers. 
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In summary, households undertake various coping strategies in the face of food shortages and 
famine situations. Coping strategies are employed at certain periods of time and they have 
limits and thresholds to sustain households and to contain a situation. When the severity and 
magnitude of the food crisis surpasses the capacity of a coping strategy, households adopt one 
or more irreversible coping strategies and this indicates that the threshold line has already 
been crossed and a famine process has already begun. If this stage is acknowledged as famine 
process, it helps to avert livelihood collapse, destitution and unnecessary suffering. 
 
6.10 Measuring green famine: Is it a food crisis or a famine? 
In this section, an attempt will be made to determine whether the ‘green  famine’ of 2007–08 
would  indeed  qualify  to  be  described  as  a  ‘famine’  or  whether  it  was  localised food insecurity 
crisis. 
 
Howe and Devereux’s  famine  intensity  scale measures the intensity of a given food crisis 
through two sets of criteria: anthropometric/mortality and livelihood/food security indicators 
in the area. As discussed above, the availability of statistically representative data on famine 
mortality and standardised nutrition surveys during the 2008 green famine and in retrospect in 
the study area is very limited. However, there is a wide array of strong but not statistically 
representative evidence about the severity of the situation in 2007–08 such as rapid nutrition 
assessments, the number of people who required emergency food aid and trends in admission 
rates of malnourished children to the therapeutic feeding centres. Further, subjective 
indicators such as livelihood specific coping strategies adopted during the 2007–08 green 
famine and the perception and definition of the affected people also reveal the severity of the 
famine in the area. Table 6.8 summarises subjective indicators and thresholds that qualify the 
2007–08 green famine as minor famine. 
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Table 6.8: Subjective indicators of green famine, 2007–08 
Nutrition and health 
outcomes indicators 
Social support breakdown 
Indicators 
Coping strategies breakdown indicators  Community perceptions indicators 
‘Yewulsano gorru’,  a  
swelling famine 
 
‘Many  children  have  
shown swollen face and 
limbs’ 
(FG_KB/AS-
CEM/12/02/2011) 
 
‘Because  malnutrition  
was so serious MSF and 
WVE have established 
emergency 
feeding/treatment 
centres in severely 
affected kebeles and 
woredas’ 
(KI_KB/W-FSEW/2011) 
‘We  had  no-one  to  call  upon’ 
(FG_KB/ME-CEM/10/02/2011) 
 
‘We  have  stopped  attending  funerals  
unless it a very close relative and resides 
in a short distance from  us’ 
(FG_KD/AD/CEM/24/02/2011) 
 
‘We  have  abandoned  paying  a  
contribution to someone who has lost 
his livestock as every little money we 
have  goes  for  purchasing  food’ 
(FG_KB/AS-CEM/12/02/2011) 
 
‘Many  people  have  dropped  out  from  
local funeral association as they could 
not  afford  to  pay’ 
(FG_KB/ME_VCG/11/02/2011) 
 
‘Before,  we  used  to  invite  our  
immediate neighbours for a coffee 
everyday and this is our unique culture. 
During the famine period we have 
completely stopped this because you 
cannot afford to provide snacks/grain 
with  food  for  your  guests’ 
(FG_DG/WG-CEW/26/03/2011) 
‘Many  people  have  leased  their  
farmland to access cash. This has not 
been  the  case  during  the  1984  famine’ 
(FG_KG/VCG-TG/02/03/2011) 
 
‘Theft  has  become  widespread.  Stealing  
of kocho was very common and was 
done by men, which is extremely 
shameful in our culture. In our kebele, 
we have heard that two people were 
killed at night while they were 
attempting to uproot and steal enset’ 
(FGD_KB-ME/RCG/10/02/2011) 
 
‘I  survived  by  selling immature enset at 
Shinshicho  market’ 
(CS_KB/AS-CS-01-17/02/2011) 
 
 
‘During  the  winter  2008,  denkelle (wild 
grass) with tea, made from coffee leaves 
has become our only available food. 
Before, we used to feed denkelle to our 
cattle’ 
(FG_KB/ME_VCG/11/02/2011) 
 
 
‘The 2007-08 food crisis was the worst by any 
measures. It is more serious and caused more 
suffering compared to all other previous famines 
and  it  also  made  us  less  resilient’ 
(FG_KB/AS-CEW/12/02/2011) 
 
‘Illachi,illanchichi kerseha gorru translated (‘it  is  a  
famine that has separated us from our children 
and  relatives’) 
FG_KB/ME-VCG/11/02/2011) 
 
‘It  affected  everybody’  ‘hundannka dedek aafe 
gorru/yewulitta’  (literally  ‘a  famine  that  affected  
everyone  across  the  wealth  group’) 
(FG_KG/AD/CEW/28/02/2011) 
 
‘The  2008  famine  was  even  worse  than  the  1984.  
Many people would have died if there was no 
wider  support  from  government  and  NGOs’ 
(FG_DG/DI-CEM/25/03/2011) 
 
‘Behaviours  and  actions  considered  severely  
shameful in our tradition and culture have 
become less shameful and more common. We 
have witnessed many people putting a portion of 
food/mostly grain snacks in their pockets to take 
home when served as a group during funeral 
ceremonies of better-off people. Such actions 
were not happened even during  the  1984  famine’ 
(FG_KB/ME-CEM/03/02/2011) 
Source:  Author’s  fieldwork,  2011. 
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Table 6.8 summarises subjective indicators of the severity and impacts of the green famine of 
2007–08 as presented by the community members and people who experienced it. As indicated in 
Figure 6.2 and Table 6.8, during the 2008 food crisis, households adopted unusual and extreme 
coping strategies compared to strategies they usually adopt in the course of regular seasonal food 
shortages. These include engaging in activities such as stealing kocho from better-off households, 
consuming immature enset and leasing out farmland that is much needed to grow food for the 
household for extended periods. As discussed in Chapter 4, the estimated average land size per 
household in the study area (in 2011) was 0.35 ha compared to 1 ha at national level. Needless to 
say, land is the scarcest resource in the study area and leasing out a portion of it for extended 
periods highlights the severity of the situation households experienced. Further, as explained by 
famine-affected households, during the green famine period, when every available option to deal 
with the situation failed, some households adopted extreme measures (see Box 6.1). 
 
Box 6.1: Examples of extreme coping strategies adopted during the 2007–08 green famine 
 
During the green famine period, extreme measures were undertaken. For instance, a household 
with a moderately or severely malnourished child could automatically become eligible to receive 
emergency relief particularly from humanitarian agencies who newly arrived and opened 
emergency treatment centres in different locations. However, those households who do not have 
eligible children or no children at  all  would  ‘borrow or swap’ a  malnourished  child’  from  their  
relatives or neighbours and would take it to the next emergency centre, get registered and receive 
support. The arrangement would be that the support received would be shared equally between 
the two families. The participants explained that this strategy was  ‘successful’  in  getting  access  to 
food than  waiting  for  government’s’  emergency  food  aid  due  to: (1) The humanitarian agencies 
cannot effectively verify whether the child belongs to the person who is bringing it to the centre or 
not; they are simply worried about the state of the child, hence as long as it is in a bad situation, it 
will be supported; (2) There is no formal identity card for people in the area so one could go to the 
next emergency centre in another kebele and access the same support again. However, the 
participants also revealed the very painful experience a few people had in the process of 
temporarily ‘lending’  children: some of the children died from exhaustion, as they had to be taken 
further distances on foot in difficult circumstances. 
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Households do not adopt certain coping strategies easily unless the food crisis is beyond their 
control. The extreme measure reported in Box 6.1 highlights the severity the situation. In Kambata 
society children are seen as a means of ‘continuity of family, kinship and clan’  (Belachew  2001:  
216).  Similarly, it is an extremely disgraceful act in Kambata culture for male members of the 
household to steal kocho or hammicho for which only women traditionally undertake the 
processing. An excerpt from a community focus group discussion illuminates this further. 
‘In  the  past,  during  regular  and  extreme  food  shortages,  people  used  to  call  upon  their  relatives  and  
receive food, particularly kocho. However, during the 2008 famine such supports failed. As a result 
many people who had nothing to taste [eat] at their home resorted to theft and stealing. We know 
and have heard that many people in our kebele and neighbouring areas have died as a result of this 
situation’  (FGD_KB-ME/RCG/10/02/2011). 
 
Thus, when these coping strategies are used widely they suggest the situation is grave and, 
moreover, the existence of famine conditions. 
 
As discussed above, respondents also indicated that the magnitude of the 2008 famine was wider 
and greater compared to the 1984 famine. The latter affected only the poorest section of the 
community and those who had been affected survived through support from their relatives and 
patrons. However, the 2008 famine affected  everyone;  as  the  respondents  said:  ‘it  [the  famine  of  
2008]  made  everyone  equal  and  as  a  result  there  was  no  one  to  call  upon’.  Further,  during  the  
2008 green famine time, the availability of enset for both affected and non-affected households 
reduced significantly and as such even those who had some could no longer support their 
relatives. As discussed in chapter 4, the situation broke down the social support system of the 
community and as a result many poor and destitute households have been hit hard. 
 
The findings of subjective indicators (coping strategies  and  victims’  perceptions) clearly show that, 
from the perspective and experience of insiders and victims, the situation in 2007–08 exceeded a 
‘normal  food  crisis’  and  can  be  categorised  as  a  famine.  We now look at the ‘objective’ indicators 
that support the subjective indicators of the severity of green famine in the study area. 
 
As has already been indicated in Table 6.4, the levels of malnutrition in the study area did not 
reach the emergency threshold set by the UN. However, the rapid nutrition screening results 
(Table 6.5) in Kadida-Gamela in 2008 and Kacha-Bira and Tembaro districts in 2009 among children 
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6–59 months of age indicated that the malnutrition estimates were much higher than recorded in 
2008 in Kadida-Gamela. If this single indicator was taken, the level of malnutrition surpassed the 
emergency threshold set by the UN WHO, which considers the prevalence of GAM 15 per cent as 
emergency level. However, as discussed above, solely depending on screening results has its own 
caveats, as ‘the results often do not provide a reliable population estimate of acute malnutrition 
prevalence’ (Young and Jaspars 2006: 15). Despite such shortcomings, if they are supplemented 
with other subjective indicators the result indicates that the green famine of 2008 was more than 
just a food crisis that affected a large portion of the people in southern Ethiopia. In the absence of 
elaborate nutrition surveys in all three districts, providing indications on oedema prevalence and 
other indicators, famine victims and community members indicated that many children and 
pregnant and lactating women had experienced swelling, particularly in their belly and feet. Due 
to these characteristics, the communities have given it the name of a swelling famine. Another 
direct indicator of the severity of the situation of 2008 was the number of malnourished children 
admitted to the emergency feeding centres in three districts as indicated in Table 6.6. 
 
Data obtained from the UNOCHA field assessment in the study area indicates that the percentage 
of the population who required emergency aid during the green famine period surpassed the 
threshold of a minimum of 20 per cent of the total population of the area facing extreme food 
deficits and very limited ability to cope that was set by the IPC scale (IPC Global Partners 2012: 32). 
Table 5.6 (in Chapter 5) disaggregates the number of people affected during the 2007–08 green 
famine: 32, 31 and 25 per cent of people survived through the emergency relief in Kacha-Bira, 
Kadida-Gamela and Doyo-Gena woredas. These numbers are in addition to 12, 14 and 5 per cent 
of people who were being supported through the PSNP in the three study woredas. 
 
As already discussed in Chapter 4, the prices of basic food commodities during the green famine 
increased sharply, in some cases recording increases of 326 per cent compared to the prices 
during the same period the year before, reflecting the severity of the situation in the area. The 
change in price was nearly double the national average. As Minot (2010) and Birru et al. (2009) 
(both cited in Hadley et al. 2012:  2412),  noted  during  the  2008  food  crisis  in  Ethiopia,  ‘food  price  
increases were particularly high,  ranging  from  83  percent  to  184  percent’  across  different cereal 
markets,  one  of  ‘the  strongest  acceleration[s]  of  food  price  inflation  [in  any  country]  during  recent  
years’.  As  the  community  elders  indicated  above,  the  price  was  unreachable  particularly for 
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households in the middle- and poor-income categories and this in turn had a serious impact on 
nutrition, health, social system and overall well-being of the people, in both the short and long 
term. 
 
6.10.1 Proposing an alternative famine scale 
I have critically reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of the FAO IPC and Howe and Devereux 
famine intensity and magnitude scales above. As already discussed, despite these two scales 
‘recognising’ the role of coping strategies adopted by households in the face of food crisis as 
indicators of famine situation, they do not give them ‘the same weight’ in categorisation. Despite 
their limitations, the anthropometric and mortality indicators have remained leading and higher 
weighted indicators. Nevertheless,  these  scales  fail  to  recognise  and  include  the  role  of  victims’  
experiences  and  definitions  of  famine.  Understanding  and  defining  famine  based  on  ‘objective’  
indicators has been a long-held view and reflects still influences the decisions and responses 
against famine.  
 
6.10.2 Unique attributes of the proposed famine scale and its contribution to famine 
conceptualisation and classification 
The proposed famine scale (Handino famine scale) draws mainly on the IPC and Howe and 
Devereux famine scales, particularly  on  the  ‘objective  indicators  and  thresholds’.  However,  it  has  
different levels of objective thresholds from those two scales and inherent differences as 
presented below. 
 
(1) Reduced thresholds for anthropometric and mortality rates  
As noted earlier, the objective thresholds that are designated to declare and classify a food crisis 
as a famine by both the IPC and Howe and Devereux famine scales are unreasonably high. As can 
be seen in Table 6.9, both propose the prevalence of GAM rate as more than 30 per cent or 20 per 
cent  respectively  as  a  threshold  for  ‘famine  condition’. Further,  Howe  and  Devereux’s  intensity  
scale  proposes  reduced  thresholds  of  CMR  for  both  phases  of  ‘famine  and  severe  famine’  
conditions as >=1 but<5/10,000/day and >5=but or <15/10,000/day respectively. Although these 
thresholds  are  lower  than  the  IPC’s  ‘famine/humanitarian catastrophe’ phase and other UN 
agencies’  thresholds  (e.g.  WHO,  RNIS),  they  are  still  relatively  high  to  be  used  as  benchmarks, 
particularly in the cases of slow-onset famine situations.  As discussed above, although they are 
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considered  as  ‘objective  indicators’  of  famine,  the  causal  relationship  between  famine,  
malnutrition and mortality remains highly contested as different factors influence and determine 
their occurrence. De Waal (1989) indicated that starvation was not the only cause of mortality 
during the 1989 famine in Darfur; rather, it was due various factors such as unhygienic and over-
crowded living conditions, poor health services provision and subsequent diseases (see also Young 
and Jaspars 1995). 
 
In addition, the death toll and malnutrition rates of recent famines have been significantly less 
than in famines of earlier days. The lower mortality is attributed to advancement in health and 
nutrition treatment, communications and logistics improvements, improved early warning systems 
and the presence of well-established humanitarian agencies operating on the ground or readily 
available upon the declaration of famine. Thus, the Handino famine scale adopts reduced 
thresholds for both malnutrition and mortality rates to classify a food crisis as famine. The 
thresholds for GAM and CMR rates for a minor famine are set as >10% but <20% and >=1 but 
<4/10,000/day, respectively (see Table 6.9). 
 
(2) The Handino scale classification  begins  with  a  ‘famine  process’ 
Unlike the IPC and Howe and Devereux famine intensity scales, the Handino scale is strictly 
developed to measure and classify famines and it recognises the early stage of food/livelihood 
crisis as a famine process. Further, the Handino famine scale prioritises subjective indicators of 
famine and begins by identifying subjective indicators and thresholds of food crisis and famine 
before the objective indicators and thresholds for famine classification. 
 
(3) Subjective indicators of famine have the same weight as objective indicators 
The Handino scale captures the perception and experience of the victims in the famine 
classification process. As noted in Chapter 3 and elsewhere the concept of food insecurity 
measurement has progressed significantly since the 1980s and currently subjective indicators that 
reflect the perception and experience of households are successfully incorporated in the 
measurement of food insecurity (D. Maxwell 1996; Coates et al. 2006). Similar to food insecurity 
measurements and classifications, the Handino famine scale incorporates the perception of 
people in its analysis and classification. Despite reflecting the true experience, knowledge and 
perception of famine victims and local communities, subjective indicators are simply included 
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without being given any weight in famine measurements and classification in existing famine 
scales. For  instance,  Howe  and  Devereux’s  intensity  scale  (2004:  361)  suggested anthropometric 
and  mortality  indicators  as  ‘sufficient  on  their  own’,  and  the  subjective  indicators  as  ‘suggestive  
but  not  confirmatory’.  Similar  to  this,  as  noted  earlier,  the  UN  declared  famine  in  Somalia in 2011 
only  after  ‘objective  thresholds’  were met. The Handino scale  introduces  ‘subjective  famine  
indicators and thresholds’  that  can  be  applicable  across  different famines (Table 6.9). On the 
Handino famine scale, no single indicator is given an outright weight in the classification of food 
crisis and famine; both objective and subjective indicators are equally important.  
 
(4) Famine prevention-focused tool  
The  Handino  famine  scale  is  developed  primarily  as  a  classification  tool  with  a  ‘preventative  role’. 
The use of reduced thresholds of objective indicators and an inclusion of famine victims and local 
perceptions in the Handino scale would imply  that  a  situation  could  be  classified  as  a  ‘famine’  
earlier. This would mean opening the gates to emergency support and response sooner than might 
otherwise be the case. In other words, the Handino scale helps to trigger an early response, 
preventing unnecessary suffering, livelihood deterioration and asset depletion. As discussed 
earlier, for the first time in history, the IPC scale was used in Somalia in 2011 to declare a food 
crisis as a famine and this was considered as a success for the IPC. Indeed, the IPC worked well at 
least in predicting the impending famine situation (early warning role) and helped in advancing our 
knowledge of how the food crisis has evolved and progressed to a famine level. It also played a 
role in bringing a wider consensus on the issue of famine and helped to trigger a global response. 
However, it should not be considered a ‘success’ because declaring a famine after livelihoods have 
collapsed, after hundreds of thousands of children suffered from severe malnutrition, and after 
the death of an estimated 244,000–273,000 people (Checchi and Robinson 2013) is not a success 
at all, but rather a distressing failure to recognise famine and respond earlier. It is a failure 
because  the  IPC’s  unreasonably  higher  mortality  and  nutrition  thresholds  consider  it ‘normal’  to  
allow the death and suffering of such a large number of people. As discussed earlier, famine is a 
preventable tragedy that should not be allowed to happen, particularly at this point in the history 
of mankind. 
 
(5) The Handino scale is simple to use and helps to reduce bureaucratic and political challenges 
 158 
 
Existing famine scales have multiple phases and the ‘higher weighted and confirmatory indicators’ 
(malnutrition and mortality rates) are complex to collect and analyse and are prone to 
underestimation by politicians and other actors. Subjective indicators of famine are easy to collect, 
require less time to do the analyses and yet they paint a more precise picture about the situation 
on the ground (Maxwell et al. 2008). The Handino scale has only three phases, is less complex and 
is designed to address these political/bureaucratic challenges that can impede the classification of 
famine events earlier (see Table 6.9). 
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Table 6.9: Comparison of indicators and thresholds of the IPC, Howe and Devereux and Handino famine scales  
 Howe and Devereux famine intensity scale IPC scale version 1.1 Handino famine scale 
Phase Objective 
indicators 
and 
thresholds 
Subjective thresholds and 
indicators 
Objective 
indicators and 
thresholds 
Subjective 
thresholds and 
indicators 
Subjective thresholds and indicators  Objective 
indicators and 
thresholds  
(1) Food crisis 
conditions 
 
(2) Acute food 
and livelihood 
crisis 
 
(3) Famine 
process 
CMR>=0.5 
but<1/10,00
0/day and or 
Wasting>10 
but<20% 
and/or 
prevalence 
of oedema 
Social system significantly 
stressed but remains largely 
cohesive; dramatic rise in 
price of food and other basic 
items; adaptive mechanisms 
start to fail; increase in 
irreversible coping strategies 
 
 
CMR 0.5-1 / 
10,000 / day,  
U5MR 1-2 / 
10,000 / day 
GAM 10-15 % 
 
 
 
 
 
Crisis strategies, 
CSI > reference, 
increasing 
 
5% of households indicated they 
have deployed irreversible coping 
strategies. 
 
10% of households indicated they 
have faced serious food shortage and 
hunger 
 
 
 
 
CMR<0.5/10000
/day 
GAM =<10% 
SAM <2% 
(1) Famine 
conditions 
 
(2) Humanitarian 
emergency 
 
(3) Minor 
/localised famine 
CMR>=1 
but<5/10,00
0/day 
and/or 
Wasting>=2
0% but <40% 
and/or 
prevalence 
of oedema 
Clear signs of social 
breakdown appear; markets 
begin to close or collapse; 
coping strategies are 
exhausted and survival 
strategies are adopted; 
affected population identify 
food as the dominant 
problem in the onset of the 
crisis 
CMR 1-2 / 
10,000 / day, 
U5MR > 2 / 
10,000 / day 
GAM >15 %  
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Distress  
strategies’,  CSI  
significantly > 
than reference 
10–20% of households face extreme 
food shortage. 10% of households 
have indicated they have deployed 
irreversible strategies and informal 
social support system has failed. 
 
Both community elders and affected 
people define the situation as famine 
during rapid assessment  
CMR >=1 
<4/10,000/day 
 
GAM>10% but 
<20% 
 
SAM 2–5% 
(1) Severe famine 
conditions 
 
(2) Famine/ 
Humanitarian 
catastrophe 
 
(3) Major famine 
CMR>5=but
<15/10,000/
day and/or 
Wasting>=4
0% and or 
prevalence 
of oedema 
Widespread social 
breakdown; markets are 
closed or inaccessible to 
affected population; survival 
strategies are widespread; 
affected population identify 
food as the dominant 
problem in the onset of the 
crisis 
 
 
 
 
CMR > 2 / 
10,000 / day 
 
GAM > 30 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20–30% of households face extreme 
food shortage. 
 
20% or more households have 
indicated deploying irreversible and 
last resort coping strategies. 
 
Both community elders and affected 
households define the situation as 
severe famine during rapid 
assessment  
CMR =>4 but 
<10/10,000/day 
 
GAM >20% 
 
SAM >5% 
(1) Extreme 
famine condition 
CMR>=15/1
0,000/day 
Complete social breakdown; 
wide-spread mortality; 
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 Howe and Devereux famine intensity scale IPC scale version 1.1 Handino famine scale 
Phase Objective 
indicators 
and 
thresholds 
Subjective thresholds and 
indicators 
Objective 
indicators and 
thresholds 
Subjective 
thresholds and 
indicators 
Subjective thresholds and indicators  Objective 
indicators and 
thresholds  
affected population identify 
food as the dominant 
problem in the onset of the 
crisis 
 
Note: (1) refers to the names of phases designated in Howe and Devereux famine intensity scales, (2) in IPC and (3) in Handino famine scale respectively.  
Source:  Author’s  construction  based  on FAO’s  IPC  version  1.1  (IPC  2008: 4) and Howe and Devereux famine scale (2004: 362). 
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6.10.3 How to combine objective and subjective thresholds to classify and measure a famine 
As noted above, the Handino famine scale does not claim to be fundamentally different from the 
IPC and Howe and Devereux famine scales. However, it identifies the weaknesses and limitations 
observed on these scales, and proposes different set of indicators and thresholds. As can be seen 
in Table 6.9, in order to classify a given food crisis as a famine, the Handino scale recognises the 
weight of both objective and subjective indicators. However, as discussed earlier, objective 
indictors (malnutrition and mortality) often do not manifest at the same time and consequently 
may not reach threshold levels at the same time.  In  addition,  given  their  nature  as  ‘trailing  
indicators’  they  only  occur  after  the  situation  gets  worse.  This causes some difficulties in aligning 
them with the subjective thresholds. However, it is possible to capture and gauge local 
perceptions and coping strategies concurrently. The severity of coping strategies and local 
perceptions can be captured through participatory assessments applying different rigorous 
qualitative techniques such as ranking and proportional piling the types of coping strategies 
applied before and during the crisis both at the community and household levels (see Chapter 2). 
Alternatively, quantitative techniques such as ‘reduced  CSI’  can  be  applied  (see Maxwell et al. 
2008, 2013). Once locally defined coping strategies are collected and ranked according to their 
severity and the community elders and affected people define the situation as a famine, these will 
be compared with the objective indicators. Here, it should be noted that, as discussed earlier, due 
to various factors the objective indicators and thresholds might not correspond with the 
assessment of subjective indicators. 
 
In the event that the subjective thresholds suggest a minor famine while the objective thresholds 
suggest a famine process, the finding of the subjective thresholds should be accepted to classify a 
famine as they reflect the actual experience, perceptions and views of the victims. Further, 
objective indicators are driven by and are outcomes of the subjective indicators. When households 
define a situation as hunger or famine, it means that the decision is made on the available 
resources at disposal and thinking ahead of the main event. In a similar vein, in ideal conditions, 
the Handino famine scale gives equal weight to both objective and subjective indicators and 
thresholds to classify a famine. However, in the absence of representative objective indicators and 
thresholds during a food crisis, subjective indicators and thresholds can be used. The absence of 
objective indicators should not deter an early response. As noted above, the primary objective of 
 162 
 
the Handino scale is prevention of famine by declaring earlier without necessary experiencing 
excess mortality and malnutrition. If the Handino famine scale had been applied, the green famine 
of 2007-08 would have been declared earlier and classified as a minor famine (see Table 6.10). 
 
Table 6.10: Category of green famine, 2007–08 
Phase Subjective indicators Subjective thresholds Objective 
indicators 
Objective 
thresholds 
Famine 
process 
Livelihood specific 
irreversible coping 
strategies are deployed. 
 
 
Community members 
expressed their concern 
about the deteriorating food 
insecurity and hunger. 
5% of households indicated 
they have deployed 
irreversible coping strategies. 
 
 
10% of households indicated 
they have faced serious food 
shortage and hunger 
CMR 
GAM 
SAM 
<0.5/10000/day 
 =<10% 
<2% 
 
Minor/locali
sed famine 
 
Livelihood-specific 
Irreversible coping 
strategies are deployed. A 
collapse of social support 
system observed. Price of 
staple food items reported 
unaffordable for the 
majority of households and 
markets begin to close or 
collapse. 
10–20% of households face 
extreme food shortage. 10% 
of households have indicated 
they have deployed 
irreversible strategies and 
informal social support 
system has failed. 
 
Both community elders and 
affected people defined the 
situation as ‘famine’ during 
rapid assessment. 
CMR 
 
 
GAM 
 
SAM 
>=1 
<4/10,000/day 
 
>10% but <20% 
 
2–5% 
Green 
famine 
2007-08 
‘We  had  no  one  to  call  
upon.’ 
‘Many  people  have  leased  
their farmland to access 
cash. This has not been the 
case during the 1984 
famine.’ 
 
‘I  survived  by  selling  
immature enset at 
Shinshicho  market.’ 
 
‘Theft  has  become  
widespread. Stealing of 
kocho was very common 
and was done by men, 
which is extremely shameful 
in our culture.’ 
‘The  2008  famine  was  even  
worse than the 1984. Many 
people would have died if 
there was no wider support 
from  government  and  NGOs’ 
 
‘This  food  crisis  [famine]  was  
the worst by any measures. It 
is more serious and caused 
more suffering compared to 
all other previous famines and 
it  also  made  us  less  resilient.’ 
‘Illachi,  illansachhi  kerseha  
gorru’ (‘it  is  a  famine  that  has  
separated us from our 
children  and  relatives’) 
CMR 
GAM 
SAM 
0.48* 
28.9%* 
2.3%** 
 
* Rapid screening result; ** Standard nutrition surveillance result 
Source: Handino famine scale, 2013. 
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As can be seen, under the objective indicators the prevalence of CMR and SAM are below the 
thresholds for a famine situation. There are different explanations for this. As previous studies 
have shown, the causes of malnutrition are multifaceted. As Lautze et al. (2003: 135) argued, the 
relationship between malnutrition and mortality is not direct and  thus,  ‘malnutrition and mortality 
do  not  necessarily  increase  in  tandem’. Further, rapid response and availability of health and 
treatment services could also lower the risk of mortality. This also highlights the inherent 
limitations of nutrition outcomes as indicators of famine. As de Waal (1989: 31) reported, citing 
the Relief  and  Rehabilitation  Commission  of  Ethiopia:  ‘In  1974  famine  in  the  Ogaden  region  the  
investigators found high levels of excess mortality but near-normal levels of nutrition and decided 
that  there  was  no  currently  famine.’ 
 
6.10.4 Limitations and operational challenges of the Handino scale  
As noted earlier, the Handino scale recognises the famine process earlier and subsequently 
declares a famine before it inflicts severe damage on lives and livelihoods of the people. This is 
one of the fundamental differences between the Handino scale and the other two scales. 
However, this could also serve as its limitation and hence cause resistance from different actors 
who are responsible for famine prevention and response, particularly local and national 
governments, donors and humanitarian agencies. This is because to date, famines are 
conventionally declared and measured once the ‘objective indicators’ are manifest and thresholds 
are met. Thus, declaring famine based on ‘subjective indicators’ is perceived as not rigorous, 
unscientific, and exaggerating the situation by conflating famine with chronic food insecurity. If 
famines were declared based on reduced objective thresholds and subjective indicators, it would 
mean the number of famines particularly in Africa, would rise significantly. Another potential 
operational challenge is to how to capture local perceptions and the weight of locally defined 
coping strategies that are globally applicable as the latter tend to vary in different contexts and 
incorporate with objective indicators. However, despite these challenges, the cost and benefit of 
recognising famine as a process just like famine victims and declaring earlier based on local 
perceptions and reduced thresholds outweighs the benefits of recognising famine as event that 
causes higher malnutrition and mortality. Recognising and declaring famine earlier could also 
increases the media profile of a crisis and that in turn helps to increase the awareness and 
resources from external sources. Further, it ‘enforces  political  contract  against  famine  between  
the  state  and  its  citizens’  by inducing pressure on policy-makers and politicians and increasing 
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accountability and responsibility of international actors to prevent the occurrence of famine as it 
has higher political costs than localised food crisis or emergency (Howe and Devereux 2004; Lautze 
et al. 2009: 33). As noted earlier, although it poses some methodological challenges, a significant 
progress is already achieved in recognising the relevance of the  ‘voice and perception of the poor’  
and incorporating them in poverty assessments (Chambers 1997; Pradhan and Ravallion 1998: 
367) and food security measurements (D. Maxwell 1996; Maxwell et al. 2008, 2013). Thus, 
experiences and lessons could be learned from these practices globally and applied in specific 
contexts. 
 
6.11 How will the occurrence of green famine force us to rethink the causes of 
famine? 
Famines in sub-Saharan Africa are often associated with drought and are geographically 
concentrated in more arid and drought-prone countries and regions. In the case of Ethiopia 
particularly this thinking has held a strong position, as the major famines happened in the 
highlands of the Amhara, Tigray, low rainfall and pastoral areas of Somali and Oromia regions. 
Lautze  and  Maxwell  (2007:  231)  neatly  captured  this  dominant  narrative  as  follows:  ‘There  is  a  
widely accepted popular narrative that major disasters (food crisis) in Ethiopia only happen about 
once a decade and the disasters are due to drought situations’. However, as noted earlier in this 
thesis, drought is not and cannot be a sufficient explanation for famine. There are always 
additional vulnerability factors working in tandem with drought, which has already progressively 
weakened the resilience of livelihood systems. These factors are multidimensional and stem from 
social, natural, economic and policy/political elements.  
 
In a similar way, an expatriate key informant who had worked in food security and rural 
development for more than two decades in Ethiopia explained:  
‘There is a dominant perception and understanding in Ethiopia from policy-makers to politicians and 
community at large that drought=hunger=famine. As a result of this popular perception, there is a 
failure to look into other factors that are contributing towards food insecurity and the dynamics of 
livelihood vulnerability in enset-dependent areas. As a result, there is a failure to recognise the entire 
dynamic  and  hence  a  failure  to  respond  on  time  and  put  the  right  policy  response  in  place’  (KI_UK/Ln-
25/11/2011). 
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However, the present day food crises and famine, particularly the green famine, occur in enset–
cereal based livelihood zones of southern Ethiopia that usually receive a better rainfall distribution 
and have a comparatively lush agro-ecology. In Ethiopia famine is generally understood as a 
product of drought, and hence policy-makers have failed and early warning systems have not 
picked up the underlying vulnerability dynamics at play in the enset-livelihood zone (Lautze et al. 
2003). Despite the outward appearance of relative ecological fecundity, there is a grim reality of 
poverty and destitution on the inside, with a growing part of the farming population no longer 
able to cope.  
 
The occurrence of green famine dispels the long-held assumption of drought as the exclusive 
cause of food insecurity and famine in Ethiopia. Green famine is caused by a web of complex 
factors that have occurred successively and simultaneously. As discussed earlier, the key 
vulnerability factors that are causing people become vulnerable over time include restrictive 
policies and lack of alternative employment opportunities, increasing agriculture input prices, 
poorly designed and implemented agricultural polices, outbreak of enset bacterial wilt and 
subsequent production dwindling, persistent rain failures, decreasing livestock ownership and land 
size due to a growing population pressure. As a result, the majority of livelihoods in the study area 
have witnessed a progressive erosion of assets and have consequently become chronically food 
insecure. Thus, the occurrence reconfirms the importance of livelihood vulnerability and how a 
single shock such as drought can easily push vulnerable livelihoods over the edge. As Herdt (2004, 
cited  in  Baro  and  Deubel  2006:  526)  argued,  ‘a  population  suffering  from  chronic  food  insecurity  is  
more vulnerable to full-blown famine, and small fluctuations can lead to emergencies’.  Based  on  
the current state of livelihoods and food insecurity, it can be safely argued that the enset–cereal 
based livelihood system in the study area is severely damaged due to intertwined natural, 
economic, political and policy-related factors. Some socio-economic groups have already 
experienced a livelihood failure and hence are experiencing a famine situation when they face a 
single shock. Thus, unless structural sources of vulnerabilities are addressed, the occurrence of 
green famine in the study  area  is  ‘a  ticking  time  bomb’  in  Walker’s  terminology  (Hampson  2008). 
 
6.12 Conclusions 
Famines have occurred in Ethiopia over a long period. However, the geography, the causes, the 
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magnitude and the scale of the different famines vary significantly. Historically, cereal-dependent 
areas of the northern and central highlands and pastoral areas of eastern lowlands of the country 
have suffered more than the enset-based livelihoods in the south. The causes of famines were 
largely associated with severe drought, outbreak of crop and livestock diseases, civil unrest, poor 
policy interventions and accountability and response failures. The enset-dominant livelihood zones 
are becoming increasingly vulnerable to food insecurity and shocks over the past two decades and 
subsequently the study area has experienced severe food crisis and localised famine situations in 
2003 and 2007–08. Despite the occurrence of famine situations, both incidents were only referred 
to as food crisis and not recognised as famine. Among other factors, political economy has played 
a role in failing to recognise it as a famine because it happened in a less powerful, ethnically 
divided part of the country. Recognising and declaring famine in Ethiopia can imply a regime 
change. As Lautze et al. (2009: 13) noted ‘famine  became  central  to  Ethiopian  politics,  a  historical  
fact  of  which  subsequent  officials  and  politicians  have  remained  intensely  aware’. 
Famine is a contested issue and there is still an ongoing debate on what exactly entails famine and 
when a food crisis situation can be categorised as a famine situation. There is a stark difference 
between the views of insiders (famine victims) and outsiders (Devereux 1993a; De Waal 1989: 10; 
Baro and Deubel 2006: 525). In the effort of searching for a universally accepted famine definition 
and  benchmarks,  the  fundamental  question  remains  unanswered:  ‘whose  definition  counts?’  The  
term famine has different meanings and implications for different actors involved in the fight 
against famine. However, famine victims perceive, understand and define famine situations 
without high mortality levels being evident. The Kambata perceive and define famine as a process 
that causes social support systems to breakdown and economic destitution and further damage, if 
no external intervention is in place. Further, they indicate that mortality is not necessarily a 
precondition for famine and they differentiate between famine that can cause swelling (oedema) 
and famine that kills. According to local people and famine victims, the 1984 famine was a killing 
famine and the 2008 famine was a swelling famine. 
 
In  contemporary  famine  understanding  and  classification,  ‘objective’  indicators  (anthropometric  
and mortality outcomes) have become dominant parameters. Despite being very important 
indicators, subjective indicators, particularly coping strategies adopted by households during food 
crisis and their own perceptions and definitions, have not been fully recognised in famine 
definition  and  classification.  Like  food  security,  famine  is  ‘a  multidimensional  phenomenon  and  
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hence  famine  measurements  require  examination  of  a  combination  of  related  indicators’  
(Frankenberger and Coyle 1993, cited in Baro and Deubel 2006: 526). The existing famine scales 
(IPC and Howe and Devereux scales) have limitations as both give more weight to objective 
indicators with little or no room for subjective indicators in their famine definition and 
measurement. The Handino famine scale seeks to address these limitations by giving equal weight 
to subjective indicators in measuring and classifying famine. Further, the Handino Scale treats 
objective and subjective indicators equally.  Understanding  famine  from  the  victims’  perspective  
(famine as a process) will have important implications for designing appropriate policies and 
responses to fight against famine. Until famine is understood and defined in a similar way to the 
victims’  understanding  (as  process,  destitution  and  social  breakdown),  it  will  continue to recur and 
inflict unnecessary human suffering. 
 
Unless the magnitude of the crisis is too severe and is beyond their coping capacity, households do 
not adopt irreversible coping strategies that will have ramifications on the long-term viability of 
their livelihood. Thus, it is very important to consider that locally defined culturally and livelihood-
specific coping strategies weigh more and are treated as credible indicators alongside other 
‘objective  and  scientific’  indicators.  Using  localised  and livelihood-specific coping strategies along 
with objective and statistical measurements and thresholds could be the best method to examine 
and determine the severity and magnitude of the food crisis and famine situation in a given area. 
By applying the Handino famine scale, the green famine of 2007-8 was a minor/localised famine. 
 
The occurrence of green famine in a historically green and lush agro-ecological and livelihood zone 
dispels the straightforward association of famine with drought. It suggests the need for improved 
understanding of the types of livelihood strategies and sources of livelihood vulnerability in 
determining how famines develop slowly over time, with clear implications for the design of 
effective policies and responses. 
 
The next chapter introduces different policy responses undertaken by the government to address 
the issue of food insecurity and famine in Ethiopia. It investigates how these policy interventions 
are addressing and reducing livelihood vulnerability to food insecurity and green famine in the 
study area. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Examining food security policies and programmes in protecting livelihoods 
and reducing vulnerability to green famine in southern Ethiopia 
 
The food security programme is designed to address problems of shortfalls in food production, 
vulnerability to falls in consumption and incomes and consequent hunger that the country has faced 
repeatedly, through adaptation of development alternatives to bring about lasting solution. The 
effort to reduce vulnerability is central to the five years plan strategy (2005–2010) (FDRE 2006: 93).37 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter briefly provides an overview of different rural and agricultural development and food 
security policies undertaken by different regimes in Ethiopia. It particularly, examines the role and 
contribution of the current government’s food security policies, strategies and programmes in 
addressing and reducing household vulnerability to food insecurity, hunger and green famine in K-
T zone. It specifically reviews three selected food security programmes and interventions that 
have been implemented in three different time spans over the course of the last two decades: the 
Agricultural Extension Service Programmes (AESP), the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), 
and the Other Food Security Programmes (OFSP).  By looking at these programmes the chapter 
attempts to shed light on the debate about multiple sources of livelihood vulnerability to food 
insecurity, especially in Ethiopia. It also briefly examines the institutional arrangement of these 
polices and draws lessons for future food security policy formulation. 
 
7.2 An overview of rural and agricultural development and food security policies 
The overall policy environment of Ethiopia is very dynamic and as a result, strategies and policies 
of rural and agricultural development and food security have been in constant flux since 1950s. 
                                                             
 
37 The objectives of the national food security programme of Ethiopia as stated in the second round poverty 
reduction strategy paper. 
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Historical accounts reflect that the problem of food insecurity in Ethiopia has been and still is 
associated with food shortages at the national and household levels. As Samuel (2006: 4) argued, 
there is a strongly held view among policy-making circles and development practitioners that the 
problem of food insecurity in Ethiopia originates from poor performance of the agricultural sector, 
and the remedy for this problem is to transform and improve the agricultural sector through the 
provision of ‘modern technology comprising improved seeds, fertilisers and technical support’ to 
smallholder famers. Thus, it is reasoned that a transformation of this sector will eventually result 
in food security at the national and household levels. For instance, Keeley and Scoones (2000: 95) 
noted how the policy narrative of 1980s agricultural extension package programme in Ethiopia 
drew on green revolution narratives in Asia: 
The narrative associated with this policy stance is very familiar, drawing on the arguments used in 
support of the Green Revolution in Asia. Growing populations and declining per capita food 
production, it is argued, will result in major food gaps, which must be filled by boosting aggregate 
food grain production. Off-the-shelf modern technologies are available, it is stated, which could 
achieve this, if only they were properly extended to the farming population. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, globally this thinking on food insecurity (as an outcome of food 
shortages) was a predominant discourse in the 1970s and as a result this has also shaped and 
influenced the food security polices in Ethiopia and elsewhere. Influenced by this thinking, most of 
the rural development and food security policies pursued in the past and today are focused on 
increasing agricultural productivity and subsequent food availability at national, regional and 
household levels. For instance, during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie (1930–74), Ethiopia 
faced successive food insecurity and famines mainly in the northern part of the country but the 
famine also spread to Hararghe. The most severe famines were in Tigray in 1958, in Wag-Lasta 
(Wollo) in 1966, in Wollo in 1973 and in Hararghe 1974 (Mesfin 1984; Sen 1981: 86). Confronted 
with famines and growing chronic food insecurity, the Imperial regime set up successive 
development plans divided into five-year periods. The First Five Year Plan (FFYP) was implemented 
from 1957 to 1962, the Second Five Year Plan (SFYP) from 1963 to 1968, and the Third Five Year 
Plan (TFYP) from 1968 to 1973 (Degefa 2005: 129). 
 
As  Dessalegn  (2009:  50)  noted,  despite  the  imperial  regime’s  aims  to  improve the agricultural 
sector of the country and rural vulnerability to food insecurity and famine, during the FFYP the 
policy actions were minimal except for ‘some support to cash crops (coffee) and livestock 
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production’. However, during the SFYP, modernisation of the agriculture sector became a major 
policy discourse and a priority. In this modernisation plan, peasant agriculture was overlooked and 
large-scale commercial agriculture was seen as a means for economic development and stimulant 
for the peasant agriculture. The facilitation of this modernisation was meant to be implemented 
through  ‘demonstration  and  dissemination’  (ibid.: 50). However, the policies and programmes 
failed to achieve their objectives for various reasons. As Dessalegn (2007: 33) and Berhanu et al. 
(2006: 10) noted, the programmes were designed in a ‘one-size-fits-all approach and focused only 
on better-off farmers and promoted cereals and cash crops at the expense of indigenous food 
crops’. 
 
In 1974, a military government led by Mengistu Hailemariam took political power abolishing the 
feudal landlord system and introducing radical land reform in early 1975. The land reform gave 
unprecedented power and control to the state. It transferred all land from the feudal landlords to 
the state, providing only ‘usufruct rights to peasants and prohibiting land sales, mortgage and 
transfers’38. The reform also provided access to land for thousands of tenants and peasants who 
used to work for and pay taxes to their landlords (Dessalegn 2007: 34; Ayele 2008: 125). During its 
early years the Derg regime continued with the same agricultural development polices inherited 
from its predecessor (the Minimum Package Project) (Berhanu et al. 2006: 11). But later it 
introduced ‘a Soviet-style socialist type of state-controlled agriculture system by setting up 
peasant associations, services and producer cooperatives in which the state was in charge of input 
supply, marketing and price control’ (Keeley and Scoones 2000: 94; Dessalegn 2007: 34). However, 
the  Derg’s development plan and policies could not successfully address chronic food insecurity 
and famine. In 1984, Ethiopia faced one of the worst famines in its modern history. The socialist 
type of collective agriculture and extractive grain quota systems negatively affected the food 
security situation of smallholders. The resettlement programme caused severe loss of lives, 
damaged livelihoods and led to environmental degradation (Wolde-Selassie 2002). As Dessalegn 
(2007: 38) noted, between 1984 and 1986, ‘out of a total of 600,000 people being resettled an 
                                                             
 
38 The current land tenure policy of Ethiopia is similar to the Derg regime, as the land remains the state 
property, except the current system (since 1997) allows short-term lease, limited transfer and offers holders 
right through land certification process (For more, see Degefa 2005; Dessalegn 2007; Ayele 2008).   
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estimated 33,000 settlers lost their lives due to disease, hunger and exhaustion and thousands of 
families were broken up’. The occurrence of famine and general public discontent towards 
government policies worked in favour of the rebel groups who were fighting the Derg regime for 
more than 15 years by giving them a momentum in late 1980s that subsequently led to the 
collapse of the Derg in 1991. 
 
7.3 Food security and agriculture policies under the EPRDF 
After the fall of the military regime in 1991, the EPRDF-led administration pledged to ensure food 
security and eradicate famine as its priority agenda. Given the historical roles that famines have 
played in the change of regimes (the Imperial and the Derg) in Ethiopia, it is not a surprise to see 
the new regime starting its administration by making food security a priority policy. Despite strong 
policy attention towards reduction of food insecurity and prevention of famine by introducing 
different interventions (see Table 7.1), recent empirical evidence suggests that areas and 
communities that used to be relatively resilient and food secure are becoming more and more 
vulnerable to seasonal shocks and stresses and subsequent food crisis and famine (Lautze et al. 
2003; Degefa 2005: 126). For instance, since 2011 Ethiopia has been among the top recipients of 
United States government food assistance in the world, and currently over 12 million people 
depend upon some food assistance in order to meet their basic needs (Feed the Future 2011: 9). 
 
This chapter attempts to understand how the three selected policy responses, strategies and 
programmes hereafter referred as’ food security programmes’  throughout undertaken by the 
current administration are addressing and reducing the issue of household livelihood vulnerability 
to food insecurity in the enset-dominant livelihood zones of southern Ethiopia. I choose these 
three programmes based on the following factors: 
(1) As can be seen in Table 7.1, some of the policies and programmes were formulated 
recently and they are still ongoing. Further, I have been actively involved in the 
implementation of the AESP at grassroots level as a development agent (DA) and thus I 
wanted to reflect on its implementation and impact and the overall process. 
(2) Some of the food security programmes, for example, the Complementary Community 
Investments (CCI), are operational only in limited regions (particularly in pastoral and 
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semi-pastoral lowlands) of the country and thus were not available in the study area to 
examine their impact. 
(3) From 2010 to 2013, as part of my PhD fieldwork and as an independent consultant, I was 
part of the impact assessment team of IDS/IFPRI, undertaking a nationwide study on the 
impact of the government’s  food  security  programme  focusing  on  PSNP,  OFSP/ Household 
Asset Building Programme (HABP) and CCI. As part of this study I spent considerable time 
in the study area and in other parts of the country. Thus, I will use this experience and the 
findings of this impact evaluation study to triangulate with my own study in order to 
capture the experience of beneficiaries, the community at large and different actors on 
the ground. 
 
Table 7.1: Selected food security policy programmes under the EPRDF 
Year Policy/Strategy/Programme Objective 
1994/95 
ongoing 
Participatory Demonstration and 
Training Extension System (PADETES)  
Transform and increase agricultural 
productivity 
1996–
2002  
Federal Food Security Strategy (FFSS) Increase food availability 
Ensure access to food 
Strengthen emergency response capabilities 
2002–
ongoing 
Revised/updated Food Security 
Strategy 
Improve food availability and access to food 
and reduce vulnerability to shocks 
2003–
ongoing 
Voluntary Resettlement Programme 
(VRP) 
Increase access to improved and productive 
land and water 
2005–14 Productive Safety Net Programme 
(PSNP) 
Prevent asset depletion at the household level, 
create assets at the community level and 
stimulate markets 
2005–10 Other Food Security Programmes 
(OFSP) 
Diversify and increase household assets 
2010–14 Household Asset Building Programme 
(HABP)39 
Diversify and increase household income and 
assets 
2010 Complementary Community 
Investment (CCI) 
Create community-level assets through 
improving infrastructure and services 
Sources: FDRE 1996, 2002b, 2003, 2006, and 2009. 
 
In the wake of the 2000 famine in Somali region40 and the 2002–03  ‘severe  food  crises’  across  the  
nation that pushed the number of people requiring emergency food assistance up to 14 million, 
                                                             
 
39 Initially this programme was designed for a five-year period from 2005 to 2010. Now the PSNP is in its 
second phase (2010–14) and the name of OFSP has been changed to HABP incorporating some additional 
elements in the programme. 
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the Ethiopian government sought to reform its food security policy and approach (Pankhurst 2009: 
2). As part of this process, in 2003 the Government of Ethiopia initiated a broader and multi-
sectoral consultation process known as the New Coalition for Food Security, a working group of 
experts representing different national ministries, INGOs and donors (Degefa 2005: 150). The key 
conclusion of the process was that the underlying causes of persisting chronic food insecurity and 
resultant hunger in Ethiopia have less to do with seasonal shocks such as drought but rather relate 
to pervasive and widespread poverty. The implication was that food insecurity is chronic in nature 
and hence predictable. Thus, food insecurity and hunger could be better addressed through multi-
annual, predictable and integrated interventions and resource transfers than through ad hoc 
emergency responses that often arrive after household livelihoods have already been damaged. 
The outcome of the process was agreement on the need to design a new National Food Security 
Programme (NFSP) consisting of the PSNP, a Voluntary Resettlement Programme and Other Food 
Security Programmes (FDRE 2003; Degefa 2005: 150; Frankenberger et al. 2007: 1; Pankhurst 
2009: 2). 
 
In parallel to the PSNP, OFSP, VRP and CCI, the Government of Ethiopia has undertaken various 
complementary and integrated food security interventions across the nation. These include the 
regular agriculture extension package programme, water harvesting and small irrigation scheme 
development, watershed management, market linkage and others (FDRE 2009). The following 
section introduces and discusses the three programmes under investigation. 
 
7.3.1 Agricultural Extension Service Programme 
Like other food security and rural development policies and strategies, agricultural extension 
service policies in Ethiopia have changed considerably over time. The change in regime in 1991 
brought  agricultural  development  to  centre  stage  of  the  government’s  macro-economic 
development policy and consequently the government introduced a new national development 
strategy called Agriculture Development-Led Industrialisation (ADLI) in 1992 (Degefa 2005: 58; 
Amdissa 2006). This policy aimed to bring ‘rapid and sustained economic growth, guarantee 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
40  See Salama et al. 2001; Hammond and Maxwell 2002. 
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maximum benefits to the majority of the people, minimise dependency on foreign aid, and 
promote the development of a market-oriented economy in Ethiopia’ (FDRE 2003: 14). Thus, 
improving the agricultural extension service was regarded as a prerequisite for improving the 
overall agricultural sector in general and for the success of the national development policy as 
such. Subsequently, in 1995 the government adopted a new agricultural extension system called 
Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System (PADETES) as a national extension 
system. The PADETES system was designed to achieve rapid agricultural productivity through an 
increased application of chemical fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides and the introduction of 
improved seeds by smallholder farmers. The specific goals of PADETES were to improve incomes 
via increasing productivity, ensuring self-sufficiency in food production, establishing farmer 
organisations, increasing production of export crops, conserving natural resources and increasing 
women’s  participation  in  development  (MOA 1994; Davis et al. 2010: 8). 
 
The extension programme started on a pilot scale based on the experience of the Sasakawa-Global 
(SG)-2000 programme targeting a small number of farmers in some regions of the country (Belay 
2003: 4). However, a rapid increase of productivity per hectare, particularly of cereal crops, 
influenced the Government of Ethiopia, donors and other actors to increase the expansion of the 
programme and subsequently the Ministry of Agriculture rolled out the extension service 
programme on a large scale in highland areas, providing different packages of cereal crops along 
with fertiliser and later including livestock, high-value crops, post-harvest technologies and agro-
forestry (Keeley and Scoones 2000: 96; Belay 2003:65; Berhanu et al. 2006: 12). There was a sharp 
increase in the number of farmers adopting the extension packages. For instance, Spielman (2008: 
2) reported that in 2004–2005 the  extension  package  reached  ‘about 40 percent of the roughly 10 
million farmers in Ethiopia’. As a result of such a rapid adoption of technologies, particularly in the 
use of chemical fertilisers, improved seeds, insecticides and herbicides, food production per capita 
increased from around 119 kg in 1994–95 to 162 kg in 2000–01 (SG 2000, 2002 cited in Ashworth 
2005: 7). However, despite its quick success in achieving increased agricultural productivity at the 
national level, the actual impact at the household level, particularly among the poor and 
vulnerable, is widely contested and the implementation process was marred by controversies and 
various challenges as explored further below. For instance, studies indicated that due to weather-
related risks, poor market access, price volatility for their produce and other related shocks, many 
poor and vulnerable recipients of the extension packages (seeds and fertilisers) failed to repay 
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their loans and subsequently fell into the trap of debt. Despite the production and market failure, 
the local authorities put pressure on the recipients by exerting excessive forces, imprisonment and 
as a result many ended up losing their valuable assets to repay their debt (Robinson 2003: 14; 
Belay 2003: 72; Samuel 2006: 18; Pankhurst 2009: 9). 
 
7.3.2 Institutional set-up of the agricultural extension programme and input delivery system 
As noted above, agricultural inputs (fertilisers and seeds) are critical elements of the PADETES. 
Since 1995, the AESP expanded tremendously and underwent different phases of restructuring. In 
the current decentralised political administrative system, the federal Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development (MoARD) ‘establishes the overall national extension policy, providing financial 
support for the extension system and supporting the regions with training and other capacity-
strengthening activities’. Regional Bureaus of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARDs) is 
responsible for distribution of the packages in the region, coordination and liaison with the Zone 
and Woreda level Bureaus of Agriculture on overall implementation and evaluation of the 
programme. Further, each regional BoARD has a pool of experts in different areas and provides 
advisory services and administrative backup support to the lower-level administrative offices 
(FDRE 2006; Davis et al. 2010: 12–16). 
 
In a similar manner, the Woreda Office of Agriculture and Rural Development (WOARD) is 
responsible for the overall implementation of the extension programme through its team of 
experts and DAs in their respective kebeles. In the current structure, three DAs are allocated per 
kebele with three distinct training backgrounds in crop, livestock and natural resource 
management and  ‘each DA is expected to train and monitor 120 farmers per year in his/her field 
of  specialisation’  (Davis  et al. 2010:10). The DAs are the interface between the government and 
peasant farmers and their role is critically important in shaping the overall success or failure of the 
extension programme. Further, in order to facilitate the demonstration and training aspect, the 
Government has set up a farmers training centres (FTCs) at every kebele, increasing the total 
number up to 18,000 centres across the country (Spielman 2008: 6). 
 
From 1984 until 1993, fertiliser importation and delivery was singlehandedly controlled a state 
parastatal. However, the 1993 fertiliser policy reform paved the way for private sector entry into 
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fertiliser import and distribution. The introduction and adoption of PADETES in 1995 also resulted 
in another policy change on fertiliser distribution. Subsequently, in 1995 the government 
permitted the creation of four mega regional holding companies41 that were 'strongly affiliated 
with the government (central party); by 1996 these four companies accounted for 67 per cent of 
all  fertilisers  distributed  in  the  country  and  were  awarded  virtually  all  the  programme’s  fertiliser  
supply contracts’ (NFIA 2001; Stepanek 1999, cited in Jayne et al. 2003: 300; Robinson 2003: 15). 
 
7.3.3 Community perspective on agricultural extension programme 
As stated above, the AESP sought to transform the agricultural sector in Ethiopia by increasing the 
productivity of small-scale agriculture by providing different agricultural inputs and technical 
packages to peasant farmers across the country. In order to gain a better understanding and 
capture local perceptions of the programme impacts in K-T zone, 12 community focus group 
discussions were held with participants consisting of resilient and vulnerable households. As 
already noted in chapters 2 and 4, the participants in the research were divided into resilient and 
vulnerable groups by a combination of administrative criteria used by local authorities and local 
indicators identified by the community members during the fieldwork. The focus group discussion 
results reveal a mixed picture about the overall impact of the programme and the perceptions 
vary considerably among the two community groups. 
 
The overwhelming majority of vulnerable households reported that the impact of the agriculture 
extension system in improving their livelihood and food security situation is limited. Focus group 
participants from vulnerable groups were asked:  ‘What  role  do  you  think  the  agriculture  extension  
package  programme  played  in  your  household  food  security?’  The  majority  responded  there  was  
very little or no impact at all, giving reasons such as: 
 
                                                             
 
41 Wondo trading PLC in SNNPR, Dinsho in Oromia, Guuna in Tigray and Ambassal in Amhara regions. 
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‘It  is  helping  those  who  are  using  the  inputs  and packages.  It  is  helping  those  ‘model  and  champion’42 
farmers, but not us. The main reason is the input price. The price of fertilisers is out of reach for us 
and is becoming more and more expensive every year. The price of improved seeds has also risen, 
almost at the same amount as fertiliser’  (FG_KB/ME-VCG/11/02/2011). 
 
‘To  begin  with,  if  you  do  not  have  enough  land  and  oxen,  and  you  are  not  in  a  position  to  buy  the  
extension packages and inputs, you [the poor and vulnerable] are automatically bypassed by the DAs. 
You know there is a severe shortage of land here and most people like us have often leased out our 
plots to a better off household. The other reason is that we fear the debt that comes with the 
package because we have had very bad experiences in the past like in 2000, 2003, and hence we do 
not  want  to  go  back  to  that  experience  again’  (FG_DG/DI-VCG/29/03/2011). 
 
A similar pattern was observed concerning the input price increase across all the localities covered 
in this research. As noted above, in 1996, the government introduced a policy reform that allowed 
‘private’ companies to import and distribute fertiliser, and in 1997 it abandoned subsidies because 
of ‘pressure from the donors and World Bank’ (Jayne et al. 2003: 300; Samuel 2006: 18). The 
change in the role of distribution of inputs from state to semi-private holdings and removal of 
subsidies made access to inputs difficult for many poor and middle-wealth category households as 
these parastatals demanded advance payment of 50–75 per cent of the cost of fertilisers and 100 
per cent of the cost of seeds from farmers who wished to receive them. Similar to a claim made by 
a focus group from Messafe kebele, other studies have also indicated that due to the high price of 
fertilisers, farmers are applying less fertiliser than recommended by the DAs. For instance, Samuel 
(2006) noted that farmers do not apply the recommended rates of fertiliser and improved seeds 
and often use only half the recommended amounts. 
 
Similar questions were posed to resilient households across all three districts and the responses 
were starkly different from their poor and vulnerable counterparts. The overall perception about 
the impact of the agricultural extension system on the livelihoods of resilient households was 
                                                             
 
42 In the current extension service system, farmers are categorised and given different names based on their 
performance and adoption of different technologies. Model and champion farmers are mainly those who 
own relatively large plots of farmlands, are early adopters of packages and are economically better off.  
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positive. Given their economic background (often they are better off), the findings are not 
surprising. These households have bigger farm plots, draught oxen and could afford to purchase 
agricultural inputs, particularly chemical fertilisers and improved seeds that are critical for better 
performance and yield increment. Further, unlike vulnerable households, resilient households 
have benefited from the extension education and technical support provided by DAs under the 
ongoing extension service package programme. As noted by the respondents: 
 
‘We  are  benefiting  from  the  extension  service  package  program.  We  are  able  to  access  improved  
seeds of maize and teff and also livestock package including artificial insemination service of 
improved breeds and technical support from the DAs. We have also seen a significant increase of 
market price for our produce. However, we have a concern with rapidly increasing prices of input and 
that  is  frightening  for  the  future  ‘(FG_KG/TG-RCG/01/03/2011). 
 
‘We  are  receiving  different technical advice and support from the DAs on soil and water conservation, 
livestock health, fodder production and management, seedlings of improved fruit trees, compost 
preparation techniques, fertilisers and seeds. We are benefiting from all these aspects of the 
extension  services  except  the  worry  of  rain  condition  that  is  often  becoming  very  unpredictable’  
(FG_KB/ME-RCG/10/02/2011). 
 
The data from the woreda and zone bureau of agriculture and rural development offices in the 
study area show that the fertiliser price has risen sharply over time, reflecting the concerns raised 
by the community groups above (see Table 7.2). 
 
Table 7.2: Trends in fertiliser price in the study area, 2004–12 
District Type of 
fertiliser 
Yearly price (in birr) of fertiliser/100 kg 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Kadida-
Gamela 
DAP 348.17 375.69 380.4 383.06 1,300 752 717 1,109 1,554 
Urea 259.27 340.30 327.20 327.85 960 551.47 610 854 1,274 
Kacha-
Bira 
DAP 351 379.23 381.30 383.06 1,300 758.21 722 1,110 1,564 
Urea 262.43 348 328.10 328 960 558 615 855 1,283 
Doyo-
Gena 
DAP N/A N/A N/A N/A 1,300 752.35 716 1,095 1,566 
Urea N/A N/A N/A N/A 960 552.03 609 841 1,285 
Source: K-T zone, Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development 2011b 
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A quick glance at the figures in Table 7.2 clearly indicates and supports the discontent of peasant 
farmers on sharply increasing fertiliser prices in the area. For instance, the price of 100 kg DAP 
(Diammonium phosphate) fertiliser has shown increases of 346 per cent and 345 per cent 
respectively in Kadida-Gamela and Kacha-Bira districts between 2004 and 2012. In the same vein, 
the price of urea has shown a 391 per cent and 389 per cent increase over the same period of time 
in these districts. 
 
Based on the responses provided by both resilient and vulnerable households on the impact of 
agriculture extension service, the following conclusions can be drawn. (1) The agricultural 
extension service is designed as a one-size-fits-all approach without carefully considering the 
economic and livelihood situation of the poor and vulnerable groups. (2) The increasing fertiliser 
price has become a major challenge for the poor and vulnerable households to access fertiliser 
and improve their food production. (3) Poor inputs distribution and debt collection process has 
created a general sense of fear about the packages, particularly for the poor and vulnerable 
households. Overall, these and other related factors mentioned above have severely affected the 
outcome of the extension service programme that is meant to help the vulnerable and poor 
households to improve their food production and reduce their vulnerability to food insecurity by 
improving their production-based entitlements. 
 
7.3.4 DAs’  perspectives 
As  stated  earlier,  the  DAs  are  a  pillar  in  the  success  or  failure  of  the  government’s  rural  
development and food security strategies. Semi-structured interviews were held with 11 DAs 
across the study area. In general, the outcomes of the assessment are mixed. Ten DAs indicated 
that the current agricultural extension programme does not benefit vulnerable and poor 
community members. The reasons for this include the unaffordability of input prices. 
Nevertheless, it is benefiting those who are economically better off and can afford to purchase the 
inputs and apply them as recommended. As noted by a veteran DA who worked for 12 years in 
three different kebeles in the study area district: 
‘Vulnerable  groups  are  not benefiting from the extension service because they cannot afford the 
costs of inputs. As a result, we don't give much attention and effort to reach out to these groups and 
teach them about different available package services. We tend to spend more with those who can 
afford  to  receive  the  inputs  and  implement  accordingly’  (KI_SA/KEB-DA /12/03/2011). 
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Other elements that were thought to hamper extension services included administrative/political 
and context-based factors and related policies, as discussed below. 
 
7.3.4.1 Political factors 
The primary task of the DAs is to identify the agricultural challenges that peasant farmers are 
confronted with and to provide technical support to deal with these. Further, they are responsible 
for introducing and promoting different packages developed at the agricultural research centres. 
However, it was observed that the DAs are spending more time in dealing with political and party-
related issues than in discharging their professional duties. This was reported as a main concern 
among the majority of the DAs. One DA commented:  
‘Since  the  last  four  years,  I  have  become  a  member  of  the  Kebele Food Security Task Force (KFSTF) 
that oversees the targeting and implementing of the PSNP. The workload increases particularly 
during the time of wealth registration of PSNP beneficiaries for a graduation where we have quite a 
number of complaints arising from participants. We as a kebele have a given quota from the woreda 
to graduate a certain number of beneficiaries in a given year and this puts a lot of pressure on us. We 
also get heavily involved in party campaigns during local and  national  election  periods.’ (KI_SA/KEB-
DA/15/03/2011). 
 
Another DA echoed these concerns:  
‘We  are  pressured  to convince as many farmers as possible to take fertilisers, improved seeds and 
different packages. Our bosses appraise our performance based on the number of farmers we are 
able to convince and target to take loans/packages. If you do well in this, there is a prize at local and 
regional  levels  and  you  will  be  awarded  a  title  of  “Developmental  DA”  and  receive  incentives.  Even  
your chance of getting a scholarship to pursue your degree in summer programmes depend on the 
number of farmers you have enrolled in the package programme. As a result, we tend to focus on 
convincing more participants, especially going after those farmers who are economically better off 
and  willing  to  adopt  different  packages  and  are  able  to  repay  their  loan’  (KI_SA/KEB-DA/28/01/2011). 
 
The above findings are in line with previous studies undertaken in other parts of the country, 
which  found  that  DAs’  time  is  stretched  by their responsibility to perform a range of other non-
extension activities: ‘This  includes  the  distribution  of  fertilizer, the collection of credit and taxes, 
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and  other  government  activities  that  do  not  typically  fall  under  the  mandate  of  extension’  (Belay 
2003: 78; Davis et al. 2010: 11).43 
 
7.3.4.2  Context-based challenges 
The  government’s  policy  document  states  that  the  agricultural extension system of PADETES was 
designed in a way to incorporate local contexts and the demands of farmers in developing tailored 
packages (FDRE 2002a: 10). However, a closer look at the actual implementation and the types of 
packages available indicates a contrasting picture. Cereal and cash crops are the dominant 
elements of the package programme and are often developed at central research stations, but 
they are often not suitable for different agro-ecological zones in the country (Belay 2003; 
EEA/EEPRI 2006). In spite of the agro-ecological and livelihood diversity of Ethiopia, it can be 
argued that the packages are designed with a one-size-fits-all approach. DAs interviewed during 
fieldwork voiced a similar view. For instance, a DA highlighted that the current extension package 
does not include non-cereal local food crops that play a significant role in household food security: 
‘The  extension  package  predominately  focuses  on  cereals  and  cash  crops  such  as  coffee  and  others.  
But, there are no enset, sweet potato and taro packages. Given their support to household food 
security  in  our  area,  these  crops  should  have  been  included  in  the  package  along  with  cereals’  
(KI_SA/KEB-DA/25/01/2011). 
 
The absence of an enset package and the focus instead on cereals production within extension 
services has had significant implications for household food security in K-T zone. As a result of such 
strong attention and subsequent support to cereals, many households who were traditionally 
dependent on enset temporarily switched to cereals production. However, this switching process 
made farmers more vulnerable to further food insecurity as the cereals easily succumbed to 
various production risks such as seasonal drought and lack of fertilisers. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
                                                             
 
43 Distribution of fertilisers is not the task and responsibility of the DAs. The DA provides advice on the 
importance of different fertilisers and packages to, application procedures and follows up. He/she registers 
those who are willing to adopt the packages and transfers the list to the kebele and woreda authorities. 
Collection of down payment, distribution and debt collection are undertaken by the kebele administration in 
collaboration with the woreda cooperative and agriculture team (personal experience). 
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many peasants in K-T zone have revealed that switching from enset to cereal caused them to pay a 
heavy price in terms of food security.  
 
7.3.4.3 Policy factors 
As noted earlier, the fertiliser subsidy, importation and distribution policy was reformed in the 
early and mid 1990s and the majority of responsibilities related to inputs supply were transferred 
to private holding companies that are affiliated to the central government. At the same time the 
new extension service was introduced in 1995. As part  of  government’s  wider  campaign  to  
encourage the uptake of the new extension service programme, fertilisers and seeds were offered 
to farmers on a credit basis and 25% advance payment particularly during the early years of the 
new extension service (from 1996 until 2000) (see, e.g. Belay 2003: 66; Samuel 2006: 18). As a 
result, many farmers including those who had very little land and were vulnerable ended up 
receiving the packages. However, during these periods farmers faced seasonal droughts and poor 
production and it became a major challenge for many households to repay input loans. As a result 
many households disposed of their critical assets to make the repayment. This situation created 
further distrust between peasant farmers and the government. A senior DA who has worked in the 
area for a long period indicated that this is one of the reasons why currently many farmers are not 
adopting packages: 
‘The  input  credit  system  did  not  work  as  it  was  hoped  for.  Many  households  have  received  inputs  on  
credit basis and failed to pay back. Some poor households received the inputs and sold it right away 
at the market to meet their immediate needs. However, later loan collection became a major 
obstacle and as a result many households ended up in debt. Now, many households fear to take 
inputs or any other packages that involve credit. For instance, we have a poultry package which is 
affordable and could benefit those who are very poor households with small plots of farmland but 
they  are  not  buying  into  it’  (KI_SA/KEB-DA/25/01/2011). 
 
Currently the cooperative unions and private firms are actively involved in fertiliser and seeds 
distribution for farmers. Although this system appears more efficient, DAs have raised issues that 
are challenging this approach as well. A DA noted: 
‘The  packages  arrive  late,  in  poor  quality  or  are  incomplete.  Last  year  [2010]  farmers  requested  a  
short maturing maize that is more drought resistant. However, we have delivered a tall variety with 
long maturation period and very susceptible to stock borers. We have reported these issues often to 
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the woreda offices  of  agriculture,  however  these  conditions  have  not  been  resolved’  (KI_SA/KEB-
DA/27/01/2011). 
 
These policy/politics-related factors have seriously affected the effectiveness and impact of the 
agriculture extension service in Ethiopia in general and in the study area in particular. Other 
studies undertaken across the country (see, e.g. Degefa 2005: 302; EEA/EEPRI 2006) have revealed 
similar results to this study, showing that the extension services have played a limited role in 
increasing food security and reducing hunger of vulnerable and poor households. 
 
7.3.5 Vulnerable  and  poor  households’  perspectives on extension services 
A majority of focus group respondents indicated that the extension package programme in place 
has become part of the problem and caused significant challenges for their households’  efforts  in  
building resilient livelihoods. As a result many households are not adopting the extension package 
programme and hence are not benefiting from it for various reasons. Similar findings were 
reported by other studies in the region. For instance, Ayele (2008) has identified that in the 
neighbouring Wolita zone, many peasant households have stopped adopting the extension 
package, fearing the risk of default. Similarly, Spielman (2008:6) citing Bonger et al. 2004 and 
EEA/EEPRI 2006 reported  ‘Although  many  farmers  seem  to  have  adopted  the  packages promoted 
by the extension system, up to a third of the farmers who have tried a package have discontinued 
its  use’.  In a similar manner, a study undertaken across different regions of the country by an 
IFPRI team in 2010 revealed that the high cost of fertiliser is a serious barrier hindering farmers 
from fully adopting the extension packages available. The study further outlined other factors: 
Other major constraints that affect extension indirectly are the high cost of inputs, a lack of inputs, 
late delivery of inputs, weak seed systems, transportation problems with the input system, 
monopolies on input markets, and a lack of communication and information sharing within the 
extension line departments from the federal to the kebele levels (Davis et al. 2010: 12). 
 
The case study presented below in Box 7.1 narrates the main challenges facing households in 
adopting of the extension packages particularly fertilizers and improved seeds in the study area.   
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Box 7.1: Case study: The experience of an early adopter of extension package 
 
Ato Arficho is a 55-year-old peasant residing in Messafe kebele. Some ten years back, he had a 
hectare of land and used to grow maize, wheat, teff, beans and other crops. In 2008, he rented out 
a quarter of his land for five years to his neighbour because he and his family faced severe food 
shortages. He indicated he was one of the first people who received the extension package when 
it started. However, since 2005, he stopped using the extension package programme due 
defaulting in the past. In 2006, he was forced to part with his ox to repay the loan of inputs he 
received. Further, he indicated that as the price of the packages is increasing sharply and the 
credit arrangement has changed the majority of peasants in his village no longer receive these, 
commenting: ‘no  one  wants  to  burn  his  finger  again’,  rainfall  situation  is  becoming more and more 
unpredictable and the risk of production failure recurs often. In 2007, he stopped producing 
cereals except maize for green consumption and focused on growing khat (Catha edulis), which 
does not require fertiliser or as much rainfall as cereals. There is a good market demand for khat. 
He hopes that once his khat production establishes well his life will improve. 
 
The household case study in boxes 7.1 and similar studies show that the high cost of inputs has 
become a major barrier to accessing the input packages. The participant in Case study 7.1 
illustrates that due to the failure of production he became indebted and was forced to sell his 
critical asset to repay the debt. The fear of defaulting is a critical factor in explaining why many 
households no longer take up extension packages. Increasing input prices and payment 
arrangement have become barriers, as well, pushing households to pursue other options. As Swift 
and Hamilton (2001: 88) noted, diversification as a livelihood strategy (such as that demonstrated 
by  the  household  case  studies  featured  above)  is  ‘a  response  to  the  failure  of  previous  livelihood  
strategy’. 
 
7.3.6 Views from extension experts and academics 
Agricultural extension experts and academics share similar views and perspectives to those of the 
communities, DAs and individual households regarding the impact of the agricultural extension 
programme in reducing livelihood vulnerability. The majority of respondents indicated that, from a 
policy perspective, the ongoing extension approach is sound and based on the experiences of 
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previous extension approaches undertaken in Ethiopia. Further, the intention of the programme 
to increase productivity is the right step forward. However, the majority of respondents also 
signalled limitations to existing extension approaches. A senior food security and rural 
development expert who worked for a long period in the enset-dominant livelihood zone of 
southern Ethiopia argued that the ongoing agriculture extension system is not appropriate in the 
context of enset-dominant livelihood systems in that area. 
‘Land  shortage  is  a  predominant  factor  and  with  the  growing  population,  the  size  of  land  is  shrinking  
at an alarming pace. As a result, the majority of households own very fragmented and extremely 
small size individual plots, literally too small to produce enough food to support their households. 
Thus, it is not sensible to promote a cereal-dominant extension service that requires large plots, good 
soil condition and regular water availability. Further, other risks [natural, social, economic, policy-and 
market-oriented] are affecting the agricultural production in these areas over time. Because of these 
inherent risks, many households are becoming heavily indebted since the start of the extension 
programme and subsequently becoming more and more vulnerable to  future  shocks’  (KI_HA/UN-
WFP/03/05/2011). 
 
Extension services are ill-suited to the social and agro-ecological context of the heavily populated 
enset-based livelihood zones. The quality of inputs, particularly of seeds, is questioned too. As 
noted earlier, since the restructuring of the agricultural inputs supply system, private firms and 
traders are in charge of the distributing inputs. More recently, local cooperatives and a small 
number of private traders and seed multipliers have become involved. As an informant at the 
regional BoARD indicated, this process has been plagued by a series of challenges: 
‘Private  seed  multipliers  and  traders  are  often  more  concerned  about  their  profit  and  maximum  
return of their investment rather than the quality of inputs they deliver. We have had serious issues 
with the adulteration of seeds with poor quality ones. Further, they often fail to deliver the input on 
time and this caused many challenges in the past. Given that agriculture is a time-sensitive practice, 
farmers cannot  afford  to  lose  important  times  they  plant’  (KI_HA/RG-ARD/16/06/2011). 
 
In principle, the presence of three DAs per kebele helps to reach the peasants and convey the 
extension messages. However, some studies have questioned the quality of the training that the 
DAs have received and their overall practical knowledge and experience. Ashworth (2005: 4) noted 
that ‘despite their three years formal training, many lack fundamental qualities such as listening 
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and learning from a very practical and rich indigenous knowledge that farmers possess, and 
incorporating that with formal and technical knowledge’.  
 
A senior rural development expert at Hawassa University indicated that the nature of the 
extension programme implementation has contributed to its failure to address household 
vulnerability to food insecurity:  
 ‘The  extension  system  in  Ethiopia  in  general  and  in  enset-dominant areas in particular has been 
implemented  as  a  sort  of  “political  campaign”.  The  implementing actors at different levels were given 
certain quota to meet.  As a result many poor households, including those who have not enough land, 
have ended up receiving the inputs. As a result of such a hasty approach many poor farmers have 
been trapped in a cycle of debt and forced to sell their last  resort  of  assets  to  repay  the  loan’  
(KI_HA/HU-AC-2/05/05/2011). 
 
Another senior researcher and expert on agricultural extension at the same institute put forward a 
similar but slightly different critique: 
‘The  packages  were  designed  on  one-size-fits-all approach with very poor/limited understanding 
about the diverse agro-ecological variation, farming system and livelihood dynamics. As a result, the 
implementers at the local level [Woreda level agricultural extension staff, the DAs, Kebele 
administrators and other actors] view and understood that by just providing improved seeds and 
fertilisers  to  all  farmers,  the  issue  of  food  security  could  be  resolved  in  a  short  span  of  time’  
(KI_HA/HU-AC-1/17/05/2011). 
 
He went further in elaborating that, in an ideal situation, the agricultural extension system should 
be menu-based, demand-driven and based on a knowledge-intensive process, rather than just 
delivering input packages and technical support. The extension system should also focus on two-
way communication. In his study and field-level observations about the current extension system 
in Ethiopia, Ashworth (2005: 18–19) explained: 
The current extension system essentially focuses on technology transfer. It conveys technical 
messages and packages to farmers, either individually or as groups. It tends to be a highly structured, 
top-down, prescriptive approach to technology transfer. The paradigm rests on the belief that 
outsiders (planners, extension, researchers) know the priority problems encountered by farmers and 
communities and are able to prescribe the appropriate solutions.  
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In line with the above observations, a senior rural development researcher at Hawassa University 
has shared his views on the impact of the ongoing agricultural extension programme in improving 
the food security of the poor and vulnerable groups: 
‘The  ongoing  agricultural  extension  package  model  is  similar  to  that  of  the  green revolution approach, 
that focused on farm intensification and yield increment through provision of packages such as 
improved seeds, fertilisers, herbicides and irrigation facilities. However, in our case [Ethiopia] the 
package  is  not  complete,  as  it  doesn’t  include  the  irrigation/water  aspect,  except  the  ill-advised water 
harvesting technologies that have occurred for a brief period. Thus, in a country like Ethiopia that is 
drought prone, the extension system that depends heavily on the availability of good rainfall 
condition is short-sighted  and  doomed  to  fail’  (KI_HA/HU-AC-3/10/05/2011). 
 
Senior researchers at the Institute of Development Research (IDR), Addis Ababa University and the 
Forum for Social Studies (FSS) have provided similar perspectives. They pointed out that the 
current agricultural extension system fails to help reduce food insecurity and, indeed has made 
some more vulnerable.  
 
Overall, the above findings highlight that the agricultural extension system that has been 
underway since 1994–95 has recorded a modest success in increasing agricultural productivity at 
the aggregate level, particularly for households with larger land plots and those who could afford 
the price of fertilisers and improved seeds. However, it falls short in supporting and improving the 
agricultural production and subsequent food security of the poor and vulnerable. Rather, it has 
become part of the problem and is aggravating household vulnerability to food insecurity. In 
particular, due to a poorly designed and implemented agriculture input provision system, many 
poor and vulnerable households became indebted and were forced to sell their assets to repay 
loans. As discussed in Chapter 4, progressive loss of critical assets left many poor and vulnerable 
households on the precipice. Thus, the extension programme is not protecting household from 
future shocks and green famine. 
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7.4 Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) 
In January 2005, the government of Ethiopia introduced the PSNP in collaboration with its 
development partners. The programme started by targeting 4.8 million people who were classified 
as ‘chronically food insecure’ in 287 woredas in mainly in farming communities (Pankhurst 2009: 
3)44.  However, in 2012, the number of beneficiaries reached 7.5 million people across 300 
woredas. The overarching programme objectives are smoothing household food consumption, 
prevention of asset depletion at household level, and creation of assets at both household and 
community levels. In doing so, the programme envisaged strengthening household and 
community resilience to further shocks (FDRE 2006: 96; Devereux et al. 2008: 2; Ellis and White 
2012: 4). The programme was designed to achieve these objectives over a five-year period, that is, 
by 2010. However, after a series of impact assessment studies and reviews the programme was 
extended into a second phase lasting until 2014. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, given the long history of famine and seasonal hunger, humanitarian 
emergency support was a dominant response in Ethiopia for many decades. The reasoning 
underlying the promotion of PSNP as a new approach was that the predictability of the transfers 
(‘A  safety  net  delayed  is  a  safety  net  denied’)  and  minimising  beneficiaries  dependence  would  
more effectively address the vulnerability of those who were food insecure (FDRE 2004:1). The 
programme has two components. Public works beneficiaries are households that have an able-
bodied household member who can participate in community-level public works activities for five 
days per month for up to six months. The second component is direct support, which delivers 
unconditional transfers to poor households that do not have an able-bodied household member, 
and they receive their transfers free of charge (FDRE 2004: 4–6). As noted earlier, the transfers 
should be ‘timely and predictable so that households do not need to resort to harmful and 
irreversible coping strategies’ to meet their immediate food and non-food needs (Bishop and 
Hilhorst 2010: 189). The following section presents the perceptions and views of the PSNP 
                                                             
 
44 The PSNP was rolled out in pastoralist and semi-pastoralist woredas of Afar and Somali region in 2010. 
However, in the lowlands of the Oromia woredas, it started at the same time as in other highland regions. 
Though it started at the same time, it is important to note that the implementation modality here 
significantly varies from the farming/highland areas (see Guush et al. 2011 for further details). 
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beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and different actors on the impacts of the program, particularly in 
addressing household vulnerability to food insecurity and green famine. 
 
7.4.1 Community perceptions 
All three districts included in this study are currently designated as chronically food insecure and 
thus are covered by PSNP. Focus group discussions were undertaken with community members 
consisting of vulnerable and resilient households separately, enquiring about the role and 
contribution of the PSNP in household food security. A majority of resilient households offered a 
mostly positive assessment of the impact of the PSNP thus far. They indicated that ten years ago 
there were destitute groups in their community. However, currently these groups have decreased 
significantly and not visible as they were before. The reason mentioned for the decrease of 
destitute groups is the inclusion of these households in the PSNP, many of which are thought to 
have received support for 6 months of the year since 2005. A separate FGD across all six kebeles 
was undertaken with vulnerable households of whom the majority are receiving PSNP support. 
The FGD was facilitated to understand specific roles and contributions of the PSNP in their 
livelihoods. Overall, the responses are diverse but mainly positive (see Table 7.3).  
 
Table 7.3: Reported impacts of the PSNP (ranked according to number of times mentioned 
during the FGD) 
Overall rank Impacts 
First Covered our food/cash need for six months 
Second Helped to send our children to school 
Second Improved our living conditions (housing) 
Fourth Improved our social status 
Fifth Helped us to create more assets 
Sixth Helped us to avoid destitution 
Source: Author’s  fieldwork,  2011. 
 
As can be seen in Table 7.3, the most cited impact of the PSNP is helping households to cover the 
food gap that they would normally face during the lean periods. In cases where the beneficiaries 
received their transfers in cash, this helped them to access food and enabled them to send their 
children to school. Overall, the results indicated that by covering their food shortages, the PSNP 
reduced the risk of vulnerable households from sliding into destitution and acute food shortages 
that exposes them further to green famine. Further, these findings also highlight that despite 
some  challenges  and  limitations,  the  PSNP  has  played  a  modest  role  of  both  ‘entitlement  
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protection’  and  ‘promotion’  by  smoothing  households’  consumption  and  by  ‘preventing  the  loss  of  
assets  due  to  distress  sales’ to access food (Devereux 2001b; Devereux et al. 2008: 16). Further, 
the respondents indicated that the PSNP has helped them to construct new housing and 
subsequently improve their social and living conditions. Interestingly, participants also indicated 
that they were able to acquire new clothes with the PSNP cash transfers, which has helped them 
to restore their social status in their community. A PSNP participant in Messafe kebele revealed: 
‘Our  situation has improved. Before the PSNP, we used to dress in very old and dirty clothes. As a 
result, we were ashamed to go to public gatherings, important social obligations and even to church. 
Now, thanks to the PSNP support, all my family members have new clothes and we keep them clean 
as we could afford to buy laundry  soap’  (FG_KB/ME-VCG/11/02/2011). 
 
However, in contrast to these positive impacts, a significant number of households have also 
indicated that the PSNP is not helping them to fully address their vulnerability to food insecurity. 
When  asked:  ‘Since you  became  a  PSNP  beneficiary,  have  you  still  been  facing  food  shortages?’  
they gave the following responses: 
 
‘The amount of food is not enough to cover the food needs of our household. For instance, I am 
receiving a transfer for five members but I have a total of eight members, and the amount of food 
that  is  given  is  hardly  covering  the  food  need  for  my  family.  We  just  stretch  it  to  cover  our  needs’  
(FG_KB/ME-VCG/11/02/2011). 
 
‘The  amount  of  food  is  not  enough  to  cover  our  food  need.  We  are  living  in  a  community where most 
people are poor and we have to share whatever we have received. So, the PSNP transfer either 
should  be  increased  or  more  people  should  be  supported’ (FG_KG/TG-VCG/02/03/2011). 
 
‘It  is  good  that  the  PSNP  transfer  has  been  helping  us  a  lot to cover our food need, but it is not 
enough to increase our assets. The transfer amount should be increased if the government wants to 
see  us  changed’  (FG_KG/AD-VCG/25/02/2011). 
 
In  addition,  almost  all  of  the  vulnerable  households’  respondents  indicated that the potential 
impact of the PSNP is severely challenged by the delay of transfers, with the majority of 
respondents indicating that delay has been a recurring problem since the programme began. As 
noted above, predictability and timeliness of transfers to the beneficiaries are central elements of 
the PSNP in addressing the vulnerability of households. However, due to the delay of transfers the 
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programme’s  effectiveness  in  addressing  livelihood  vulnerability  is  significantly  limited.  The  
following quotes from respondents reflect this. 
 
‘We are not able to improve and bring changes in our living conditions with PSNP support. This is 
mainly because the transfer often arrives late. Since most of us do not produce enough food from our 
own and save it for hunger periods, we need to go for cash loans from our neighbours when the 
transfer  is  delayed.  Thus,  when  the  transfer  comes  the  money  goes  straight  to  the  lenders.’  
(FG_DG/DI-VCG/29/03/2011). 
 
‘Though  it  is  improving  over  the  last  two  years,  our  PSNP  transfer does not come on time. When it is 
delayed, we don't wait and starve. We go for local creditors who often charge us too much in return, 
and purchase food. Those of us who have few assets, sell them and access food. Had the transfer 
come on time, we could have  kept  our  assets  for  the  future’  (FG_KG/AD-VCG/25/02/2011). 
 
‘Transfer  delay  is  the  main  concern.  We  often  receive  two–three months after the actual time. For us, 
a delayed transfer means putting your money in a pocket that has a big hole. If you put your money 
in  a  pocket  that  has  a  hole,  you  know  that  you  are  going  to  lose  it’ (FG_KB/ME-VCG/11/02/2011). 
 
Overall, the community members indicated the positive impact of the PSNP. However, the 
majority voice concerns and problems with the timeliness of the transfers, which is jeopardising 
the positive outcomes of the programme. These findings are similar to other studies that are 
undertaken at the national level examining the perception of PSNP beneficiaries about timeliness 
and preferences of transfers (e.g. how often they wanted to be paid). For instance, a 2008 study 
indicated that ‘the PSNP transfers (food and cash) are dependable (paid for all six months) but not 
predictable (not paid on time). Further, the study indicated that almost three beneficiaries in four 
(71.3 per cent) reported that they had encountered delays in PSNP payments in 2007’ (Devereux 
et al. 2008: 43). These findings are backed up by a more recent evaluation by Guush et al. 2011, 
which found that there were significant delays in PSNP transfers (see Table 7.4). 
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Table 7.4: Beneficiaries’  perceptions  regarding  the  timeliness  of  payments  (percent) 
Region 2008  2010 
 (% saying 
yes) 
 Strongly 
agree 
% 
Agree 
% 
Disagree 
% 
Strongly 
disagree 
% 
Did not 
state 
% 
Tigray 17  8 27 34 22 8 
Amhara 40  9 35 38 16 1 
Amhara-
HVFB 
52  32 36 24 8 1 
Oromia 15  5 9 41 37 9 
SNNPR 53  27 27 28 16 1 
Source: Guush et al. 2011: 78. 
 
As can be seen In Table 7.4, although there have been modest improvements in Tigray and 
Amhara regions in 2010 compared to 2008, transfer delay has remained a significant challenge in 
SNNPR and Oromia regions. In Oromia, the situation has even got worse whereas Amhara-High 
Value Food Basket (HVFB) woredas have improved significantly. The HVFB woredas case should be 
treated differently as these are selected areas where the PSNP is supported by USAID and 
implemented by NGOs unlike woredas under pure government implementation. Similarly, the 
qualitative results have also reflected strikingly similar results to the quantitative study. ‘Out of 30 
FGDs across Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and SNNP regions, 24 stated that payments were made 
irregularly and often they did not know when to expect payment from one month to the next’ 
(Guush et al. 2011: 78). The above quotes by the PSNP beneficiaries highlight how they have 
coped with the transfer delays. As respondents indicated, when transfers were delayed, they were 
forced to adopt irreversible coping strategies to contend with food shortages. The severity of the 
knock-on effect of the transfer delay is higher particularly for the poor and vulnerable community 
groups as it increases their susceptibility to food insecurity and green famine by reducing their 
capacity against shocks.  Guush et al. (2011) found that when faced with food shortages, PSNP-
beneficiary households adopted irreversible coping strategies such as consuming seed stocks, 
unusual foods and wild animals and plants (Figure 7.1). The consumption of seeds is a strong 
indicator of the severity of the situation across all regions. The regionally disaggregated results 
show that in Oromia and SNNPR a considerable proportion of households reported having eaten 
their seed stocks in all years compared to Tigray and Amhara regions (ibid.: 36–37).  
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Figure 7.1: Coping strategies, by year and region 
 
Source: Guush et al. (2011: 39). 
 
7.4.2 Household perceptions 
Individual case studies were undertaken with vulnerable households who are current beneficiaries 
of the programme, to gain a deeper understanding about the role that the PSNP has played in 
improving household food security and addressing vulnerability to shocks. In-depth case studies 
have illustrated the complex process and impacts of transfer delays on recipient households. Case 
studies in boxes 7.2 and 7.3 narrate the experience of PSNP beneficiary households with the 
transfers and packages they have received through the programme. 
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Box 7.2: Case study: PSNP beneficiary household performing better 
 
Ato Mekango is a 55-year-old peasant farmer who lives in Wagebetta kebele with his family, 
consisting of his wife and seven children. All the children reside with him and four of them support 
the family with different activities. His main livelihood is agriculture. He owns one hectare of land 
and grows enset, wheat, maize, potato, cabbage and other annual food crops depending on the 
availability of resources and rainfall condition. Some 10–15 years back, he was considered to be a 
middle-level wealth household in his locality, as he used to own a pair of oxen, three milking cows, 
three calves, a donkey and some chickens. Further, he used to produce enough food to cover the 
food needs of his family. However, over the last ten years, his asset-holdings progressively 
decreased as he sold his assets to cover the needs of his growing family. Overall, life has become 
an uphill struggle for him. Considering his situation the community selected him to be a PSNP 
beneficiary in 2005. He has been receiving PSNP support for a total of seven people. In addition to 
the food and cash transfer, he also received a credit package of 1,500 birr and bought a bull. 
Currently, he is able plough his farm plot by pairing up his bull with others in the community. From 
the cash transfer he was also able to save 250 birr and purchased a goat. He fattened and sold it at 
a Christmas market for 600 birr and purchased a poorly cared for ox. After fattening the ox for two 
years he sold it for 8,000 birr. Further, he was able to buy four chickens and is now earning regular 
income from selling eggs in the local market and also consumes them with his family. He indicated 
that since he became a PSNP beneficiary, he is not worried about where and how he could cover 
the food needs during lean seasons. At the moment, he said his living condition is in a better 
situation. However, he fears that the kebele administration and the DA might soon ask him to 
graduate from the programme without establishing enough assets and building better resilience. 
He indicated that in order to have more secure living conditions, he would like to access more 
loans from the government and would like to engage in fattening livestock. 
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Box 7.3: Case study: A vulnerable household striving to build a resilient livelihood 
 
Ato Kalbiso is in his early 50s and is a former resettlement returnee currently residing in Ashira 
kebele with his wife and four children. After the 1984 famine Ato Kalbiso was selected by the local 
authorities against his will to take part in resettlement programme and was taken to the north-
western part of the country along with his five children. Upon arriving he faced a very difficult 
start. His entire family suffered from malaria and other diseases and as a result he lost four of his 
children. After a very challenging time, he was able to establish a stable livelihood working on two 
hectares of land he was provided with. He used to have five milking cows, a pair of draught oxen, a 
donkey, seven goats, ten chickens and some beehives. He used to produce 20 quintals of grain and 
he had surplus food for his family. Further, his wife was able to have three more children. 
However, after the collapse of the Derg regime in 1991, the situation turned bad. Host 
communities became very hostile towards the settlers and tensions become daily episodes of life, 
and as a result people started moving away. 
 
Upon his return to his kebele of origin, his close relatives provided him with a 0.25 ha plot to 
establish a house. Given the size of his land, he was not able to produce enough food for his 
family, and thus he started working as daily a labourer for better-off households in the area and a 
nearby town. In 2005 he became a PSNP beneficiary. However, in 2008 things turned bad again 
and he could not get local employment and make his living due to the green famine. Thus the 
PSNP has become the sole source of food and cash for the family. As the situation become very 
severe, even households who used to support him came to him to seek food that he received from 
the PSNP. He said he had to share half of his food with his relatives and friends, and he and his 
family would only have a single meal a day. Currently, he receives for five members and life has 
become normal. His eldest daughter is supporting with income she gets from working as a daily 
labourer. He has a plan to start saving some of the cash he receives, but he has been unable to do 
so thus far as the transfer often comes late and he receives loans from local lenders to cover 
immediate needs. Since he became a PSNP beneficiary, he has been able to send his children to 
school and even local lenders are willing to give him a credit considering his regular income from 
the PSNP. He revealed that since he does not have other assets he could use as collateral, nobody 
would give him a loan if it were not for his PSNP status. Further, he indicated that his social status 
has also improved as he was able build new housing and has a radio. 
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The two life stories narrated in boxes 7.2 and 7.3 capture well how the PSNP has played different 
roles in the lives and livelihoods of vulnerable households in the area of study. In the case of the 
first household (Box 7.2), the PSNP not only helped in covering the food gaps, but also helped in 
creating more assets and building a resilient livelihood system. In a similar manner, in the case of 
the second household (Box 7.3) the story also underlines the dynamics of vulnerability that is 
brought about by the regime change and how that pushed a resilient household to become 
vulnerable and food insecure. Further, it underlines how the PSNP played an additional role 
beyond consumption smoothing. The PSNP helped to enhance the well-being of a household 
through improving the living conditions and acting as a reliable protection/insurance during an 
extreme situation like the green famine of 2008. A continues and regular income from the PSNP 
transfer also improved his status in the community. 
 
However, the life story of a household that is making considerable progress in building resilient 
livelihood system through the support of PSNP and OFSP also underlines the contested issue of 
‘graduation’  from  PSNP.  As  noted  earlier,  the  PSNP  envisages  that  the  beneficiaries  would  
graduate (leave the programme) when they are able to accumulate a certain amount of wealth 
and meet a graduation benchmark that is set by the different regional governments during 
household  asset  registration.  SNNPR’s  graduation  benchmark  is  2,998 birr per capita. 45 However, 
the overwhelming majority of households discussed here indicated that the whole graduation 
process is unclear, unfair and too early before they are able to create even half the assets that are 
necessary to support their families in the face of shocks. The following comments reflect this: 
 
‘PSNP  really  helped  us  to  overcome  the  problems  in  many  regards.  The  important  aspect  of  the  PSNP  
is its continuity and regularity. But recently, the DA had visited our homes and registered the assets 
we have and informed us to be prepared to graduate. This is very worrying for us because we have 
not made much progress in accumulating assets. The assets we have are not enough to cover the 
food  gap  that  PSNP  is  covering  to  us’  (FG_KB/ME-VCG/11/02/2011). 
 
                                                             
 
45 The regional benchmark for Tigray is 5,600 birr per capita, Amhara, 4,200 birr per capita, and Oromia, 
19,187 birr per household. 
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‘This  year  we  are  told  to  graduate  at  least  20 PSNP participants. However, for me this is not realistic 
and I don't think we have this number of people to leave the programme. It is a good idea to 
encourage people to make efforts to develop a saving  culture’  (KI_SA/KEB-DA /12/03/2011). 
 
Interviews with the local authorities in the study area also revealed that they have a plan to 
graduate all public work beneficiaries at the end of 2014, when the current phase of the PSNP 
ends. As noted by the head of woreda food security and early warning in Kacha-Bira: 
‘Initially  we  planned  to  graduate  the  majority  of  PSNP  beneficiaries  in  five  years’  time  [2005–10]. 
However, due to the drought of 2008 and other challenges we face in 2011, we could not materialise 
the plan. Now, we have a new plan that is to graduate all the PSNP public works beneficiaries by 
2014.  This  is  the  plan  we  have  agreed  with  the  zone  and  region  administration’  (KI_KB/WO-
FSEW/05/01/2001). 
 
A study by Sandford et al. (2010) at the national level indicated a similar outlook on graduation to 
that expressed by the beneficiaries and the DAs above. The response by the local authority is a 
classic example of the quota-driven and unrealistic pursuit of graduation that the authorities are 
undertaking and planning across different regions of the country without proper understanding of 
the process of food security and livelihood resilience. Achieving food security and building a 
resilient livelihood system are inherently more complex and longer-term processes than simply 
reaching the graduation benchmark in a short span of time. In the same vein, graduation should 
not be treated narrowly as just reaching a certain cut-off point applicable across the region; 
rather, it should be identified and decided based on local and community indicators. To measure 
the level of resilience that indicates how long a beneficiary household has been able to withstand 
the shock and maintain its livelihood requires the inclusion of a time factor. 
 
7.4.3 DAs’  perspectives 
Given their close attachment to communities at the local level, development agents have first-
hand knowledge about the overall implementation of the programme and the impacts it has had 
on the lives of the programme beneficiaries. Out of eleven development agents interviewed, nine 
said that the PSNP has helped protect destitute and vulnerable households from seasonal and 
unanticipated shocks. They echoed the views of the community that primarily the PSNP has 
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helped to close a chronic food gap that most of the beneficiary households face during the lean 
season, as the following comments show: 
 
‘It  helped  those  very  poor  and  destitute  households  to  stay  where  they  are  and  not  go  down  the  hill  
of poverty and hunger. It also played a role in  increasing  social  recognition  and  school  attendance’  
(KI_SA/KEB-DA/26/02/2011). 
 
‘It  reduced  the  food  gap  they  used  to  face  in  the  past  and  helped  a  few  households  to  create  assets.  
However,  the  payments  are  often  delayed  and  this  is  a  huge  challenge’  (KI_SA/KEB/-DA/27/02/2011). 
 
‘We  are  seeing  very  positive  changes  in  regards  to  the  PSNP.  For  instance  there  are  many  poor  
households who have successfully returned their leased land to themselves and there are also some 
who are able to send their children to  school  after  being  supported  by  the  PSNP’  (KI_SA/KEB-
DA/28/03/2011). 
 
However, the DAs also noted that delays in the transfers and other administrative issues have 
hampered the impacts of the programme, confirming the outlook of focus groups. 
 
In contrast to the majority view, two DAs said that the PSNP is not supporting poor and vulnerable 
households to build a resilient livelihood. They argued that the PSNP is the same as the food-for-
work projects that were undertaken in the past, yet did not bring a significant change in the lives 
of vulnerable households. The following quotes reflect this: 
 
‘Although  the  PSNP  is  much  better  compared  to  other  emergency  support,  its  impact  depends  on  the  
individual beneficiaries. Some households have made good progress in diversifying and increasing 
their  assets,  but  the  majority  of  the  beneficiaries  have  developed  a  “dependency”  culture  and  are  still  
at the same place since the start of the programme. Therefore, the impact of the PSNP at individual 
level is both negative  and  positive’ (KI_SA/KEB-DA/30/01/2011). 
 
‘I  think  the  PSNP  has  been  rolled  out  without  proper  planning  and  mental  preparation  for  both  
beneficiaries and implementers and this is causing a serious challenge for the impact of the 
programme. For instance, we gave a package credit for some of the PSNP beneficiaries, which they 
should be paying back on a rolling basis. However, most of the recipients have used it for different 
purposes and failed to repay. Now, the woreda asked us to deduct the loan from their monthly 
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transfer and as a result these households are getting a very small portion of their actual entitlement. 
Because of such deductions, the PSNP is not effectively helping the recipient households to improve 
their  food  insecurity’  (KI_SA/KEB-DA/28/03/2011). 
 
These findings, particularly the positive role that the PSNP played in smoothing consumption and 
helping in the creation of assets in some cases, are similar to other assessments and appraisals 
that have been undertaken in various parts of the country. Similarly, the full impact of the PSNP 
has been limited due to various factors such as delays in transfers to the beneficiaries and the 
changing prices of food and the occurrence of seasonal droughts and subsequent failures of 
production (Devereux et al. 2008; Ellis and White 2012; Guush et al. 2013). The findings also 
highlight that due to the delays in transfers and their non-arrival when needed badly, the PSNP is 
failing to protect the livelihoods of those households who are already living on the edge and to 
protect chronically food-insecure people from further shocks. As a response to the transfer delays, 
these households resort to irreversible coping strategies such as consumption of seed stocks, 
leasing out land from an area that is already very small for extended periods, which in turn is 
making  them  more  vulnerable  to  future  shocks  and  stress  and  thus  undermining  the  programme’s  
objective of minimising their vulnerability. 
 
7.5 Other Food Security Programmes (OFSP) 
The OFSP is designed to complement the PSNP, and its primary targets are the public work 
participants of the PSNP. It provides a range of complementary household packages (in kind and 
cash forms) to vulnerable households in the programme. The primary role of these packages is to 
diversify and increase the assets of PSNP beneficiaries and subsequently facilitate their graduation 
from the PSNP (Slater et al. 2006: 13). The most popular types of packages delivered across all the 
regions are livestock rearing, fattening of oxen, sheep/goat dairy production, petty trade, 
beekeeping, vegetable production, donkey carts, small-scale irrigation and many others (Devereux 
et al. 2008; Guush et al. 2013). These packages vary from region to region and from household to 
household. For instance, the 2013 evaluation survey identified the most popular activities 
(packages) proposed in business plans in SNNPR include cattle fattening (21 per cent), irrigation 
and water harvesting (16 per cent), soil and water conservation (15 per cent) and input (seeds and 
fertilisers) 15 per cent, with poultry 1 per cent and all others 48 per cent (Guush et al. 2013: 160). 
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Interviews with DAs indicated that they have provided various types of packages to PSNP 
beneficiaries over the five years period. They have further indicated that those few households 
who have received the OFSP packages are able to build their assets and diversify their income. 
However, different factors have affected the wider impacts of the OFSP packages. Interviews with 
the woreda-level food security actors across in all three districts revealed that the OFSP package 
coverage was very limited, reaching few PSNP beneficiaries. As noted by a woreda food security 
coordinator during the discussion: 
‘We  did  not  receive  enough  OFSP  resources  from  the  regional  level  to  provide  to  the  PSNP  
beneficiaries. This put us under serious pressure from the PSNP beneficiaries and we had faced 
difficulties to prioritise and deliver the resources. We identified a few beneficiaries who we deemed 
were proactive and could use the resources and be a model  for  others’  (KI_KB/WO-FSC/05/01/2001). 
 
This shows that lack of resources has been a major challenge in the OFSP. Due to limited 
resources, the woreda actors were forced to spread the available packages among a few 
beneficiaries and prioritise only those who were considered better performing and delivering 
results, bypassing those who are the majority of the poor. As a result, the majority were left out of 
the programme and consequently did not benefit from this programme component. 
 
A key informant interview with the DAs further revealed challenges faced by the OFSP programme 
in their kebeles. Out of eleven DAs interviewed, seven indicated that the size of the OFSP package 
is too small to make a significant contribution in helping the recipients to increase their assets. 
Further, they have highlighted that in most cases the packages were standardised and were not 
tailored to the interests and needs of the beneficiaries, as the following comments reveal: 
 
‘We  have  been  told  to  promote  and  distribute  modern  beehives  while  the  majority  of  the  
beneficiaries in our kebele wanted to have donkey carts and an ox-package’  (KI_SA/KEB-
DA/27/02/2011). 
 
‘During  the  first  round,  we  gave 1,600 birr per beneficiary. This amount is very small if a beneficiary 
household wanted to do small business or other income generating activities such as to run a tea 
shop  or  local  food  store’  (KI_SA/KEB-DA/30/01/2011). 
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In addition to the limitations of size and standardisation of the packages, other administrative 
issues have hampered the impact of the programme. The packages are delivered to the 
beneficiaries as a revolving credit system where the recipients are expected to return the seed 
money after some years. However, many households who have received the packages have failed 
to repay the loans. As a result, the loan recollection responsibility has fallen into the hands of 
woreda and kebele officials and the DAs. Many recipient households were pushed to repay their 
loans by selling whatever meagre assets they possessed. For those who do not have assets to sell 
and pay back, the woreda and kebele administrators have used different mechanisms to collect 
the debts. For instance, a DA in one of the districts indicated that he has deducted the loan from a 
beneficiary’s  monthly PSNP transfer. 
 
The other challenges affecting the outcomes of the OFSP are the level of risks that are associated 
with the livelihood strategies that the beneficiaries are involved in. Most OFSP beneficiaries have 
been involved in on-farm activities where there are inherent and multiple risks such as the 
outbreak of disease (animal and crop), market, rain failures and others. Due to these risks many 
households have lost their investment over time and yet are forced to pay back the loans they 
have received. This situation has put many households into the trap of debt and food insecurity. 
As a result, the packages have become a source of vulnerability rather than supporting 
households’  livelihood resilience against the shocks. 
 
Similarly, DAs have indicated that there was a mismatch between what the beneficiaries wanted 
and the packages that were available both in terms of size and types. In some cases beneficiaries 
received packages they had not asked for and as a result they did not make the best use of them. 
Yet, they were forced to pay back the value of the packages that they received and that the debt 
created by the OFSP became a shock in itself, which required asset depletion to cope with. Overall, 
the impact of the OFSP, similar to other food security programmes and interventions put in place 
to reduce the livelihood vulnerability to food insecurity, has shown a mixed result due to these 
various factors. As a result, it can be argued the food security programmes particularly the 
extension packages and the OFSP are not protecting households from the risk of green famine. 
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7.5.1 Household perspectives 
Households who have received both PSNP and livelihood packages/credit have indicated that they 
were able to increase their assets. Access to credit has enabled them to engage in different 
livelihood activities and earn extra income in addition to that derived from their main source of 
livelihood. However, many respondents indicated that the packages were not tailored to specific 
household needs and interests. As a community focus group participant put it: 
‘In our kebele, the majority of PSNP beneficiaries have received a livestock package, even those who 
have very small plots of land and no access to pasture and feed. How will these people get good 
pasture  and  other  sources  of  feed  to  fatten  their  animals?  I  don’t  understand  why  everyone  should  
receive  the  same  package  while  everyone  has  a  different  livelihood  situation’  (FG_KB/AS-
RCG/16/02/2011). 
 
In contrast, few OFSP beneficiary households indicated that livelihood packages have helped them 
to earn extra income and thus, strengthen their resilience (see Box 7.4).
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Box 7.4: Case study: A household that received a donkey cart as an OFSP package 
 
Mankore is a 35-year-old PSNP beneficiary. He lives with his wife and three children aged two, five 
and nine in Ashira kebele. He has 0.25 ha of land where he grows some enset trees and 
vegetables. His wife takes care of the children and also works as a daily labourer for better-off 
households in the locality. Every morning, he gets up and travels an hour to the nearby town to 
work as a daily labourer. With the money he earns, he buys food for his family. Sometimes he 
comes back empty-handed. He lived in such uncertain conditions for a long time. However, in 
2005, things changed when he became a PSNP beneficiary on the grounds of poor economic/asset 
levels. He receives a transfer for four family members.  
 
In 2007, he received a household package credit worth 1,600 birr and bought a donkey cart. He 
rented a donkey for 10 birr per day from a better-off household. With his donkey cart, he provides 
a service for people who need to transport grain, fuel wood and different items from rural areas to 
the  nearest  town  and  back.  He  also  provides  a  ‘local  ambulance’  service  carrying  sick  people  on  
the donkey cart to the public clinic in Shinshicho town and charges 40 birr for a round trip. He 
makes up to 200 birr a week and contributes 50 birr a week for equb (informal saving/credit 
system). He indicated that, because of the regular income from the transport business and food 
transfer for six months from the PSNP, he does not need to consume his enset from his own farm 
and is keeping it as security for the future. In 2011, he collected 3000 birr from the equb and has 
returned the loan package. He has three big plans for the future: first, he wants to buy a donkey 
and an additional  cart  in  a  year’s  time  (2012);  he  plans  to  work  together  with  his  younger  brother.  
Second, with the money he earns, he wants his wife to start up a petty trade in her kebele. He will 
support his wife by bringing goods from town by using his donkey cart. And third, he wants to 
construct a corrugated iron roof house for his family. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
This chapter examines the contribution of government food security interventions in reducing 
household vulnerability to food insecurity, hunger and green famine in K-T zone. Overall, the food 
security policies and programmes undertaken by the Ethiopian government to address livelihood 
vulnerability to food insecurity, hunger and famine are making some progress. However, they fall 
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short in promoting the livelihoods of the poor and vulnerable households and protecting against 
green famine in the study area due to the various factors identified in this chapter. 
 
Improving the agricultural productivity at the household and national levels through the provision 
of improved seeds and fertilisers is an important step towards improving and ensuring food 
availability and subsequent food security. This has been a tried and tested approach in many 
countries. As Devereux (2001b: 268) noted, the introduction of ‘hybrid maize smallholders in 
Malawi, and Green Revolution in India and other Asian countries have played a critical role in 
achieving the roles of both production increase and food security’. However, putting too much 
emphasis on the increasing productivity and availability of food fails to take into consideration the 
multi-dimensional nature of food security. Food security goes beyond increased food production 
and availability at the household and national levels and addressing only one aspect of an 
entitlement to food cannot go further in ensuring food security and reducing vulnerability to green 
famine. 
 
As discussed in chapters 2 and 5, the enset-dominant livelihood zone in K-T zone has different 
livelihood characteristics from the cereal-dominant zone. In this livelihood zone, root and tuber 
crops such as enset, sweet potato, potato and taro play a significant role for household food 
security. The ongoing extension service is dominated by cereal and cash crops and does not 
include enset and sweet potato in its package. Further, in addition to its inappropriateness, it is 
poorly designed and implemented and favours a few rich peasant farmers with bigger farm plots 
over the poor and vulnerable. Due to these factors, the extension service is increasing the 
susceptibility of households to future shocks and food insecurity and is not protecting households 
particularly the poor and vulnerable from the risk of green famine. 
 
The government should revamp its input delivery and pricing mechanisms and reconsider 
subsidising it so that those poor and vulnerable households who are supposed to be the main 
beneficiaries of the programme have better access. Given the nature of risks associated with 
small-scale agriculture, the impacts of seasonality should be given strong attention and 
introducing certain insurance/guarantee systems (Pankhurst 2009: 11) might be an option to 
mitigate and reduce different risks such as production failure, market volatility, outbreaks of 
animal and crop diseases, and policy-related and other risks. Improving agricultural productivity at 
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household level should work in tandem with other interventions that help to reduce household 
vulnerability by protecting different sets of entitlements.  
 
The AESP should also take on board non-cereal crops such as enset, taro, sweet potato and others, 
which have a proven potential of relieving millions from hunger. Further, the government should 
consider policies outside agriculture that would address vulnerability and promote non-farm 
livelihoods.  
 
Despite the failure to achieve its key goal (the graduation target), the PSNP has helped in reducing 
livelihood vulnerability and enhancing the resilience against shocks that could have pushed those 
vulnerable households over the edge (protection role). It has also helped in improving their well-
being by enhancing their social status in the community. With the availability of regular transfers 
and resources (secured transfer entitlements), the possibility of vulnerable households facing 
acute food insecurity and resultant green famines has reduced. The OFSP that comprises different 
livelihood packages supposed to play an entitlement promotion role (Devereux 2001b) by helping 
the PSNP beneficiaries to create assets and build their resilience against shocks. However, its 
coverage was very limited and the packages were not suitable to a unique livelihood zone in K-T 
zone. In very limited cases where the PSNP was integrated with OFSP, it helped households to 
bounce back from shocks. In the terminology of Frankenberger et al. (2012, cited in Vaitla et al. 
2012: 5), PSNP played both a relatively ‘flat trajectory (bounce back) and downward trajectory 
(recover, but worse off than before’).  
 
However, like other food security programmes and interventions in Ethiopia, the greater impact of 
the PSNP was hindered by various factors. Delay of transfer of resources was one of the main 
obstacles that have negatively affected the outcomes of the PSNP (entitlement protection role) in 
the terminology of Devereux 2001b. The knock-on effect of the resource transfer delay is severe 
on particularly vulnerable and poor households as they often adopt irreversible coping strategies 
such as selling assets, which are often too small to resolve the situation. In turn, the consequence 
of adopting such coping strategies has serious implications on the capacity and resilience of the 
livelihood against shocks in the future and unless, this issue is  properly  addressed,  government’s  
effort to reduce food insecurity, hunger and green famine in the study area could be futile. As 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5, over the past two decades, the resilience of livelihoods in the study 
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area has been in decline and consequently there is growing food insecurity and green famine. 
However, due to insufficient coverage and other reasons identified, the PSNP and OFSP are not 
fully addressing these situations. Thus, the government should consider expansion of the 
programmes by refocusing on entitlement protection and enhancing livelihood resilience of poor 
and destitute groups in K-T zone.  
 
The  policy  of  ‘graduation’  based  on  the  size  of  assets  that  the  beneficiaries  have  accumulated  
during their stay in the programme lacks the central aspect of achieving food security and building 
and maintaining livelihood resilience against shocks. Some households might achieve and reach 
the graduation threshold under normal conditions (without experiencing different covariate and 
idiosyncratic shocks). However, if they face shocks and fall back to their original situation, it can be 
considered as a failure. Thus, graduation should be context-based and seen as achieving resilience 
against shocks over time. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusions and implications for future research 
 
8.1 Summary and conclusions 
This study set out to investigate and understand the underlying causes of famine in general and of 
green famine in particular, in the enset-dominant livelihood zones of Kambata land in southern 
Ethiopia that are historically considered more resilient and less vulnerable to hunger and famine 
than other parts of Ethiopia. The study also aimed at capturing perceptions of people at different 
levels, about the causes of green famine, and sources and trends in vulnerability of rural 
livelihoods. It examined the local dynamics of food insecurity, how households are coping with the 
recurrent shocks and how government policies and programmes are addressing these issues. This 
study employed multi-site, rigorous qualitative research techniques to capture the experiences 
and perceptions of different actors at different levels regarding the causes of green famine in the 
study area.  
 
Rural households in K-T zone engage in diverse livelihood activities to ensure their current food 
needs and secure their future livelihoods. Smallholder and subsistence-oriented agricultural 
production integrated with livestock is the predominant livelihood in the area of study. In addition, 
households also undertake various livelihood activities including daily labouring, selling fuel woods 
and fresh grass, seasonal and long-term migration and caste-based occupations (blacksmithing, 
pottery-making and tanning) on a full- or part-time basis. Caste-based occupations are specialised 
activities primarily undertaken by low caste and minority groups. 
 
Chapter 5 sought to examine the trends and sources of livelihood vulnerability and identify which 
livelihoods are becoming more or less vulnerable to different shocks and stresses and current 
state of livelihoods and food (in)security. The chapter has shown the central role played by enset 
and its contribution to household food security among the Kambata people. The utilisation of 
enset was identified as one of the reasons that the enset-dominant livelihood zones of southern 
Ethiopia are known to be resilient and less affected by hunger and periodic famines, compared to 
the cereal-dominant and pastoral livelihoods in other parts of the country. However, over the last 
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two decades, the enset-dominant livelihoods have lost their resilience against shocks and have 
become more vulnerable, especially to rain-related shocks. As a result the central and regional 
government  early  warning  and  food  security  offices  have  categorised  the  enset  areas  as  ‘hotspot’  
areas for food crises and recurring severe malnutrition. Community discussions, household cases 
studies and in-depth interviews with experts in the area have indicated different factors have 
contributed to the weakening of the resilience of local livelihoods. These factors are of 
natural/climatic, demographic, socio-economic and policy-oriented origin. Among these, the 
persistence of enset bacterial wilt was identified as the most important factor, not only affecting 
mature enset trees and subsequently affecting the production-based entitlement, but also 
disrupting  the  trees’  ‘age-based  succession  and  production  system’  (Dessalegn  1996).  The  
occurrences of drought and seasonal rain failures also significantly affected the resilience of the 
enset livelihood system. When cereal crops fail, the middle and poor wealth groups heavily rely on 
enset as the main source of food and livestock feed. The recurrence of these factors has forced 
many households to consume immature enset and consequently many households have very little 
or no immature enset on their farms. When a shock occurs, susceptible households become 
exposed to hunger and green famine as their production-based entitlement is severely 
compromised. Due to drought, distress sales and shortage of grazing lands, the livestock size and 
production has been in a declining trend over time and these negatively affected the production of 
enset. 
 
As the study was primarily aimed at understanding and unpacking the causes of food insecurity 
and resultant green famine, it approached the causal analysis process through the lens  of  Sen’s  
entitlement analytical framework of famine (Sen 1981). This framework was chosen as it supports 
the identification of a range of different reasons why a household or a community could face 
famine at a given time. Further, this framework outlines that famine occurs not due to a food 
shortage at aggregate level, but when different sets of entitlements of a household fail due to 
various confounding factors. This analytical framework is particularly relevant in the case of food 
insecurity and famine study in Ethiopia, where the dominant discourse still explains the causes of 
food insecurity and famine as a result of food shortages due to natural and demographic aspects 
(too many people, too small farmlands). 
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Chapter 4 presented the central theme of this research – green famine – by tracking its historical 
timeline in Ethiopian famine history and famine research. The term green famine refers to the 
occurrence and spread of food crises and resultant famines in the green and lush enset-dominant 
livelihood zones of southern Ethiopia, historically considered as relatively food-secure areas. 
Despite the existence of green famine in southern Ethiopia since at least the 1980s, it did not 
receive much attention and has failed to attract policy and research interest due to its geographic 
spread outside of ‘the traditional famine  zones’ (northern and central highlands and lowlands) of 
the country (Dessalegn 2009: 43). However, since the beginning of the new millennium it has 
received greater media attention, locally and internationally, as the crisis recurred in 2003, 2008 
and affected more and larger areas. 
 
This study investigated the underlying causes of an increasing vulnerability of the enset-dominant 
livelihood system in Ethiopia. This livelihood system is unique and quite diverse compared to 
cereal-dominant livelihoods in other parts of Ethiopia. The specificities that apply for this context 
include dependence on enset as a staple food source, bi-modal rainfall pattern and heavy reliance 
on belg rains for household food production, and seasonal and permanent migration-based 
livelihood strategies.  
 
The chapter also introduced the conventional narratives around the concept of famine. Despite 
the overall understanding and conception of famine having come a long way since the 1980s, it 
remains fuzzy and contested among different actors. In general, the concept of famine has 
remained an unresolved and divisive issue, particularly among different actors who are involved in 
policy formulation, famine response and management. Some argue that famine is a one-off event 
resulting in great mortality. This view is historically dominant and widely influenced by Malthusian 
thinking. For others, famine is a process with a series of phases and does not necessarily result in 
excess mortality. De Waal (1989: 191), for instance, argued that mortality during famine situations 
is not necessarily related to starvation and hunger, but to poor hygiene and sanitation and health 
services provision. He further explained that affected people do not associate mortality with 
famine  and  that  focusing  on  ‘famine  deaths  and  skeletons’  is  more  the  preoccupation  of  outsiders,  
particularly – in his phrase – ‘famine  tourists’  of  Western  aid  agency  personnel  and  the  media 
(ibid: 30). This latter thinking supports and is consistent with the way famine victims and insiders 
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experience and define famine. Insiders, particularly famine-affected people, have different views 
on hunger and famine compared to outsiders such as famine experts and policy-makers. 
Resonating with this view, the study has shown that the Kambata communities in the study area 
perceive and define famine as a complex process with different phases that causes widespread 
social, economic and well-being suffering for the people. The first phase is shoomma, a minor 
feeling of hunger that occurs when one does not get food at a normal or regular time. The second 
phase is gorro, literally meaning hunger. This is a more severe condition where households face a 
shortage of food. In this phase, the informal social support system within the community is still 
intact and those who are in need can make use of it. The third phase has two sub-levels. The first is 
udufunne/qaa’ne, a situation of extreme food shortage when those affected are failing to receive 
informal support from their relatives and patrons. This is equivalent to a destitution stage where 
households are running out of options. The second sub-level is called yewulle. If external support 
does not arrive at the udufunne level, the situation evolves to yewulle, literally  meaning  ‘being  
swollen’  as  many  of  those  affected  start  showing  symptoms  of  malnutrition,  with  swelling  
particularly in the legs and stomach, which are signs of nutritional oedema. Death is a final stage 
that occurs only when external interventions have failed to arrive on time. These findings are 
consistent with other previous studies such as Mesfin (1984) in Wollo in northern Ethiopia, de 
Waal (1989) in Darfur, Walker (1990) in southern Ethiopia, Deng (1999) in Southern Sudan, Bevan 
and Pankhurst (2004) in different villages in Ethiopia and Degefa (2006) in North-western Ethiopia. 
 
By reviewing the political economy of famine in general and green famine in particular, the study 
highlights several reasons why the issue of green famine has failed to be recognised and 
considered  as  ‘famine’  despite  its  visible  effects  on  the  lives  and  livelihoods of millions of people in 
southern Ethiopia. The following points are key:  
(1) Famine classification in Ethiopia is heavily influenced by historical and political processes 
(de Waal 1989; Lautze and Maxwell 2007) and declaring green famine as  ‘famine’  could  
have negative political and economic consequences for the regional and federal 
government of Ethiopia, both locally and globally, particularly with its donors. 
(2) The geography of famine is a critical factor in the case of green famine, as it happened in 
an ethnically divided regional state with less political importance and weight to influence 
actions at the federal level. Therefore, alarming indicators passed unnoticed and were not 
acted upon (Vadala 2008: 14). 
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(3) The green and lush agro-ecology in the majority of enset-dominant livelihood zones of 
southern Ethiopia has concealed the occurrence of chronic food insecurity and a growing 
livelihood crisis. Thus, improved understanding of the types of livelihood strategies and 
sources of livelihood vulnerability is vital for designing effective policies and responses to 
act on food insecurity and livelihood failures. 
(4) Conceptualising and perceiving famine as a sudden event and attributing its cause with 
weather-induced shocks and demographic and natural factors and results in widespread 
mortality, among influential actors at regional and national level has played a role in failing 
to acknowledge and categorise green famine as famine. 
 
This study challenges the classic view of natural and demographic reasons being responsible for 
food crisis and famine, and demonstrates that the cause of green famine goes beyond the 
dominant narratives of drought and population growth, and that these factors alone cannot fully 
explain the occurrence of famine. The empirical findings, as presented in Figure 4.2, demonstrate 
that green famine is an outcome of multiple vulnerability factors that have been recurring over 
time and affecting the livelihoods of people and their entitlements to food in K-T zone. These 
causal factors include changing pattern of rainfall distribution, recurrent drought, inappropriate 
policy intervention and poor implementation, lack of employment opportunities, decreasing land 
size, failure to acknowledge (denial and cover-ups, underestimation of acute food insecurity and 
famine conditions) and respond by state and relevant government actors, poor understanding of 
growing vulnerability situation and limited research. Due to these diverse factors, livelihoods for 
many have already weakened over a long period. Green famine has been coming for some time, 
although it was only recognised by outsiders, particularly policy-makers, in more recent years. The 
findings are specific to this livelihood context; however, they shed light on conceptions of food 
insecurity and famine by introducing a multiple-causes perspective and challenge the dominant 
discourse of causes of food insecurity and famine in Ethiopia invariably associated with natural 
and demographic factors. In so doing, this study highlighted the significance of political and policy 
processes (human action or the role of state and non-state actors) in increasing livelihood 
vulnerability to different shocks over time and facilitates the development of insecurity and 
progression of famine situation. Understanding how the political and policy process have 
negatively affected the resilience of livelihoods of people over time helps to improve the general 
conception of famine as a long-term vulnerability process rather than a sudden event affecting 
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certain geographic or livelihood zones and their poor and vulnerable populations. By unpacking 
these causal factors, the study helps to improve our understanding of the causes of contemporary 
famines in famine prone regions of Africa and adds to the existing literature on theories of famine 
in general. 
 
The findings indicate that different policies introduced over time in the area have played a 
significant role in increasing the vulnerability of people and creating a context conducive to the 
occurrence of green famine in the study area. The introduction of inappropriate agricultural 
policies favouring cereal and cash crop cultivation over enset in a traditionally enset-dominant 
area have played a significant role in increasing household and community vulnerability to food 
insecurity and green famine. At the same time, lack of policy attention to enset, a culturally 
important staple crop, also contributed to the occurrence of green famine. 
 
The introduction of an ethnic-based federal system in Ethiopia in the early 1990s restricted the 
movement of people from one region to another, and hence reduced their access to seasonal 
employment opportunities (Lautze and Maxwell 2007: 229). This particularly affected the Kambata 
ethnic groups in the study area who are renowned for their seasonal migration to different regions 
(Alemayehu 2001: 10). This change has hindered access to seasonal employment in neighbouring 
regions for many people from the study area, directly affecting their labour-based entitlements. 
Due to this policy, ethnic tensions and conflicts have occurred resulting in loss of livelihoods and 
reverse migration of people who used to live permanently in other regions back to K-T zone. In 
addition to this, during the regime change in 1991, many soldiers who were in the army during the 
previous government were demobilised and returned to their localities, adding more pressure to 
the already low cultivatable land availability. Thus, the returnees and demobilised soldiers have 
become prospective vulnerable groups for future shocks. The study area is one of the most 
densely populated in Ethiopia with a total population of 698,616 and 584 persons per sq.km in 
Doyo-Gena, Kacha-Bira and Kadida-Gamela districts, significantly higher than both the regional 
and national-level densities, which are 164 and 76 respectively (2012 projection). The area has 
experienced a very fast population growth over a decade; in 1999, the estimated population 
density in Kacha-Bira and Kadida-Gamela was 413 and 499 persons per sq.km respectively 
(Belachew 2001: 128). As a result of a rapidly growing population and restricted movements to 
other regions, the average land-holding size has reduced and in most cases has reached a sub-
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optimal size to produce enough food to support a household. As a result, many peasant farmers 
have faced regular food shortages because they are unable to produce enough food even in years 
considered normal in terms of rain distribution. This is further compounded by a loss of seasonal 
employment income and increasing food prices. As a result of these complex factors the majority 
of households were in a chronic food insecurity situation. This situation has increased their 
vulnerability to future shocks and results in hunger and green famine. 
 
The study also identified factors that have played a role in triggering the occurrence of green 
famine. These factors include the failure of gillalo/belg rain and subsequent belg crop production 
failure, an outbreak of sweet potato wilt disease, the sudden hike of food prices (in some markets 
up to 300 per cent in 2008) and response failure by the authorities. In particular, the denial and 
under-reporting of the magnitude of the crisis during the 2007–08 green famine, played a major 
role in spreading  the  effect  to  wider  areas.  In  Lautze  and  Maxwell’s  terminology  (2007),  the  
‘politicisation  of  famine’  has  become  a  major  concern  in  the  current  political  landscape  because  
regions and zones reporting larger numbers of emergency caseloads are considered to be not 
performing well in the view of the regional and federal authorities. 
 
In sum, the occurrence of the above factors has negatively affected the resilience of the enset-
dominant livelihood and has increased household vulnerability to food insecurity and green 
famine. The findings of this study also indicated that the majority of communities perceive a 
significant change in the community wealth groups over the last ten years: many households are 
becoming poorer and destitution is growing. The empirical findings highlight that the overall 
production of food crops in the area is decreasing due to increasing prices of inputs, recurrence of 
rain failures, decreasing land plot sizes and policy-related issues, resulting in an expanding food 
insecurity situation. This was demonstrated by the increasing number of people in the study area 
surviving on different government emergency relief over the last 15 years. For instance, during 
2007–08, of a total of 783,610 people in K-T zone, 26 per cent faced extreme food shortages and 
survived through emergency relief and 13 per cent through the regular government PSNP support 
and  5  per  cent  were  declared  ‘at  risk  and  required  close  monitoring’  for  possible  emergency  
support. 
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Chapter 6 also investigated famine thresholds and indicators of famine scales and measurements 
by different external actors and famine scholars in measuring and classifying food crises and 
famine  levels.  By  analysing  Howe  and  Devereux’s  famine  severity  and  magnitude  scales  and  the  
FAO’s  IPC  scale, I have critiqued and indicated their weaknesses in famine measurement and 
classification. These two scales have included the significance of coping strategies as indicators of 
the severity of famine in a given context, but their measurement and classification of famine is 
heavily based on the results of anthropometric malnutrition measurements and crude/under-five 
mortality rates. I have challenged this widely held view by suggesting alternative famine 
measurements and scales to judge the severity and magnitude of famine. This study demonstrated 
that  understanding  and  defining  famine  based  only  on  those  indicators  considered  ‘objective  and  
scientific’  is  misleading.  The  causes  of  these  indicators  such  as  malnutrition  and  higher  mortality  
are more complex and not necessarily directly related to hunger and famine. Collecting and 
analysing nutrition survey is more complex and requires very elaborate logistic provisions and 
human and financial resources. Further, this study has argued that the current thresholds of 
quantitative indicators and anthropometric outcomes that are used to declare a famine are very 
high and waiting until these thresholds have been reached is causing unnecessary suffering of 
people and livelihood deterioration and undermining efforts to prevent famine occurring in the 
future. Thus, this study suggested considering lower cut-off levels for GAM, SAM and mortality 
rates so that livelihood destitution is averted, full-blown famine is prevented and famine suffering 
can be stopped at an earlier stage. The revised famine scale (Handino famine scale) addresses 
these challenges by incorporating the perceptions of famine victims and types of coping strategies 
adopted along with reduced thresholds for anthropometric and mortality rates in its famine 
analysis and classification.  
 
This study has shown how these famine scales and measurements that are considered as 
‘objective  and  scientific’  by  these  actors  are  missing  a  central  point  in  defining  and  measuring  of  
food crisis and famine events. They failed to consider and incorporate the views, perceptions, 
experiences and coping strategies that are adopted by famine victims and communities that are 
directly affected by the incident. The idea of including coping strategies as predictors of impending 
food crisis and famine particularly in famine early warning systems, has been around for quite 
some time, and hence this research does not claim it as a new concept. However, what this study 
argues and demonstrates is that locally defined and culturally and livelihood specific coping 
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strategies can also be applied to measure the severity of a famine situation. This study argues that 
the current and conventional understanding of famine, which views famine as an event of food 
crisis resulting in greater mortality, is playing a role in delay and failure of famine response and 
livelihood failure. Thus, failing to define famine as a process and response failure by concerned 
actors are major factors in the continued occurrence of famine and resultant suffering for 
hundreds of thousands in Africa in particular.  
 
By adopting local experiences and the perceptions and particularly the conception of famine 
victims, the study investigated food insecurity and green famine situation in the context of the 
enset-dominant livelihood zone in southern Ethiopia and categorised as a minor famine as 
opposed to simply food crisis situation by the Government of Ethiopia and different actors. The 
definition and concept of famine of the Kambata community supports the emerging view put 
forward by different famine scholars that perceives famine as a process, which is defined not only 
by mortality but also by its effect and the loss that it causes in the livelihood of people and the 
strain caused to the social fabric and support system of the community in the short and long term. 
Despite the fact that the local perceptions and type of irreversible coping strategies adopted by 
households during the food crisis and green famine periods apply to this specific context, they also 
can be applied in different livelihood, social and political contexts. As Chapter 6 shows, unless the 
magnitude of the crisis is too severe and is beyond the coping capacity of households, they do not 
adopt irreversible coping strategies that will have severe ramifications on the long-term viability 
and impacts on their livelihoods. To reiterate, households do not opt for irreversible, culturally 
unacceptable coping strategies unless they are facing famine. As shown in this research, during the 
green famine of 2007–08 some  households  even  ‘lent’  their  own  children  to  other  people  to  get  
access emergency relief provided by international humanitarian agencies. In a culture and society 
where children are very much valued, considered as sources of future pension and ‘means of 
continuity of a household and  clan’  (Belachew  2001:  216)  this exploitation of children indicates 
how severe a situation has become. Further, renting out land for extended period or selling other 
livelihood assets that have strong cultural and sentimental values, consumption of seeds that are 
meant for future production, consuming and abandoning livestock (in the case of pastoral 
communities) also indicate the severity of famine. 
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The study investigated how  the  government’s  food  security  policies,  programmes  and  strategies  in  
place  are  addressing  and  reducing  households’  livelihood  vulnerability  to  food  insecurity  and  green 
famine in the study area. It particularly investigated three specific food security strategies and 
programmes: (1) the agricultural extension programme, (2) the Productive Safety Net Programme, 
and (3) the Other Food Security Programmes, now called the Household Asset Building 
Programme.  
 
The findings highlight that understanding food insecurity and famine, as being a result of food 
availability shortage and consequently designing nationwide policies supporting greater 
agricultural output and food availability at national and local level, cannot fully address the 
structural problems of food insecurity across the country. Although designing agricultural policies 
that increase food production at the household and national levels is a significant step in the right 
direction  given  the  country’s  subsistence-oriented agricultural system, improved production alone 
is not enough to ensure food security and stave off famine. Case studies, community discussions 
and key informant interviews with relevant actors in this sector have strongly indicated that the 
cereal and cash crop focused extension services are not appropriate in the context of enset-based 
livelihood zones. It was found that the majority of households who participated and received the 
credit package have become indebted due to recurrent production failures and hence the 
extension programme has actually contributed to their vulnerability as a policy-induced factor 
reducing household livelihood capacity against future shocks. Thus, it can be argued that the 
agricultural extension programme is not protecting the poor and vulnerable households from the 
risk of green famine in K-T zone. This advocates for policies and strategies aimed at addressing 
various vulnerabilities (social, economic, policy-oriented, political and natural) affecting 
livelihoods, rather than merely striving to increase agricultural productivity. The findings also 
indicated that the agricultural policies are designed on a one-size-fits-all approach without proper 
consideration of differences that exist within the country. This calls for policies and strategies that 
are tailored and specific to particular livelihoods that exist in each region. 
 
This study shows that despite various challenges related to effective implementation, the PSNP is 
playing a significant role in reducing the hunger gap, protecting vulnerable households against 
further asset depletion and strengthening livelihood resilience against diverse shocks. By ensuring 
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regular food availability and access for targeted vulnerable households, the PSNP reduced their 
susceptibility to acute food shortage that exposes them to green famine.  
 
The findings of this research have highlighted that the Other Food Security Programme (OFSP) 
does not achieve its objectives, particularly that of increasing the assets of vulnerable households, 
for the study population. The programme’s  effects  are  hampered  by  various  administrative  and  
other related factors in the study area, the most important of which are the small size of livelihood 
packages, the small number of beneficiaries targeted and the inappropriateness of packages for 
the livelihood zone. 
 
The findings show how the growing and deepening livelihood crises have pushed households to 
diversify within and beyond agricultural production, with migration coming to the fore as an 
important response. Internal migration to larger urban centres in Ethiopia as well as migration 
overseas to South Africa (mostly by young male household members), the Middle East and the 
Gulf States (preferred by young women) is rapidly growing. The study results indicated that 
migration (both types) is playing an important role in strengthening the resilience of livelihood 
systems for many households in the study area. Thus, the government should consider developing 
policies that allow and encourage the movement of people to search for employment 
opportunities outside their region and country and should provide proper protection.  
 
The findings highlight some critical areas for policy reviews. The Ethiopian government should 
address challenges facing poor and vulnerable households in accessing agricultural inputs through 
the provision of subsidies, offering certain insurance/guarantee systems to poor and vulnerable 
households. Further, the agricultural extension service should include enset and other root and 
tuber crops in its package, for the promotion of and support to improved local agriculture 
production. The government should promote different non-agricultural livelihoods and allow free 
movement of people to different parts of the country when seeking labour and employment. 
 
8.2 The contribution of the study to understanding the causes of famine in Ethiopia, 
knowledge and theories of famine and famine measurements 
This research has unpacked the underlying causes of food insecurity and green famine in southern 
Ethiopia. The findings highlight that the enset-based livelihood system is severely strained and 
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rapidly deteriorating. Although livelihoods in K-T had deteriorated over a long period of time, the 
extent of vulnerability only became widely evident during the first green famine in 2000 and later 
in 2003. However, in spite of plentiful evidence that the situation, particularly the 2007–08 green 
famine, was severe enough to be considered a minor famine, the situation was regarded as only a 
localised food crisis (likened with ‘pre-famine’ conditions) and, thus, responses were muted. This 
study has identified the existing gap in vulnerability and famine studies in Ethiopia, particularly in 
enset-dominant livelihood zones, and hence has attempted to raise the profile and understanding 
of green famine and indicate further directions for research and policy. By applying a holistic 
livelihood vulnerability lens, this research contributes to an overall understanding of the causes of 
food insecurity and famine in Ethiopia, which is mainly focused on one aspect of entitlements 
(production-based entitlements) at the household level. This research contributes important new 
insights to understanding the dynamics of famine and vulnerability in the SNNP region, where 
future emergencies are more likely, given existing trends of worsening vulnerability.  
 
This study contributes towards famine theory by identifying multiple causes of contemporary 
famines. By using Sen’s  analytical  framework  of  ‘entitlement  to  food’ this study identified how the 
failure of different sets of entitlements of people caused a green famine. Further, the study 
identified how various policy-induced shocks (inappropriate and poorly implemented polices) and 
response failures have played a role in increasing households’  vulnerability  to  food  insecurity  and  
famine.  
 
As another important contribution to the field of famine concepts, measurements and 
classification, the study raises the issue of subjective indicators in understanding, defining and 
measuring famine. Subjective indicators such as the perceptions and experience of affected 
people and communities and their various coping strategies are essential for revealing the 
intensity and magnitude of a famine situation. This study demonstrates that inclusion of these 
indicators will improve the early detection and therefore prevention of large-scale suffering due to 
occurrence of famine. As the findings of this study indicate, households do not resort to 
irreversible and socially unacceptable coping strategies unless the severity of the prevailing food 
crisis and famine is beyond their individual capacity and the informal community support system. 
The limitation of existing responses to famine is that humanitarian support only kicks in after 
certain thresholds (defined by various anthropometric and nutrition indicators) are reached; yet 
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many households falling into famine will have already depleted their assets by this point, and 
informal social support will often no longer be available. The strength of the Handino scale is that 
it gives due importance to the views and perceptions of the famine victims and the types of locally 
defined coping strategies alongside anthropometric measurements and cut-offs. The use of local 
perceptions in famine early warning systems (as proposed in the Handino famine scale) would 
imply that a situation could be classified as a famine earlier and thus open the gates to emergency 
support sooner than might otherwise be the case. This would necessarily help to prevent needless 
suffering as well as further asset depletion. In other words, unlike the IPC and Howe and Devereux 
famine intensity scales, the Handino scale is a more famine-prevention-oriented tool that helps in 
identification and classification of famine situation. 
 
8.3 Implications for future research 
This study has identified the livelihood strategies, sources of vulnerability and current state of food 
security and livelihoods in three districts in southern Ethiopia. Recently, the Food Economy Group 
has undertaken large-scale livelihood studies in different parts of Ethiopia dividing the country into 
175 livelihood zones by applying the household economy approach. These studies, however, focus 
more on food production and availability aspects of food security with little or no research on 
scrutinising how government policies are affecting the livelihood situations. Thus, future research 
needs to look at the vulnerability and the current state of food insecurity of the wider enset-based 
livelihood zones across the country. Undertaking such a large-scale vulnerability study to identify 
different types of livelihood strategies and sources of livelihood vulnerability would paint a clearer 
picture of the current food security and livelihood situation and could help avoid further green 
famines.  
 
Despite the considerable progress made, the threat of food crises and famines remains eminent in 
Africa. Devereux (1993a), de Waal (1989) and others argued that response and accountability 
failure is a main cause of contemporary famines in Africa. Edkins (2007: 61) echoed similar views 
on  how  response  failure  is  playing  a  role  in  famine  causation,  saying  ‘If [famines] are not produced 
deliberately,  then  they  are  often  allowed  to  progress  beyond  the  stage  of  “famishment”  to  
“morbidity”,  through  deliberate  or  negligent  inaction  on  the  part  of  those  who  could  intervene  to  
save  lives  and  livelihoods’.  A future study should look into how the operational aspect of the 
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Handino famine scale with reduced thresholds and strong emphasis on subjective indicators of 
famine can inform contingency planning and preparedness to improve early response to avoid 
famine progress and livelihood deterioration. 
 
Future studies should look into how the Handino famine scale can be field tested and integrated 
with other subjective food security indicators such as reduced coping strategies index (rCSI) 
advanced by Maxwell et al. (2008) to establish and define more nuanced famine indexes that are 
applicable across different contexts.  
 
This study has revealed the significance of informal social support systems in famine situations and 
how famine affects larger segments of populations once the system breaks down. In order to 
sustain an informal social support system, future studies could look into whether food insecurity 
and famine interventions should also focus on the provision of some forms of entitlements 
promotion supports to the middle-level wealth categories, while providing entitlement protection 
supports to the poor and destitute groups. 
 
This study was initiated based on my personal and professional curiosity to understand why the 
enset dominant livelihood zone is becoming more vulnerable to food insecurity and green famine. 
I was fortunate to be born in the Kambata highlands where for many, hunger and famine was not 
a daily reality at that time. However, over the last two decades, the state of livelihood and food 
security of the Kambata highlands has changed. As one of my key informants during the fieldwork 
had succinctly put it ’It  is  green  from  outside  but  there  is  trouble  inside’.  This  area, once 
considered as food secure and less affected by famines ravaging other parts of the country, has 
become vulnerable to food insecurity and green famine. Why are these local livelihoods becoming 
more vulnerable and what are the underlying causes of green famine? These are the questions I 
have attempted to find an answer to in this study. Unless the prevailing livelihood vulnerability 
factors are properly addressed through livelihood specific policies and interventions, the 
livelihoods will continue to deteriorate and food insecurity and wider scale green famine will occur 
and reoccur. During my fieldwork, I have also witnessed some positive developments, as some of 
the government policies such as the safety net programme are playing a protective role, 
preventing vulnerable households from sliding further into destitution.  
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I hope the research on green famine will not end after the completion of my study. I hope by 
raising the profile and understanding of green famine and identifying its causes, I have paved a 
way for future policies and research to prevent the occurrence of food insecurity and green famine 
in the study area and other enset dominant parts of Ethiopia.  
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Appendix 1: Fieldwork instruments 
 
CHECKLIST FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS AND PRA EXERCISES WITH DIFFERENT COMMUNITY 
GROUPS 
 
Timeline and Chronologies 
1. What are the main events happened that positively or negatively affected livelihoods of the 
people in the history of this kebele/area since 2001? 
 
Wealth ranking and livelihood activities of different wealth groups 
1. What are the main wealth groups in this kebele/area currently? (Use local names for these 
groups e.g. Rich (Duubala\qabaxxammu), middle (Mererancho), poor (buxxichu), and destitute 
(wienna buxxichu). 
2. What were the main wealth groups in this area five years ago? 
3. What were the main wealth groups in this area ten years ago? 
4. Why there are more rich/middle/poor/destitute groups during these three periods of time? 
5. What are the social and economic criteria for wealth differences in this area? 
6. What are the major livelihood activities for each wealth group? (List only the top 2 or 3) 
7. What proportion of the community belongs to each group? 
8. How many months a year does each group have a food shortage?  
9. Have there been any changes in social and economic characteristics for each of the wealth 
groups since 2007/08? 
10. If yes, please explain why? 
 
Trends in livelihoods and vulnerability 
1. What are the main types of shocks affecting the livelihoods of people in this Kebele? 
2. Please rank the three main shocks affecting households in this area.  
3. How does the trend of these shocks look like? 
4. Increasing, decreasing, no change?  
5. Please also explain if these shocks are policy related, political, economic or natural 
6. What changes were there since 2007/08 in what people are doing to make their living? 
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7. Why have there been changes? What  factors  have  caused  people’s  livelihoods  to  change?  
(Natural, historical, political, others please explain). (Ask the participants to rank factors that 
caused changes in livelihood in order of importance) 
8. What sorts of households are the most vulnerable to food shortages and why? (Rank them in 
order of importance) 
9. Which households emerged as winners against shocks and risks that faced the community and 
why? (Rank in order of importance) 
10. Overall, do you think the livelihoods in this area are becoming more or less vulnerable to 
hunger and periodic famines, or is there no change over time? 
11.  If vulnerability is changing, why? 
12. Do you know anyone in the community who had been in Oromia and Sidama areas for long 
times, but has returned to this community after the fall of the Derg regime? 
13. If yes, where are they? 
14. Who provided them land upon return? 
15. What is your opinion on ethnic based regionalism and its impact on free movement of people 
in search of wage labor opportunities? 
 
Community consultation on the underlying causes of green famine 
1. What is hunger? What is its name in local language (Kambatissa)? 
2. What is famine? What is its name in local language? 
3. What do you recall about the food crisis that affected this community in the past 15 years?  
4. Recall the years in your lifetime that this community was affected by famine? What do you 
recall about those years? 
5. What is your understanding about green famine? 
6. Is there any local name given to green famine? If yes, what does it mean and please elaborate! 
7. What are the characteristics of green famine? 
8. What are the similarities and differences between famine of 1984 (ye seba sebat dirq) and 
green famine? Would you name the latter a famine? If not, why? 
9. What is your perception about the causes of green famine? 
10. Do you think drought is the main cause of green famine? Please elaborate.  
11. What are the trigger factors of green famine? 
12. What is the overall impact of green famine on the livelihoods of people? 
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13. Who were the livelihood groups most affected by the green famine? (Rank by livelihood 
group) Why? 
14. What are the ways people cope with food shortages in this community?  
15. What unusual coping strategies households in this community adopted to get through the 
impacts of green famine? 
16. What are the factors contributed to the change of the coping strategies over times? 
17. What is the impact of adopting these unusual coping strategies on the livelihoods of people? 
18. Were there any unusual mortality and morbidity in the community during the green famine 
time? If yes, how many people died in this community? 
19. Which age group was the most affected (children, elderly, pregnant women, others)? 
20. What were their causes of death (starvation, disease, others)? 
21. Has it been reported to the Woreda offices and received response? If yes, was it adequate and 
timely response? 
22. Do you think is it conceivable to experience another green famine in this area in the future? If 
yes, what is your argument? If not, why do you think it will happen again? 
 
Community perceptions on agricultural production 
1. What is the most valuable crop in your farm currently and before green famine? Why? 
2. Does the importance of these crops have changed over time? Why? 
3. Compare with reference year, would you say that the total production of your: 
Type of crop Area coverage in 
timad 
Increasing Decreasing Staying the same Why 
Cereals      
Perennial crops (Coffee 
fruits) 
     
Enset(false banana)      
Vegetables      
Eucalyptus      
Pasture      
Spices      
Others      
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Informal social supports system 
1. Please indicate the type informal social support systems that exist in the community to help 
you to overcome shocks and household food shortages? 
 
Type of social support system Reference year During the green famine 
(2007/08) 
Currently 
Iddire    
Serra    
Gezzima    
Goggotta    
    
 
2. How have these types of informal social support systems changed from the past? 
3. What are the factors contributed to the change of the coping strategies over times? 
4. What was the impact of green famine on the informal social networks and community 
solidarity? 
 
Government’s  food  security  policy  and  its  effectiveness 
1. What supports did you receive through the regular agricultural extension service? 
2. Do you think chronically food insecure and destitute households are benefiting from the 
agricultural extension package service in this area? If not, why not? 
3. Is the extension package is tailored to your needs and livelihood system? 
4. If not, please explain 
5. What is the impact of the extension service program in reducing further food shortage and 
hunger in your family? 
6. What are the main challenges you face in accessing agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and 
improved seeds? Who is the supplier of the agricultural inputs? 
7. What is your perception about the ongoing food security programs (AESP, PSNP, OFSP) in 
addressing livelihood vulnerability and seasonal hunger? 
 
CHECKLIST OF INTERVIEWS WITH THE DEVELOPMENT AGENTS (DAS) 
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Sources of livelihood vulnerability 
1. What are the main types of shocks affecting the livelihoods of people in this Kebele? 
2. Please rank the three main shocks affecting households in this area.  
3. How does the trend of these shocks look like? 
4. Increasing, decreasing, no change?  
5. Please also explain if these shocks are policy related, economic, political or natural 
6. Which livelihoods are the most vulnerable to these shocks? 
7. Why are these livelihoods more vulnerable? 
8. Which livelihoods are adapting the shocks well and are resilient? 
9. Why are these livelihoods adapting well? 
 
Government food security policies and their effectiveness 
1. What livelihood packages did you deliver for households? 
2. What agricultural extension services are available in this kebele? 
3. What role do you think the agricultural extension package program played for vulnerable 
households’  food  security? 
4. Do you think the ongoing agricultural extension service program that comprise various 
package sis tailored to the need and interest of vulnerable and chronically food insecure 
households in this Kebele? 
5. If not, what additional packages would help to support the household food security? 
6. What are the main challenges you are facing in delivering the package program? 
7. How well are the farmers in this Kebele adopting the inputs particularly improved seeds and 
fertilizers? If the trend is changed, what are the reasons? 
8. What are the main challenges you are facing in implementing PSNP? 
9. What is the impact of the PSNP thus far in addressing the livelihood vulnerability and ensuring 
the wellbeing of vulnerable households in this Kebele? 
 
Green famine 
1. What do you recall about the food crisis that affected this community in 2007/08/ 
2. What is your understanding about hunger? 
3. What is your understanding about famine? 
4. What do you understand under the term green famine? 
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5. What do you think the underlying causes of green famine are? 
6. What do you think the trigger factors of green famine are? 
7. What was the overall impact of green famine on various livelihood systems in this district? 
8. Was anyone from this district admitted to the emergency feeding centers during the green 
famine? If yes, when and what support did they receive? 
9. Were there any deaths during the green famine? 
10. If yes, please ask and note the following: 
 Sex of the person:_____________________ 
 Age at time of death:____________________ 
 Cause of death:_________________________ 
11. What is your opinion about the current food security responses (PSNP, OFSP and VRP) in 
addressing the food security situation in this district? Please elaborate in detail 
12. Do you think is it conceivable to experience another green famine in this area in the future? If 
yes, what is your argument? If not, why do you think it will happen again? 
 
WOREDA LEVEL KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS  
 
Total population of the Woreda__________________ 
Male: ______________________________________ 
Female: ____________________________________ 
Returnees: __________________________________ 
Ex-soldiers: __________________________________ 
PSNP beneficiaries: ___________________________ 
Non-PSNP: __________________________________ 
Others specify: _______________________________ 
 
Crop production 
1. Request the district office of Agriculture and Rural Development (BOARD) about the crop 
production data for the last 10 years, for the main crops in the Woreda. Fill the following table 
for yields of various crops. 
2. In the year xxx, why there was an overall crop production increased/decreased in the region?  
3. What were the reasons that caused? 
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Food aid distribution 
1. Gather information on the quantities and distribution of food aid (through Government and 
NGOs/WFP) by year for the last 10 years for the divisions within the District.  
2. In the year xxx, why there was a large increase in food aid? 
3. What are the reasons and what caused the crisis? 
4. In the year xxx, why the food aid need was very small compared to others? 
5. Please elaborate the reasons? 
 
Sources of livelihood vulnerability 
1. What are the main types of shocks affecting the livelihoods of people in this district? 
2. Please rank the three main shocks affecting households in this area.  
3. How does the trend of these shocks look like? 
4. Increasing, decreasing, no change? 
5. Please also explain if these shocks are policy related, economic, political or natural  
6. Which livelihoods are the most vulnerable to these shocks? 
7. Why are these livelihoods more vulnerable? 
8. Which livelihoods are adapting the shocks well and are resilient? 
9. Why are these livelihoods adapting well? 
 
Government food security policies and their effectiveness 
1. What livelihood packages did you deliver to the communities?  
2. What agricultural extension services are available in this district? 
3. What role do you think the agricultural extension package program played for vulnerable 
households’  food  security? 
4. What are the impacts of the food security policy responses (AESP, PSNP, OFSP) in addressing 
the livelihood vulnerability and ensuring wellbeing of people in this district? 
5. What are the main challenges you faced in delivering the PSNP in this district? 
6. What are the main challenges you faced in delivering the regular extension package 
(particularly seeds and fertilizers) to households? 
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Green famine 
1. Can you tell me how many times have communities been hit hard by hunger in this district in 
the last 15 years? 
2. What do you recall about the food crisis that affected this community in 2007/09?  
3. Was it the first time this district faced a food crisis of that magnitude? 
4. What do you understand under the term green famine? 
5. Would you name it a famine? If not, why not? 
6. What do you think the underlying causes of green famine are? 
7. Do you think a drought is responsible for it or there were other factors? Please explain 
8. What are the similarities and differences between famine of 1984 (ye seba sebat dirq) and 
green famine? 
9. What do you think the trigger factors of green famine are? 
10. What was the overall impact of green famine on various livelihood systems in this district? 
11. Was anyone from this district admitted to the emergency feeding centers during the green 
famine? 
12. If yes, when and what support did they receive? 
13. Were there any deaths during the green famine? 
14. If yes, please ask and note the following: 
 Sex of the person:_____________________ 
 Age at time of death:____________________ 
 Cause of death:_________________________ 
15. Has it been reported to the zonal or regional level Government offices? 
16. If yes, did you receive adequate and timely response? 
17. In your opinion, is it conceivable to have such a food crisis in the future in this area? 
18. If yes, why? If not, why not? 
 
REGIONAL LEVEL INTERVIEWS (BoARD, DPPA, SARI, FOOD SECURITY AND EARLY WARNING 
COORDINATION OFFICE, BoFED) 
 
Total population of the Region: _______________________ 
Male: ___________________________________________ 
Female: _________________________________________ 
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PSNP beneficiaries: ________________________________ 
Non-PSNP: _______________________________________ 
Others specify: ____________________________________ 
 
1. Request the regional bureau of agriculture and rural development (BoARD) about crop 
production data for the last 10 years, for the main crops in the region.  
2. In the year xxx, why there was an overall crop production increased/decreased in the region? 
Please elaborate 
 
Food aid distribution 
1. Gather information from the bureau of the regional Disaster Prevention and Preparedness 
Agency or Food Security and Early Warning Coordination Bureau on the quantities and 
distribution of food aid (through Government and NGOs/WFP) by year for the last 10 years. 
2. In the year xxx, why there was a large increase in food aid need?  
3. What are the reasons and what caused the crisis? 
4. In the year xxx, why the food aid need was very small compared to other years? 
5. Please elaborate the reasons? 
6. What are the main types of shocks affecting the livelihoods of people in this region? 
7. Please rank the three main shocks affecting households in this region. 
8. How does the trend of these shocks look like? 
9. Increasing, decreasing, no change? 
10. Please also explain if these shocks are policy related, economic or natural 
11. Who are the districts chronically vulnerable to shocks and hunger? Why these districts are 
more vulnerable than others? 
12. What are the impacts of the food security policy responses (AESP, PSNP, OFSP) in addressing 
the livelihood vulnerability and ensuring wellbeing of people in this region? 
 
Government food security policies and their effectiveness (SARI) 
1. What is the role of non-cereal crops in attaining household food security in the region? Please 
elaborate. 
2. What is the policy and research direction towards promoting non-cereal food crops in the 
region? 
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3. What are the main challenges faced by the enset production in this region? 
4. Compared to the last 10 years, how is the total production of enset in the region? Is it 
increasing, decreasing or without change? 
5. If increasing, what are the reasons? 
6. If decreasing, what are the reasons? 
7. What specific research and policy support is provided to promote enset crop in this region? 
8. How effective is the policy and research support provided towards enset crop? 
 
Hunger and Famine 
1. What is your understanding of hunger? 
2. What is your understanding of famine? 
3. When do you categorize and label a food crisis as a famine? Please elaborate in detail 
4. What do you recall about the food crisis that affected Ethiopia in general and the Southern 
part of Ethiopia in particular in 2007/08? 
5. What do you know about the term green famine in SNNPR? Can you elaborate? 
6. Would you name this a famine? If not, why? 
7. Is it the first time this part of the country has experienced a famine of that magnitude after 
1984? Have there been other times a green famine happened after 2007/08? 
8. If yes, when was it? 
9. What do you think the underlying causes of green famine are? 
10. Do you think a drought is responsible for it or there were other factors? 
11. Please explain 
12. What do you think of the trigger factors of green famine are? 
13. Were there any deaths during the green famine? 
14. If yes, do you have a report on sex, Age and causes of the death and can you share it?  
15. Has it been reported to the UN and donor countries for an intervention? 
19. In your opinion, is it conceivable to have green famine in the future in this region? If yes, why? 
If not, why not? 
 
Green famine and early warning system 
1. Can you explain about how the early warning information system functions in this region? 
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2. What early warning information is collected from the Woreda and kebele levels to detect 
impending crisis? Who collects the information? 
3. How often is the early warning information collected? 
4. Is the information livelihood based? 
5. If the early warning information system is in place, why did it fail to capture the crisis of the 
green famine on time? 
6. What were the gaps in the early warning information system? 
7. How was the response from the Federal Government and humanitarian agencies towards the 
green famine? 
8. Was it timely and adequate? If not, please explain 
9. What additional resources would you need to establish a well-coordinated and proactive early 
warning system in the region and districts? 
 
FEDERAL LEVEL KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
 
Food insecurity, hunger and famine  
1. What is your understanding of Hunger? 
2. What is your understanding of famine? 
3. When do you categorize and label a food crisis as a famine? Please elaborate in detail 
4. Can you recall the times that Ethiopia experienced a famine in the past 15 years? 
5. What do you recall about the food crisis that affected Ethiopia in general and the Southern 
part of Ethiopia in particular in 2007/08? 
6. What do you know about the term green famine in SNNPR? Can you elaborate? 
7. Would you name this a famine? If not, why? 
8. Is it the first time this part of the country has experienced a famine of that magnitude after 
1984? 
9. Have there been other times a green famine happened after 2007/08? 
10. If yes, when was it? 
11. What do you think the underlying causes of green famine are? 
12. Do you think a drought is responsible for it or there were other factors? 
13. Please explain 
14. What do you think of the trigger factors of green famine are? 
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15. Were there any deaths during the green famine? 
16. If yes, do you have a report on sex, Age and causes of the death and can you share it?  
17. Has it been reported to the UN and donor countries for an intervention? 
18. If yes, did you receiver adequate and timely response? 
19. What is your opinion about the ongoing food security responses (PSNP, OFSP and VRP) in 
addressing the food crisis in this part of the country? Please elaborate in detail 
20. In your opinion, is it conceivable to have such a magnitude of food crisis in the future in 
Ethiopia in general and the Southern Ethiopia highlands in particular? 
21. If yes, what are the reasons and gaps? If not, why not? 
 
Food aid 
1. Gather information on the quantities and distribution of food aid (through the Government, 
NGOs and WFP) by year for the last 10 years. 
2. In the year xxx, why there was a large increase in food aid?  
3. What are the reasons and what caused the crisis? 
4. Was the response of food aid for the crisis adequate and timely? If not, please explain and 
what was the gap? 
5. In the year xxx, why the food aid need was very small compared to other years? Please 
elaborate the reasons? 
 
Early warning system and green famine 
1. Can you explain the structure of the early warning system and how it functions? 
2. What early warning information is collected from the regional, Woreda and kebele levels to 
detect the impending crisis? 
3. Who collects the early warning information? 
4. Do the formal early warning systems include the informal community response mechanisms? 
5. How often do you receive early warning information from the regional level? 
6. What do you do with the information you have received from the regions? 
7. Is the information livelihood based? 
8. If the early warning information system was in place, why did it fail to capture the crisis of 
green famine on time? 
9. What are the gaps in early warning information system? 
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Food security policies and their effectiveness 
1. What are the current food security and rural development policies in Ethiopia? 
2. What is the role of the agricultural extension system in supporting the food security efforts? 
3. What packages are available for households and what is the rational of focusing on these 
packages? 
4. In your opinion, are these packages specific and tailored to the diverse livelihood system of 
Ethiopia? If not, why? 
5. What are the opportunities and challenges of the agriculture sector in ensuring the food 
security in Ethiopia? 
6. What are the impacts of the PSNP in the livelihoods of people? 
7. Looking back the last five years, do you think the PSNP has achieved its objectives? 
8. If not, what challenges were faced and what measures are planned to be undertaken to 
improve this for next phase?  
9. Do you think the livelihoods in the southern Ethiopia highlands particularly in enset farming 
system are becoming more or less vulnerable to hunger and periodic famines, or is there no 
change over time? 
10. If vulnerability is changing, why and what are the contributing factors to the livelihoods 
vulnerability? 
 
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW WITH ACADEMIA AT THE ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY, FORUM FOR 
SOCIAL STUDIES, HAWASSA UNIVERSITY AND OTHER FAMINE AND POLICY EXPERTS 
 
Sources of livelihood vulnerability in enset farming systems in Southern Ethiopia  
1. Do you think the livelihoods in the Southern Ethiopia highlands particularly in enset farming 
system are becoming more or less vulnerable to hunger and periodic famines, or is there no 
change over time?  
2. If vulnerability is changing, why and what are the contributing factors to the livelihoods 
vulnerability? 
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Food security policies and their effectiveness 
1. What do you think about the current rural development and food security policies and 
strategies of Ethiopia in addressing food insecurity? 
2. Do you think the current food security policies (extension package, PSNP, resettlement) are 
adequately addressing vulnerability and food insecurity in Ethiopia? 
3. If not, please elaborate 
4. Do you think the current agricultural extension service program that comprises various 
packages has at all contributed to ensuring household food security? 
5. If not, please elaborate 
6. What are the opportunities and challenges of the agriculture sector in ensuring the food 
security in Ethiopia? 
7. What do you think is the role of the PSNP and OFSP in addressing livelihood vulnerability? 
8. What are the visible impacts of the PSNP and OFSP in minimizing livelihood vulnerability? 
9. What more should be done to address the current and emerging food crisis in SNNPR? 
 
Food insecurity, hunger and Green famine 
1. What is your understanding of hunger? 
2. What is your understanding of famine? 
3. When do you categorize and label a food crisis to famine? Please elaborate in detail 
4. Can you recall the times that Ethiopia experienced famine in the past 15 years? 
5. What do you recall about the food crisis that affected Ethiopia in general and the Southern 
part of Ethiopia in particular in 2003 and later in 2007 and 2008? 
6. What do you know about the term a green famine in SNNPR? Can you elaborate? 
7. When and from where did you hear about it?  
8. If you have heard, what do you think are the underlying causes of a green famine? 
9. What do you think trigger factors of a green famine? 
10. What are the difference and similarities between the 1984 and the green famine? 
11. Would you name the latter a famine? If not, why? 
12. Have you heard any reports that indicate deaths related to green famine? 
13. If yes, can you recall the numbers? 
14. In your opinion, is it conceivable to have such a food crisis in the future in this region? 
15. If yes, why If not, why not?  
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16. What should be done to avert such type of food crises and famine in the future? 
 
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW WITH THE DONOR GROUP AND INGO REPRESENTATIVES 
1. In what development support are you involved in Ethiopia? 
2. Do you think the livelihoods in the Southern Ethiopia highlands particularly in enset farming 
system are becoming more or less vulnerable to hunger and periodic famines, or is there no 
change over time?  
3. If vulnerability is changing, why and what are the contributing factors to the livelihoods 
vulnerability? 
 
Food security policies and their effectiveness 
1. Do you think the current food security policies (AESP, PSNP, OFSP) adequately address 
vulnerability and food insecurity in Ethiopia in general and Southern highlands in particular? 
2. If not, please elaborate 
3. What are the opportunities and challenges of the agriculture sector in ensuring the food 
security in Ethiopia? 
4. What do you think is the role of the PSNP in addressing livelihood vulnerability? 
5. What are the main challenges faced by the PSNP implementation? 
6. What more should be done to address the food crisis in SNNPR and other regions? 
 
Food insecurity, hunger and Green famine 
1. What is your understanding of hunger? 
2. What is your understanding of famine? 
3. When do you categorize and label a food crisis to famine? Please elaborate in detail 
4. Can you recall the times that Ethiopia experienced famine in the past 15 years? 
5. What do you recall about the food crisis that affected Ethiopia in general and the Southern 
part of Ethiopia in particular in 2007/08? 
6. Have you heard about green famine? If yes, when and from where did you hear about it? 
7. Would you name it a famine? If not, why? 
8. What do you think of underlying causes of a green famine are? 
9. What do you think trigger factors of a green famine? 
10. Have you heard any reports that indicate deaths related to green famine? 
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11. If yes, can you recall the numbers? 
12. In your opinion, is it conceivable to have such a food crisis in the future in this region? 
13. If yes, why If not, why not?  
14. What should be done to avert such type of food crises and famine in the future? 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CASE HOUSEHOLDS 
 
Households Profile for the in-depth case study includes: 
 Households who have benefited from the ongoing food security interventions and graduated 
from the PSNP 
 Households who have successfully overcome shocks and have built resilient livelihood system 
 Households who have been settled in other parts of the country for long times but have 
returned to their original place after the introduction of ethnic federalism 
 Migrant households who normally spend some times of the year in far places in seeking 
seasonal jobs 
 Households who have a family member migrated to South Africa or other countries and 
benefiting through the remittance 
 Cereal based farming households and enset based farming households 
 Households  that  are  traditionally  considered  as  “low  caste”  (such  as fuuga and others) 
 Households that were severely affected by the green famine in 2007/08 
 Households that were not affected by the green famine in 2007/08 
Household profile 
 
Household status (PSNP beneficiary, non-
beneficiary,  returnee….) 
Date of interview: Start time: 
End time: Name of head of HH: Sex: 
Marital status:  # of HH members (# of people 
living under one roof): 
Education level:  
# of HH participants during the interview 
M____________F____/ 
District:  Kebele/Village: 
Primary livelihood activities: Supporting livelihood 
activities: 
Others… 
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Age structure of the household 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Land size 
1. How many timad of land does your household own? ____________________ 
2. How many timad of land does your household rent –in from someone else for your own 
production?  
3. How many timad of land does your household rent-out to someone? 
4. How many timad of land does your household given-out to your son/close relatives during the 
last five years? 
5. How many timad of  land  does  your  household  sharecrop  on  someone’s  land? 
6. How many timad of land does your household sharecropped-out to someone? 
7. Has there been a change in total land size between before green famine and now? 
8. If increasing/decreasing please explain the reasons in details 
Land use pattern 
1. What is the most valuable crop in your farm currently and before green famine and why?  
2. Compare with reference year, would you say that the total production of your: 
Type of crop Area coverage in timad Increasing Decreasing Staying the same Why 
Cereals      
Perennial crops (Coffee 
and fruit trees)  
     
Enset (false banana)      
Vegetables      
Eucalyptus      
Pasture      
Spices      
Others      
 
Age Group Male Female Total Occupation 
0-5     
6-15     
16-25     
25-45     
46-60     
≥65     
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Livestock ownership 
1. How many livestock do you possess? Please indicate the total number of each livestock type 
currently owned (today), during reference year, during the green famine time, pre-green 
famine) by the household. 
Type of livestock  Currently Xxxx(reference 
year 
2007/08 Before 2007/08 
Oxen     
Cow     
Bull     
Heifer     
Calves     
Shoats     
Horse     
Mule     
Donkey     
Chickens     
Others     
 
2. What are the reasons for change in number of livestock owned? 
 
Sources of food 
1. What are the various food sources your household relies on? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. In  the  last  year,  what  percentage  (%)  of  your  household’s  diet  comes  from  the  following  
sources? (NB: Use beans for proportional piling).  
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Vulnerability and resilience 
1. What are the main sources of vulnerability for your livelihood currently? Please rank the three 
main shocks affecting your livelihood?  
2. How does the trend of these shocks look like? 
3. Increasing, decreasing, no change?  
4. Please also explain if these shocks are policy related, economic or natural 
 
Labor, Seasonal migration and Household food Security  
1. What off-farm employment opportunities do exist in this area? 
2. When (season) do you go out in seeking off-farm job opportunities? 
3. Where do you go to find casual work? 
4. Have you ever gone far places (government plantations, private farms in other regions) in 
seeking casual work? 
5. If yes, where and when? And for how long? 
6. Can you explain the contribution of such movements for your household food security? 
7. Have there been any changes in out-migration during the off-season to state plantations or 
others parts of the country in the last 10 years? 
8. If yes, what has changed and how have these changes affected your food security situation? 
9. Are you still going other places in looking for off-farm jobs? 
Food Source Contribution to HH Diet (%) 
Own crop  (cereals,  Irish  potato,  sweet  potato….  ) % 
Own crop (enset and enset products) % 
Animal products % 
Food purchased from market  % 
Labor exchange (Paid in food and cash) % 
Wild food gathered % 
Gift / family support (Do not have to pay back) % 
Food loan (Must pay back) % 
PSNP transfer % 
Other (please specify) % 
Total (must add up to 100%) 100% 
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10. If yes, where? If not, why did you stop? 
11. What  is  the  impact  of  the  introduction  of  ‘ethnic  regionalism’  on  your  mobility? 
12. What is your opinion on the migration of youth to South Africa and other places?  
13. Do you have a family member who has migrated to South Africa or other places abroad and if 
yes, can you explain about the migration process and its benefits or negative impacts on your 
livelihood condition.  
 
Green famine 
1. What is hunger? What is the local name for hunger? 
2. What is famine? What is the local name for famine? 
3. When did you /your family experience famine for the first time? Please explain 
4. What do you recall about the food crisis that affected this community in 2007/08?  
5. Could you say it was a famine? If yes why and if not why not? 
6. What do you understand under the term green famine? 
7. What are the characteristics of green famine? 
8. What are the similarities and differences between famine of 1984 (ye seba sebat dirq) and 
green famine? 
9. What do you think are the underlying causes of green famine? 
10. Do you think drought is the main cause of the green famine? If yes, please explain.  
11. How did you survive during the green famine period? 
12. What is the difference between the coping strategies you adopted during the green famine 
time and other years? Please list the types of coping strategies separately.  
13. What are the factors contributed to the change of the coping strategies over times? 
14. What was the overall impact of green famine on your livelihood system? 
15. Was anyone from your household admitted to the emergency feeding center? 
16. If yes, what support did he/she receive? 
17. Were there any deaths among household members during the green famine? 
18. If yes, please ask and note the following: 
 Sex of the person 
 Age at time of death 
 Cause of death 
19. Has it been reported to the Kebele/Woreda level Government offices? 
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20. Did you receive any support from the Government during the green famine? 
21. If yes, do you think the response was timely and adequate in addressing the crisis you faced? If 
not, please explain 
22. Did you receive any support from INGOs and local organizations? 
23. If yes, was it timely and adequate in addressing the crisis you faced? 
24. If not, please explain the reasons 
25. Do you believe green famine could happen again? If yes why, if not why not? 
 
Government’s  food  security  policy  and  its  effectiveness 
1. What supports did you receive through the regular agricultural extension service? 
2. Do you think chronically food insecure and destitute households are benefiting from the 
agricultural extension package service in this area? 
3. What household package did you receive in the last five years? 
4. Is the extension package is tailored to your needs and livelihood system? 
5. If not, please explain 
6. What is the impact of the extension service program in reducing further food shortage and 
hunger in your family? 
7. Do you think the agricultural extension service contributed to address livelihood shocks? 
8. What role do you think the agricultural extension package program played for your household 
to recover from a green famine effects? 
9. Do you have access to credit services? If yes, in what types of income generating activities you 
or any other member of your households is engaged? 
What are the challenges you face in accessing credit services? 
10. What are the main challenges you face in accessing agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and 
improved seeds? 
11. Currently, are you using/applying commercial fertilizers (DAP and Urea) for your crop 
production? 
12. If yes, are you using the same amount of fertilizer you have used to ten years ago, five years 
ago, and two years ago? 
13. If not, please explain reasons 
14. Are you able to pay back the loans of fertilizers and improved seeds? 
15. If not, what are the reasons for defaulting?  
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16. If you default what would be the consequence? 
17. To improve your household food security and address seasonal hunger is it better to grow 
more food crops or more cash crops? 
18. If food crops, what are the most important food crops you would like to grow and why? 
19. Are these food crops delivered by the agricultural extension service to you? 
20. If cash crops, what are the most important cash crops you would like to grow and why? 
21. Are these food crops delivered by the agricultural extension service to you? 
22. What is your perception about the ongoing food security programs (AESP, PSNP, OFSP) in 
addressing livelihood vulnerability and seasonal hunger? 
 
PSNP specific questions 
1. Are you a Public Work (PW) or Direct Support (DS) beneficiary? 
2. In a normal year, for how many months your household faces food shortages per year? 
3. What is the role of the PSNP in your household food security? 
4. Since you become a PSNP beneficiary, are you still facing food shortages? 
5. If yes, why and for how many months of the year you face? 
6. What are the challenges related to the PNSP transfers? 
7. Are you still renting out your land? If yes, why 
8. Since you become a PSNP beneficiary, are you still doing similar activities to make a living? 
9. If no, what and why it has changed? 
10. Have you received an OFSP package? 
11. Have you used the package to build your household asset? Please elaborate! 
12. Are you still in the PSNP or graduated from the program? 
13. If yes, do you think you have reached a graduation benchmark set by the Government? 
14. If yes, do you think you are in a position to cover the food needs of your households for all 
year round? 
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Appendix 2:  Codes  used  for  participants’  quotes  and  comments 
Administrative 
level/Institution 
 
Location 
 
Methods 
 
Respondent/participant 
Woreda (WO) Kebele (KB) Focus Group 
Discussion/PRA 
exercises (FGD), Key 
informant interview 
(KI), Case Studies (CS) 
 
Kacha-Bira (KB) Ashira (AS) FG Community Elders-Men (CEM) 
 Messafe (MS) FG 
 
Community Elders-Women (CEW) 
  FG 
CS 
Vulnerable Community Group 
(VCG) 
Kadida-Gamela(KG) Aze-Dobo’o  
(AD) 
FG 
CS 
Resilient Community Group (RCG)  
 Teza-Gerba (TG) KI Development Agent (DA) 
Doyo-Gena (DG) Wagebeta (WG) KI Woreda Food Security and Early 
Warning Expert (FSEW) 
 Dinika (DI) KI Woreda Food Security 
Coordinator/adminstrator (FSC) 
Zone (Z) Kambata-
Tembaro (KT) 
KI Zone Food Security and Early 
Warning Expert (FSEW) 
Region (RG) Hawassa (HA) KI Regional Senior Agronomist (ARD) 
   Regional Early Warning and Food 
Security Expert (FSEW) 
   Regional Food Security Coordinator 
(FSC) 
Southern Agricultural 
Research Institute 
(SARI) 
HA KI Regional Agricultural Research 
Institute Director (DG) 
Areka Enset Research 
Center (ARC) 
AR KI Senor Enset Researcher (SARI) 
Hawassa University HA KI Senior Economist and 
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(HU) Development Expert (AC-1) 
 HU KI Senor Researcher on Rural 
Development issues (AC-2) 
 HU KI Senior Rural Development and 
Agricultural Extension Expert (AC-
3) 
Federal (FED) AA KI Federal Food Security and Early 
Warning Team (FSEW) 
 AA KI Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development Team 
   Livelihoods Integration Unit Team 
Addis Ababa University 
(AAU-IDR) 
AA KI Senior Researcher (DT) 
Forum for Social 
Studies (FSS)  
AA KI Senior Researcher (DR) 
UN agencies (UN) 
FAO (UNFAO) 
HA KI Food security and livelihood expert 
(FSE) 
 AA KI Food security and Livelihood expert 
(FSE) 
WFP (UNWFP) HA KI Food security and livelihood expert 
and program Coordinator at 
regional sub-office (WFP) 
OCHA (UNOCHA) AA KI Program Coordinator (OCHA) 
International 
consultant  
UK/Ln KI Senior livelihood and food security 
expert who worked for more than 
two decades  
Senior Food Security 
and Famine expert  
AA KI Former UNOCHA emergency 
coordinator and livelihood expert 
currently (FSE) 
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The quotes are used in texts as follows: 
 
A direct quote from the Community Elders–Men focus group discussion/PRA exercise from Kacha-
Bira Woreda, Ashira Kebele on 27 January 2011 is indicated as (FG_KB/AS-CEM/27/1/2011). 
 
A direct quote from the Community Elders–Women focus group discussion/PRA exercise from 
Kadida-Gamela Woreda Aze-Dobo’o  Kebele on 25 February 2011 is indicated as (FG_KG/AD-
CEW/25/02/2011). 
 
A direct quote from key informant interview with the Food Security and Early Warning expert from 
Kacha-Bira district on 5 January 2011 is referenced as (KI_KB/WO-FSEW/05/01/2001). 
 
A direct quote from Key informant interview with the senior economist and researcher at Hawassa 
University on 5 May 2011 is referenced as (KI-HA/HU-AC-1/05/05/2011). 
 
A direct quote from key informant interview with an international consultant who worked more 
than two decades in Ethiopia who is currently based in London, UK, on 25 November 2011 is 
referenced as (KI_UK/Ln-25/11/2011). 
 
The quotes from the development agents (DAs) do not follow similar tagging format to the above 
system. In the case of direct quotes from the DAs, the specific kebeles are not indicated in the text 
and referred as study area (SA). For instance a key informant with the DA in one of the study 
kebeles on 15 March 2011 referenced as (KI_SA/KEB-DA/15/03/2011). 
 
 
